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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 2087882300

A.M.
P.M.
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DEC 02 2010
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
)
Petitioner
)
),
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
________~R=e=sp~o=n=de=n~t___________)

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S FILING
MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached documents in the abovestyled matter: Subpoena and Affidavit of Service for Officer Ross Kirtley; Subpoena and
Affidavit of Service for Julia Dupuis; Subpoena and Affidavit of Service Conseula
Cedeno; Subpoena and Affidavit of Service Jane Lopez.

EY AT LAW

STOPHER P. SIMMS
C
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December 2010, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM was delivered to
the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica
Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010;
The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number
208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US

Mail

- - - Hand

Deliver

_ _/_Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM

2
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11129/2010

SARAH M JOHNSON
-VSSTATE OF IDAHO
BLAINE COUNTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

CV20060324

SHERIFF'S RETURN ON SUBPOENA - SHERIFF'S# 1015063
RECEIVED BY SHERIFF ON 11/17/2010
I CERTIFY THAT I SERVED A COpy OF THE SUBPOENA TO
OFFICER ROSS KIRTLEY
ON 11124/2010 @ 11 :20 HRS,
ROSS KIRTLEY
700 W JEFFERSON STREET #228
BOISE, ID 83720
I RETURN THE SERVED SUBPOENA AND ASSESS MY FEES OF: $55.00 PAID
BY ADVANCE FEES.
GAF-Y RANEY, SHERIFF

AD~Cf Y'.~

B#" ;,. ,

LLY ADAMS 4485

CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS-ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 1861
HAILEY,
10 83333
1/4254/ 44\tvs

l

ADA COUNTY SHERlFF'S OFFICE
CIVIL SECTION
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
-VSSTATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
BLAINE COUNTY -FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT CASE NO:
CV20060324
SHERIFF'S CASE NO 1015063

SERVE TO:
ADDRESS:
I,

Officer Ross Kirtley
700 W JEFFERSON STREET #228 BOISE, ID 83720

_----'r:;'--~__'_\l-'4-_~--'-'
_~S"--___,CERTIFY THAT I PERSONALLY
--=-.:;.-

(DEPUTY'SPRINTED NAME)

SERVED A COpy OF THE
• SUBPOENA
TO:

-::-::--~__0-=b-==~ ~_.,_VC_\-.:-\__
___'_\

-t--____- -__

(NAME OF INDIVIDUAL RECEI ING DOCUMENTS)
AT:

(Q 0 lJu

:-:s- -e

(ADDRESS)
ON:

II [ .-z..
(DATE)

'*"1 L0

AT:

C

~. ~22~ ~ (~

_-----Lrt_7~
___
(TIME)

_-1:--'-1<--,-\_4l...-Q--=-.,~~-=--__"~=_____ _ _ ADA#:
(SIGNATURE)

).

~

_m_S_

ORIGINAUl/3l,

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

__________R~es~p=o=nd~e=n=t,~__________)
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: OFFICER ROSS KIRTLEY
700 W. Jefferson Street, #228
Boise, Idaho 83720
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this

SUBPOENA

I -) day of November, 2010.

(tt<SQ

SUBPOENA

11/30/2010

SARAH M JOHNSON
-VSSTATE OF IDAHO
BLAINE COUNTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

CV20060324

SHERIFF'S RETURN ON SUBPOENA - SHERIFF'S# 1015457
RECEIVED BY SHERIFF ON 11/24/2010
I CERTIFY THAT I SERVED A COpy OF THE SUBPOENA TO
JULIA DUPUIS
ON 11130/2010 @ 12:39 HRS,
JULIA DUPUIS
4522 W BEACON LIGHT
EAGLE, ID 83616
I RETURN THE SERVED SUBPOENA AND ASSESS MY FEES OF: $55.00 PAID
BY ADVANCE FEES.

GARY RA~Y' SHERIFF
ADA CO TY, IDAH
BY

.-'A.<"

L",) J:;tlV

DEPUTY LEANN WALTON 4196

CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS-ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 1861 STE 303
HAILEY,
ID 83333
1/4254/4196

\lttJt;;

ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
CIVIL SECTION
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
-VSSTATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
BLAINE COUNTY -FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT CASE NO:
CV20060324
SHERIFF'S CASE NO 1015457
SERVE TO:
ADDRESS:

I,

Julia Dupuis
4522 W BEACON LIGHT ROAD EAGLE, ID 83616

_......!L:::..=.."e.....,a.""""'--'Y"\'-L!.(""..~_\N-"-'tL!4.,.""""-'\_k~'--'--""--_" CERTIFY THAT I PERSONALLY
(DEPUTY'S PRINTED NAME)

SERVED A COpy OF THE
• SUBPOENA

TO:

;:ru,\)

C&

~u. \..5

(NAME OF INDIVIDUAL
AT:

CEIVING DOCUMENTS)

LJs a?. \N. B-e~ L~\v+ t~lQ.

(ADDRESS)
ON:

II

130 1'0

~DA1E)

AT:

1dc3Cf
(TIME)

~ (.;J~

ADA#:

4\%

(SIGNATURE)

ORIGINAL
\\t"5~
fA

•

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

_

f

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

________~R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~__________)
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Julia Dupuis
1-166 RivCI vicl"C Dtive
Dclle~e, leah\"} 83313
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this

\

~

day of November, 2010.
ACSO CIIJIL '10N01J24PM 2:18

SUBPOENA

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

BY:_-1~~~~~~~\

Deputy Clerk

SUBPOENA

AMERICAN EAGLE INC., BAIL BONDS
Rick Filkins, President

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON
vs
STATE OF IDAHO
Blaine County, Fifth Judicial District
Case No. CV-2006-0324

SERVED TO: Consuela Cedeno a.k.a Maria Cedeno
820 Silverstar Drive, Hailey Idaho 83333
ADDRESS:
DATE:
December 1,2010 at 9:08 p.m.

I, Rick Filkins, certify that I personally served the above named individual at the above location
on the above date and time, with the following document(s):

4.

Subpoena for Consuela Cedeno

Rick Filkins
Dated this 2 nd day of December, 2010

-~,-.~~~
...

,

\~

..

'"t"

\'

~~-.-.-"~~-'--"'-

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

)
)
vs.
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
__________R~es~p~o~n~de=n=t,L___________)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Consuelo Cedeno
Physical Address Unknown
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you maybe held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this

SUBPOENA

\s

day of November, 2010.

.

"... .,.-

.-._-

CLERK OF THE

ISTRI~;:9URT

cct~TY~rr

By:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--I-~__+_.
Deputy Clerk

SUBPOENA

.AMERICAN EAGLE INC., BAIL BONDS
Rick Filkins, President

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON
vs
STATE OF IDAHO
Blaine County, Fifth Judicial District
Case No. CV-2006-0324

SERVED TO: Jane Lopez
820 Silverstar Drive, Hailey Idaho 83333
ADDRESS:
DATE:
December 1,2010 at 9:08 p.m.

I, Rick Filkins, certify that I personally served the above named individual at the above location
on the above date and time, with the following document(s):
•

Subpoena for Jane Lopez

Rick Filkins
Dated this 2nd day of December, 2010

ISSUED
DATE_ I I -

I)"

~-

(.b----._ . :'~~.~)
:..:...'"'"

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 2087882300

.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

__________R~es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~__________)
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Jane Lopez
Physical Address Unknown
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this

SUBPOENA

(S

day of November, 2010.

l~~

SUBPOENA

2

\
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FI LED ~. ~. \1/\' ,
DEC - 3 2010
Jolynn Drage,
District
Goult Blaine Cal ty, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
Case No. CV 2006-0324
)
)
) MEMORANDUM DECISION
) GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
) MOTION FOR

STATE OF IDAHO,
ResEondent.

) RECONSIDERATION
)
)

THIS MATTER is before the court on the respondent, State of Idaho's
Motion for Reconsideration. The court heard oral argument on the motion on
November 8, 2010. The petitioner was not present, but she was represented by
her counsel, Christopher P. Simms. The respondent was represented by Jessica
M. Lorello.

The court took the matter under advisement subsequent to the

hearing. The record was supplemented with the Affidavit of Jason Pintler,
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

Direct Appeal Co-Counsel. Based upon that affidavit, and the standard of proof
required of the petitioner, the court hereby GRANTS the respondent's motion for
reconsideration as to the petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.
The claim will be dismissed.
ANALYSIS

The respondent, State of Idaho (hereinafter referred to as the "State")
seeks reconsideration of this court's prior ruling precluding summary disposition
on the petitioner, Sarah M. Johnson's (hereinafter Johnson) claim that her
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that there was insufficient
evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction.
After this court's prior ruling, the court was provided with new evidence,
in the form of an affidavit from Jason Pintler, one of Johnson's appellate lawyers.
The court has considered the entirety of Mr. Pintler's affidavit, and determines
that no genuine issue of material fact remains that, if resolved in Johnson's favor,
would entitle her to any requested relief.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural
equivalent of summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56. "A claim for post-conviction
relief will be subject to summary dismissal ... if the applicant has not presented
evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho
599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (quoting Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960
P.2d 738,739 (1998»). Thus, summary dismissal is permissible when the
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved
in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such
a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. State v.

Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho
269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002).
However, "while the underlying facts must be regarded as true, the
petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,
250,220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009)(quoting Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700
P.2d 27, 29 (1985»; see also Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct.
App. 2008). As this court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in this case,
summary dismissal is appropriate where the evidentiary facts are not disputed,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for
this court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483; Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195
P.3d at 714. Thus, this court is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
Johnson but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn
from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3

The most probable inferences regarding appellate counsel'sl performance
are set forth in paragraphs 5 through 18 of Mr. Pintler's affidavit, and the court
will not repeat them here. Those paragraphs substantiate that, notwithstanding
the lack of a "live witness" to assess credibility, there is no genuine issue of fact
necessitating an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Johnson must
show that her attorney's performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced
by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v.

State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a
deficiency, Johnson has the burden of showing that her attorney's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). These standards are equally applicable to claims
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985);

Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). To establish
prejudice, the applicant must show a "reasonable probability that, but for the
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the [appeal] would have been
different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Johnson must also
overcome the" strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the

I The court recognizes that Johnson had more than one appellate attorney, as referenced in Pintler's
affidavit; however, the court will refer to counsel in the singular in this opinion, based upon the facts
presented by Pintler himself.

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4

wide range of reasonable professional assistance," Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,
406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
As to appellate counsel specifically, such an attorney has no constitutional
obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by a defendant. Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho at 765, 760 P.2d at
1181 (citing Jones, 463 U.s. at 751-754). Beyond that, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal cannot be predicated upon counsel's failure to
raise meritless issues. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,809 n.2, 839 P.2d 1215,
1223 n.2 (1992).
Pintler's affidavit establishes that Johnson's appellate counsel was not
ineffective in any way. As to the first, deficient performance prong of Strickland,
the court finds that Pintler reviewed the appellate record with another attorney,
and that both counsel knew and reasonably applied existing law to the issues at
hand. Therefore, their conduct was not objectively deficient. The record also
establishes that Judge Wood found that the aiding and abetting instruction was
supported by the evidence, even if such evidence was circumstantial. His
determination to give the instruction was a discretionary determination. See

State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 539-40, 37 P.3d 625, 630-31 (Ct. App. 2001). Given
that standard of review, appellate counsel's rejection of this issue on appeal was
not deficient.
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The record also establishes that the second, prejudice prong of Strickland
cannot be met because even if the issue regarding the aiding and abetting
instruction had been raised on appeal, there has been no showing that the result
would have been different. This court concludes that the appellate court would
not have found an abuse of discretion in giving the instruction, based upon the
record as it now exits. Accordingly, there is no prejudice to Johnson in the
approach taken by her appellate lawyers.
Johnson's proffered authority for the lack of evidence to support the
aiding and abetting instruction is likewise misplaced. The law she relies upon -that circumstantial evidence is insufficient if an inference of innocence is possible
-- has been rejected by both the Idaho and the United States Supreme Courts. See

Holland v. U.S., 348 U.s. 121, 138-40 (1954); State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659,
8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000). The legal standard relied upon by Johnson is not
consistent with these legal standards.
Finally, to the extent that Johnson is asserting that this claim was not
based upon strategy, but was instead based upon inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the law, or some other objective basis for evaluating counsel's
performance, Pinter's affidavit puts those issues to rest. The affidavit establishes
that both Pinter and co-counsel researched the relevant legal standards and
thoroughly reviewed the record and ultimately concluded that the sufficiency of
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the evidence claim Johnson contends they should have pursued was without
merit. The record and the law support counsel's assessment as well as Judge
Wood's conclusion that the instruction was appropriate based upon the evidence
presented.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the court hereby dismisses Johnson's
claim asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Judgment for the State
will enter accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

~£-

Dated this _~_ day of Decem

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
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I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the
day of December, 2010, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or
hand-delivered to the following persons:

Mr. Christopher Simms

Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID 83333

Fct~ JD%'7~S?·.)~CO

Ms. Jessica M. Lorello
Deputy Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010.

{ax:

1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S MEMORALNDUM
DISMISSING CLAIM

__________~R=e=sp~o=n=d=e=nt~___________)
COMES

NOW

PETITIONER,

and

files

this,

her

MEMORANDUM

DISMIISSING CLAIM, and in support thereof states as follows:
1.

In paragraph 15.d. of her Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to have admitted into evidence a
ballistics recreation demonstrating the effect of shooting the murder weapon through a
sheet of the type on the bed in the master bedroom of the crime scene.
2.

In fact said Demonstration of Stellate Tearing was admitted into evidence, albeit

with a limiting instruction, as Exhibit 1012. (Trial Transcript page 48l3)
WHEREFORE, for the reason stated above Petitioner withdraws and dismisses
said claim from her Second Amended Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief.

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM DISMISSING CLAIM

R P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

£. day of __tJ_E---"''''---____ 2010, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF was delivered to
the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello;
Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office
of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second
Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G.
Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 833030126.

- - - US

Mail

/~Deliver
_ _ _ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM DISMISSING CLAIM
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Jolynn Drage.
District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)

SARAH M JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-0324

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDERRE:
CAMERAS IN THE
COURTROOM

Pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 45(h), the Court, having considered
the requests of several media outlets under the Rule permitting cameras in the trial
courtroom, hereby MODIFIES permission to broadcast and/or photograph the above
hearing with the following additional restrictions:
1. An informal pretrial media conference will be held on December 7, 2010 at 9:00
a.m. M.S.T. at the Twin Falls County Courthouse in the Conference Room, or
other suitable location, for the purpose of reviewing all relevant matters with
representatives of the news media who desire to provide coverage of the trial
proceedings. It is anticipated that such relevant matters may include:
a. Any objection to coverage that may have been raised;
b. The scope of coverage to be permitted;
c. The nature and extent of the technical equipment and personnel to be
displayed, including location of equipment and personnel and;
d. The restrictions on coverage to be observed.
ORDER RE: CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
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2. Coverage of this trial shan be subject to the continuing supervision of the
presiding trial judge. No coverage shall take place within the courtroom, whether
during recesses or at any other time, when the presiding trial judge is not present
and presiding.
3. No interviews will be allowed inside the courtroom.
4. Notwithstanding the approval of an application for permission to provide
coverage of the trial, the presiding trial judge shall have discretion throughout
such proceeding to revoke such approval or to limit the coverage authorized in
any way. In the exercise of this discretion, the presiding trial judge intends to be
especially sensitive and responsive to the needs and concerns of all parties,
victims. witnesses, and other participants in such proceedings.
5. Pursuant to Idaho Administrative Rule 45(f) and (h)(9), one TV organization will
be selected to provide pooled TV coverage and one still photographer will be
allowed inside the courtroom. It is anticipated that those news entities seeking to
obtain video or stili photographic coverage of the court proceedings will
determine, on their own, which entity will provide pooled TV coverage.
DATED this

61sy of December,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

G. RICHARD BEVAN
District Judge
VIRGINIA BAILEY
Court Reporter
SHARlE COOPER
Deputy Clerk
SARAH JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

December 7, 2010
Date

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

10:00 a.m.
Time

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. CV 06-324

----------------------------------)
Evidentiary Court Trial
9:55 Court reviews file. Christopher Simms with petitioner Sarah Johnson, Jessica
Lorello and Ken Jorgensen for the State ofIdaho. Mr. Simms addresses Court in regards
to the State requesting removal of evidence from Blaine County to Twin Falls County for
this trial. A stipulation was reached between Counsel for the State Jim Thomas and
Appointed Counsel for Sarah Johnson, Keith Roark. Ms. Lorello, moves to exclude
witnesses, Mr. Simms does not object and joins in that motion, Court so orders. Ms
Lorello, moves the Court for reconsider, or alternatively ask for a motion in limine ruling
as to witnesses Michelle Ellison; Allan Dupuis; Glenda Osuna; Luis Ramirez; Becky
Lopez and Carlos Ayala.
9:59 Mr. Simms gives argument.

10:01 Ms. Lorello gives brief follow-up argument.
10:01 Court denies the motion for reconsideration at this time.

COURT MINUTES - 1

10:02 M. Lorello would like clarification to the stipulation to dismiss a count in the

petition.
10:03 Mr. Simms gives comments; claim 15d of the second amended petition as to the

ballistic tests that dealt with the sheets.
10:08 Mr. Simms gives opening statements.

10:21 Ms. Lorello gives opening statement.
10:22 Petitioner's 1st witness, Patrick Dunn called to the stand, sworn and examined by

Mr. Simms.
10:34 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, sustained.
10:40 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation as to witness's knowledge of gang tattoos,

sustained, Mr. Simms will redirect witness.
10:41 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation, overruled.
10:42 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay as to what the Father would say, allowed for the

truth of the matter.
10:43 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, overruled, allowed for the truth of the matter.
10:45 Mr. Simms offers Petitioner's Exhibit 1 (Grand Jury Transcript), obvious

hearsay objection is noted; offered and admitted. The parties have agreed the Court
would consider as evidence the trial transcript, the record and the exhibits in the criminal
case.
10:47 Ms. Lorello stipulates to admitting Petitioner's Exhibits 4,5, 6, 7 and 8. Court

admits Petitioner's Exhibit 4,5,6, 7 and 8.
Petitioner's Exhibit 4 (Johnson Residence Layout)
Petitioner's Exhibit 5 (photo of door way going into the bedroom with weapon and
blood spatter)
Petitioner's Exhibit 6 (photo of trash can at Johnson residence)
Petitioner's Exhibit 7 (photo of rifle scope removed from rifle on guest bed in
Johnson home)
Petitioner's Exhibit 8 (photo of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges)

COURT MINUTES - 2

10:55 Petitioner's Exhibit 13 (transcript of Police interview Consuelo Cedeno and
Jane Lopez), identified.
10:57 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, Mr. Simms gives argument, Court overrules
objection.

10:59 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, overruled.
11:00 Petitioner's Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, to be reviewed by witness.
State objects to Petitioner's Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, hearsay and foundation, Court
relies on previous ruling to hearsay, Counsel must lay foundation.

11:02 Petitioner's Exhibit 13, offered, objection, admitted.
Petitioner's Exhibit 9 (phone records ofConsuelo Cedeno)
Petitioner's Exhibit 10 (phone records of Jane Lopez)
Petitioner's Exhibit 11 (Bruno Santos application for travel document)
Petitioner's Exhibit 40 (Qwest Telephone Records)
11:05 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, Mr. Simms gives argument.
11:06 Ms. Lorello gives further comments. Court overrules objection.
11:07 Mr. Simms continues examination.
11:10 Mr. Simms offers Petitioner's Exhibits 9, to, and 11, Court notes continuing
objection of Ms. Lorello, overruled, admitted.

11:19 Petitioner's Exhibit 34,35 and 36 reviewed by witness.
Petitioner's Exhibit 34 (transcript police interview of Bruno Santos)
11:24 Petitioner's Exhibit 34, offered, same objection, same ruling, admitted.
Petitioner's Exhibit 35 (Sheriff Report from Interview of Bruno Santos)
. Petitioner's Exhibit 36 (transcript of phone call between Nikki Settle and Bruno
Santos)
11:26 Petitioner's Exhibits 35 and 36 offered, objection by Ms. Lorello, Court reviews
rule, overrules objection, admitted.

11:31 Petitioner's Exhibit 37 (report of investigation, summary of interview with
Carlos Ayala)

COURT MINUTES - 3

I Lr/?S

11:34 Petitioner's Exhibit 37, offered, same objection, same ruling, admitted.
11:38 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation, Mr. Simms laid foundation.
11:40 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation, sustained.
11 :43 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay and foundation as to who was speaking, Court
overrules hearsay objection. Mr. Simms laid foundation for who was speaking.

11:46 Objection by Ms. Lorello, reference in petition and hearsay, Court allows
statements.

11:48 Ms. Lorello places concerns to the evidence on the record.
11:52 Petitioner's Exhibit 12, offered, and will be played during Sheriff Femling's
testimony, Court reserves ruling the Sheriff's testimony, objection by Ms. Lorello.

11:53 Petitioner's Exhibit 18 (Lab Report from Cellmark lab), offered, hearsay arid
relevance, goes to cumulative claim Counsel's unpreparedness for trial, Court overrules
hearsay objection. Takes the relevance objection under advisement until after lunch

11:58 Court in recess for the lunch hour.
1:31 Court reconvenes. Mr. Simms gives argument on claim discussed prior to lunch
recess.

1:33 Ms. Lorello gives argument.
1:34 Court overrules objection and allows Petitioner's Exhibit 18 to be admitted.
1:35 Petitioner's Exhibit 40, offered, objection, overruled, admitted.
1:36 Cross-examination by Ms. Lorello.
1 :39 Objection by Mr. Simms to the form ofthe question, overruled.

1:51 Redirect by Mr. Simms.
1:54 Witness stepped dovl'll and was excused.
nd

Petitioner's 2 witness, Mark Rader, called to the stand sworn and examined by Mr.
Simms.

2:48 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello.
2:55 Redirect by Mr. Simms.
2:58 Witness stepped doVl'll and was excused. Court takes a brief recess.

COURT MINUTES - 4

3:16 Court reconvenes.
rd

Petitioner's 3 witness Raul Ornelas called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr.
Simms.

3:33 No cross examination. Witness stepped down and was excused.
Petitioner's 4th witness, Stuart Robinson called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr.
Simms.

3:49 Objection by Ms. Simms argumentative, sustained.
3:50 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello.
3:51 Witness stepped down and was excused.
Petitioner's 5th witness Bob Pangburn called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr.
Simms.

4:35 Cross Examination by Ms. Lorello.
4:45 No redirect examination. Witness stepped down and was excused.
4:50 Court recesses for the evening, will reconvene at 10:00 am in the morning

COURT MINUTES - 5
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Date

SARAH JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

10:00 a.m.
Time

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. CV 06-324

--------------------------------)
Evidentiary Court Trial Day 2
Parties met in chambers at 10:00 am in regards to a witness.
10:13 Court in session. Friday Court will start at 9:00 am.
Mr. Simms offers Petitioner's Exhibit 15 (Disciplinary Order from Supreme Court), offered

as public record and as impeachment for testimony from yesterday of Bob Pangburn, objection
as hearsay, relevance and foundation. Court gives ruling as to hearsay, overruled; as to relevancy
it becomes relevant, overruled; as to the certification, conditionally denies the request to admit;
not admitted. Mr. Simms asks for clarification, if Court is provided, before the end of the trial,
with a certified copy of the exhibit it will be accepted into evidence.
10:17 Mr. Simms addresses Court in regards as to the subpoena that has been served on Julia
Dupuis. Witness is not present at this time. Based on her not appearing Mr. Simms offers into
evidence a written statement by Julia Dupuis.

COURT MINUTES - 1

10:22 Ms. Lorello objects.
10:23 Mr. Simms gives further argument.
10:24 Ms. Lorello gives argument.

Court gives ruling, sustains objection for today, will allow Counsel after the close of evidence on
Friday a chance to do a trial deposition on this witness, since the Court will not take this case
under advisement until sometime next year.
10:26 Mr. Simms has had contact with Blaine County Public Defender in regards to Bruno

Santos. Mr. Simms would like to have a hearing in regards to Bruno Santos' testimony later
today preferably by phone.
10:27 Petitioner's 6th witness Jerry "Walt" Femling called to the stand, sworn and examined by

Mr. Simms.
10:51 Mr. Simms would like to play the video/audio recording of Ross Kirtley's initial response

to the scene.
10:52 Ms. Lorello objects hearsay, Court overrules hearsay objection, allows the recording to be

played. Court reporter waived for the playing of the DVD.
10:53 Petitioner's Exhibit 12 (DVD of video/audio recording by Ross Kirtley's response to
the scene) is offered, admitted and played for the Court.
11:58 Court notes 7:23:23 on the comer ofthe video portion ofthe DVD, takes noon recess.
1:32 Court reconvenes. Chris Simms with Sarah Johnson are present for petitioner, Jessica

Lorello and Ken Jorgensen present for the State. No preliminary matters prior to continuing
playing DVD.
2:25 End of DVD, witness Jerry "Walt" Femling retakes the stand under previous oath and Mr.

Simms continues examination.
2:29 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation as to time, sustained.
2:40 Objection by Ms. Lorello as to time, Court allows answer.
2:41 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello.
2:49 Objection by Mr. Simms, non responsive and hearsay, correct in objection infom1s Ms.

Lorello to ask another question.

COURT MINUTES - 2

2:51 Redirect by Mr. Simms.
2:57 Witness stepped down and was excused. Court takes a brief recess.
3:22 Court reconvenes all parties present. Petitioner's

i h witness Jane Lopez called to the stand,

sworn and examined by Mr. Simms.
3:28 Objection by Ms. Lorello, as to this witnesses knowledge of this document; discussion by

Counsel, Court allows Counsel to proceed with questions.
3:30 Objection by Ms. Lorello, leading, overruled for the nature of the question.
3:31 Objection by Ms. Lorello, leading, overruled. Cross examination by Ms. Lorello. Witness

stepped down and was excused.
3:32 Petitioner's 8th witness Steve Harkins called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr.

Simms.
3:45 Petitioner's Exhibit 34 (transcript of interview of Bruno Santos), reviewed by Mr. Simms.
3:47 Objection by Ms. Lorello, as refreshing witness's recollection, Court allows Mr. Simms to

continue.
3:54 Objection by Ms. Lorello, beyond the scope ofthe petition, argument, overruled.
3:55 Ms. Lorello makes a record, the purpose of the beyond the scope objection is because the

State is not consenting to litigation that is not clearly in the petition.
4:08 Objection by Ms. Lorello, assumes facts not in evidence.
4:15 Objection by Ms. Lorello, not reading the record accurately.
4:18 Objection by Ms. Lorello, misrepresents the testimony, response by Mr. Simms, Court

allows witness to answer question.
4:23 Objection by Ms. Lorello, relevance, sustained.
4:24 Objection by Ms. Lorello, relevance, Mr. Simms response, goes to the intent and

seriousness of law enforcement; Court allows question.
4:34 Recordings ofInterviews of Mel Spiegel and Christopher Hill offered into evidence by Mr.

Simms. Court inquires as to purpose. Mr. Simms lays out basis for offering them.
4:35 Mr. Jorgensen objects. Court allows him to argue as to the legal matter.
4:38 Mr. Simms gives argument.

COURT MfNUTES - 3

4:39 Court gives ruling, overruled objection, admitted solely for the purpose of establishing the

alleged inconsistency and scope of the investigation, the assertions made s to there truth are not
going to be relied on by the Court and will compare the statements as given.
4:40 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello.
4:43 Witness stepped down and was excused.

Court addresses parties in regards to the telephone conference in regards to Bruno Santos'
testimony with Dan Dolan. Dan Dolan will be present at 9:00 or 9:30 am in the morning for the
testimony of Bruno Santos.
4:45 Court in recess for the day.

COURT MrNUTES - 4
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MINUTE ENTRY
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----------------------------------)
Evidentiary Court Trial Day 3
10:19 Court in session. Christopher Simms present with petitioner, Sarah Johnson.
Jessica Lorello and Ken Jorgensen present for the State of Idaho. Court reviews meeting
in chambers with Counsel as well as Dan Dolan Counsel for witness Bruno Santos.
10:20 Mr. Simms would like to take up Petitioner's Exhibits 29 and 30 police interviews
of Mel Spiegle and Christopher Hill, that were offered yesterday and would like to play
them today. Petitioner offers into evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 2 (CD oftranscript of
proceedings of trial), No objection from Ms. Lorello, Court admits. Mr. Simms
additionally offers Petitioner's Exhibit 41 (the record on appeal) State has no objection.
Court admits all exhibits 29,30,2 and 41. Court's intent is to not bring all of the exhibits
here but have them available in Blaine County for the Court to review. The record on
appeal is here and we have access to it here. Counsel does not object to the Court

COURT MINUTES - 1

traveling to Blaine County to review this case, nor communicating with persons from the
prosecutor's or the Court in Blaine County to locate these exhibits and record.
10:23 Petitioner's Exhibit 29 (DVD Interview of Mel Speegle 2/10/2009) previously
admitted, played for the Court. Counsels stipulate to waive Court reporter of exhibit.
10:26 Court is having a hard time hearing the audio. A speaker is placed by a micro
phone to enhance the sound. DVD restarted.
10:39 End of Petitioner's Exhibit 29,
10:40 Petitioner's Exhibit 30 CDVD Interview of Chris Hill 2/12/2009) previously
admitted, played for the Court. Counsels stipulate to waive Court reporter of exhibit.
10:52 End of Petitioner's Exhibit 30.
10:53 Petitioner's 9th Witness Consuelo Cedeno called to the stand, sworn and examined
by Mr. Simms. Interpreter Mary Jo Palma present to interpret and under previous signed
oath with the Court.
10:58 Objection by Ms. Lorello, beyond the scope, Court overrules objection, allows
questioning.
11:02 Objection by Ms. Lorello, asked and answered, Court allows question to be
answered yet again, overruled.
11:07 Objection by Ms. Lorello, beyond the scope as to what is alleged in the petition,
Court allows question, overruled.
11:10 Petitioner's Exhibit 13 is handed to witness directed to page 3026.
11:10 Object to the characterization of what he is reading as testimony by Ms. Lorello.
Mr. Simms apologizes for the mischaracterization.
11:15 No cross examination. Witness stepped down and was excused.
Petitioner's 10th witness Bruno Santos called to the stand, present with Attorney Dan
Dolan, and Interpreter Mary Jo Palma, sworn. Attorney for Bruno Santos may remain
next to Bruno Santos on the witness stand during his testimony. Court instructs witness to
listen to the whole question interpreted before answering. Court also reminds the witness
he has a Fifth Amendment right.

COURT MINUTES - 2

11:20 Direct examination by Mr. Simms. Fifth Amendment right invoked.
11:22 Objection by Mr. Dolan, argument by Counsel. Court sustains. Mr. Simms strikes

the testimony of Bruno Santos in the criminal trial. Ms. Lorello gives argument as to
relevance.
11:27 Court sustains the objection.

Mr. Simms continues with direct examination. Fifth Amendment right invoked. Mr.
Dolan argued. Objection is sustained.
11:29 Mr. Simms continued with direct examination.
11:33 Fifth Amendment right invoked. Objection is sustained.
11:34 Ms. Lorello gave argument that Fifth Amendment rights were discussed and

argued in chambers. Mr. Simms gives argument on Mr. Santos' gang affiliation.
11:35 Mr. Dolan argued on the gang affiliation question. Objection is sustained.
11:36 Ms. Lorello objected as to 404(b) evidence. Court overrules a 404(b) objection.
11:37 Fifth Amendment right invoker, Court sustains. Fifth Amendment objection, Court

overrules.
11:38 Objection by Mr. Dolan, different question from the previous question. Court asks

Mr. Simms to rephrase.
11:39 Mr. Simms continues with examination. Fifth amendment right invoked.

Objection is sustained.
11:40 Mr. Simms continues with examination. Fifth amendment right invoked.

Objection is overruled.
11:42 Objection by Mr. Dolan, Court sustains. Mr. Simms has no further questions for

this witness given the Fifth Amendment rights.
11:43 No cross examination from the state.

11 :43 Witness stepped down and is excused.
11:44 Petitioner's 11 th witness, Maria Eguren, was called the stand. Ms. Eguren was

duly sworn and examined by Mr. Simms.
11:56 Court is in recess and will reconvene at 1:30 pm.

COURT MfNUTES - 3

1 :33 Court reconvenes. Maria Eguren returns to the stand under previous oath.
1 :45 Petitioner's Exhibit 32 (Document -ISP chain of custody), offered, objection,

need foundation laid. Offered only for the chain of custody (left side of document),
admitted for that purpose.
1:59 Cross examination by Mr. Jorgensen.
2:00 State's Exhibit 1002 (Screen print from AFIS system), offered, no objection,

admitted.
2:03 Redirect by Mr. Simms.
2:05 Witness stepped down and was excused.

Petitioner's lih witness, Robert J. Kerchusky called to the stand, sworn and examined by

Mr. Simms.
2:08 Petitioner's Exhibit 38 (Resume of Robert Kerchusky), State stipulates to

admittance of Petitioner's Exhibit 38, offered and admitted.
2:47 Petitioner's Exhibit 39 (latent fingerprint cards), offered, objection hearsay,

argument, admitted, reserves as to facts asserted in document.
3:03 Court takes a brief recess.
3:20 Court reconvenes, Mr. Robert Kerchusky returns to the stand under previous oath

and Mr. Simms continues examination.
3:35 Mr. Simms approaches witness with Petitioners Exhibits 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,

26,27,28. Court approves.
Petitioner's Exhibit 19, objection by Mr. Jorgensen, sustained. (Blaine County Police
Report), offered, admitted subject to prior ruling.
Petitioner's Exhibit 20 (ISP Forensic Report)
Petitioner's Exhibit 21 (ISP Forensic Report)
Petitioner's Exhibit 22 (Blaine County Sheriff Report)
Petitioner's Exhibit 23 (ISP Forensic Report)
Petitioner's Exhibit 24 (Blaine County Sheriff Report Hill ID)
Petitioner's Exhibit 25 (ISP Forensic Report)

COURT MINUTES - 4

Petitioner's Exhibit 26 (ISP Forensic Report)
Petitioner's Exhibits 20 through 26 offered, same objection same ruling admitted in
a limited way.
3:56 Cross Examination by Mr. Jorgensen.
3:59 Document created by Mr. Kerchusky shown to witness and a portion read by

witness.
4:08 Objection by Mr. Simms, Counsel interrupts before response is completed.
4:09 Court reporter reads back question.

4: 17 Redirect by Mr. Simms.
4:19 Witness stepped down and is subject to recall.
4:21 Court takes a brief recess.
4:32 Court reconvenes. Petitioner rests at this time.
4:33 State's 1st witness Tina Walthall called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr.

Jorgensen.
5:07 Cross examination by Mr. Simms.
5:29 Redirect examination by Mr. Jorgensen.
5:34 Witness stepped down and was excused. Mr. Simms would like to recross. Court

does not allow recross. Court in recess for the night, 9:00 am start in the morning.

COURT MINUTES - 5
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Time

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. CV 06-324

Evidentiary Court Trial Day 4
9:02 Court reconvenes for the fInal day of trial. Christopher Simms present with
petitioner Sarah Johnson. Ken Jorgensen and Jessica Lorello present for the State of
Idaho.
State's 2 nd witness Mel Speegle called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr.
Jorgensen.
9:09 Cross examination by Mr. Simms.
9:13 Mr. Jorgensen inquires ifthere was a question before the witness or ifMr. Simms
was just reading the transcript. If Mr. Simms was just reading transcript Mr. Jorgensen
moves to strike the reading. Mr. Simms asks a question ofthe witness.
9:23 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, extremely vague question not sure what contradictions
we are going to hear. Court instructs Mr. Simms to rephrase question.

COURT MINUTES - 1

9:24 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, does not accurately characterize what we say in the

interview with Detective Harkins. Court overruled.
9:25 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, what things are we taking about, overruled.
9:27 Redirect Examination by Mr. Jorgensen.
9:28 Witness stepped down and was excused.
9:29 State's 3 rd witness Christopher Kevin Hill called to the stand sworn and examined

by Mr. Jorgensen.
9:34 Objection by Mr. Simms, leading, sustained.
9:35 State's Exhibit 123 (rifle scope) from the original criminal trial handed to

witness.
9:36 Objection by Mr. Simms, speculation, Court instructs witness to answer if he can

without speculating.
9:37 Objection by Mr. Simms, speculation as to what he would have done as opposed to

doing, sustained
Objection by Mr. Simms, overruled.
9:38 Cross examination by Mr. Simms.

Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, line of this question, sustained.
9:40 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, as to the characterization of what he was doing on the

BLM land, overruled.
9:41 No redirect, witness stepped down and was excused.

State rests at this time. No rebuttal from the Petitioner.
9:42 Court addresses Counsel in regards to time frame to take case under advisement.

Mr. Jorgesen instructed to retrieve State's Exhibit 123 and send back to Blaine County
for safe keeping.
Court reporter will have transcript completed by the first of January. Counsel will file by
5 :00 pm on January 31, 2011 all findings of fact and briefing in Blaine County and copy
to Twin Falls a Judge's copy; also to be submitted electronically to Justin Call law clerk.
Simultaneous rebuttal closings and all final documents will be filed by 5 :00 pm on

COURT MrNUTES - 2

February 11,2011 in Blaine County with a Judge's copy to Twin Falls also to be
submitted electronically to Justin Call law clerk. Case will possibly go under advisement
the first part of March.
Housekeeping matters discussed. Mr. Simms has one document that needs a certification
before submitting to the Court for consideration. Mr. Simms will not be taking the trial
deposition of the witness. Petitioner's Exhibit 12 admitted.
9:48 Mr. Simms gives closing argument.
9:57 Ms. Lorello gives closing argument.
9:58 Court thanks Counsel, in recess for this case.

COURT MINUTES - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Case No: CV-2006-324

)

MOTION FOR ORDER
TO PREP ARE TRANSCRIPT
OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
HEARING AT COUNTY COST

)
)
)
)
)

I.C. 19 - 4904

__________~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t=,____________)
COMES NOW PETITIONER, through counsel, and moves this Court to order
preparation of a transcript of the Post-Conviction Relief Hearing herein, at county cost,
and in support thereof states:
1.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Pocatello Women's Correctional

Facility, serving two life without the possibility of parole plus fifteen years sentences.
2.

Upon application for Post-Conviction Relief, counsel was appointed to represent

Petitioner pursuant to the Blaine County Public Defender Contract, upon a finding that
Petitioner is indigent.
3.

The Post-Conviction Relief hearing took place on December 7, 2010 - December

10, 2010, before the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, District Court Judge, in Twin Falls
County.
4.

Post hearing briefs are to be submitted to the Court based on testimony produced

at the Post-Conviction Relief Hearing, on or before January 30, 2011 ..
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT
COUNTY COST

1

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this Court enter an Order directing the
preparation of the transcript for Post-Conviction Relief Hearing, at the Court Reporter's
earliest convenience.

) z . /3, /i:)
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13 th day of December 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO
PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT
COUNTY COST was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special
Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100,
Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan,
Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

MOTION FOR ORDER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT
COUNTY COST

2

l1b'1.J

- - - US Mail

- - - Hand Deliver

~ia

facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208;;t4155

MOTION FOR ORDER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT
COUNTY COST
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF lDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
VB.

STATE O~ IDAHO.
Re~

)
)

Case No: CV-2006-324

)
)
)
)
)

ORDER TO PREPARE
TRANSCRlPT OF

)
}

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
HEARING AT COUNTY COST
LC. 19·4904

The Court, haviDg considered PETITIONER"S MOTION FOR ORDER. TO

PREPARE TRANSCRiPT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF liEARlNG AT COUNTY
COST filed herein by the PetitiODe'!, Sarah M Johnson, by and through her Attorney,
Christopher P. SiIIims. and good cause appearing therefore, HEREBY ORDERS the
transcript of~ P~st-Conviction ReIiefHeanng in the above styled matter wmscnDed at
the'cost ofBl~e County. Idaho.

DATED this

11 day

of December, 2010.

ON. G. RICHARD BEVAN. DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER 10 PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVlCI10N lUU.1B.F H!AlUNG AT COUNTY COST
SOOO/SOODI!!
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Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STA TE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

__________R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~__________)

Case No: CV -2006-0324
MOTION FOR ORDER
TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER
TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S
CORRECTIONAL CENTER
I.C. 19-4907 (a)
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED

COMES NOW Petitioner by and through her attorney, CHRISTOPHER P.
SIMMS, and files this, her MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO
POCATELLO WOMENS CORRECTIONAL CENTER and in support thereof states as
follows:
1.

Petitioner is serving life sentences, upon conviction of Murder, First Degree, with

Firearm Enhancement, The Fifth District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Blaine,
Case No. CR-2003-1820 in the custody of the Pocatello Women's COITectional Center,
located in Pocatello, Idaho,
2.

Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, was set for

evidentiary hearing and heard commencing December 7,2010.
3.

Petitioner was transported to the Twin Falls County Jail in order to be present at

the Theron Ward Judicial Building, located in Twin Falls, Idaho, for said hearing.
MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S
CORRECTIONAL CENTER

4.

Petitioner should be transported back to the Pocatello Women's Correctional

Center pending any ruling by the Court on matters presented during the four (4) day
evidentiary hearing, which concluded on December 10,2010.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court enter an Order to Transport
Petitioner to the Pocatello Women's Correctional Center.

/2./ . /u
istopher P. Simms
Attorney for Petitioner

Dated

MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S
CORRECTIONAL CENTER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 th day of December, 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT
PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER was
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn:
Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 837200010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Facsimile number
208.788.5554, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126 by:

- - - US

Mail

_ _ _ Hand Delivery

~ia

facsimile 208.854.8074,208.788.5554 and 208.736.4155

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S
CORRECTIONAL CENTER
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF !HE FIFTH ruDIClAL DIS....-. ..... ""
i STATE 0' IDAliO
IN AND ROa THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Jo/ynn Drage,
District
Court Blaine Count ,~

)

SARAH M. JOHNSON.

Case No: CV-2006-0324

)

Petitioner,

)

ORDER TO TRANSPORT·
PETITIONER TO
POCATEllO WOMEN'S
COlU.ECITONAL CENTER

)
)

VS.

)
)

STATE OP IDAHO,

)
~2n~nt,

)

TIle' CoUl'tt having considered. Potitioner's MonoN TO ORDER

PETlnoNEk TRANSPORTBD TO POCA'l"BLLO WOMEN's COR.R.ECITONAL
CENTBR, filed herein and goodi oause appcarl.tlg therefore, HEREBY ORDERS
Petitioner Transported to t110 Pocatello Women's COITeetiona/. Facility, from the Twin
,

Falls COtulty Jail. at the eariie,,1 opportunity.
,

\

ORDER. TO TRANSPORT PE1mONER TO POCA"rELLO WOMEN'S
CORRECTIONAL CID-.'T'fER
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FILED~'
P.M..__ __
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

~/ynt1nBDr.!.'8ge,
ou

Clerk District
ame County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S FILING
MEMORANDUM

)
)
)

__________R==es=p~o=nd=e=n=t____________)
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached document, a certified copy
of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho's Disciplinary Order in the Matter of Bobby
E. Pangburn, Attorney at Law, Idaho State Bar vs. Bobby E. Pangburn, previously
marked and offered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 15, and again offers same into
evidence under Rule 902 as a Domestic Public Record Under Seal and under Rule 803 a
public record the circumstances and source of which indicate no lack of trustworthiness.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW

/Z2J/u
.
,

C RISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of December 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM was
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn:
Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US Mail

- - - Hand Deliver

~~faCSimile

---

208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.736.4155

PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN THE MATTER OF BOBBY E.
PANGBURN, ATTORNEY AT LAW.

)
)

----------------------------------------------------------- )
IDAHO STATE BAR,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BOBBY E. PANGBURN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DISCIPLINARY ORDER
Supreme Court Docket No. 34173
ISB FC No. 05-07
Ref. No. 07-287

A CERTIFICATE OF RECORD with attachments of proceedings before the Professional
Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar was filed by Respondent May 11, 2007 which contains
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION. A NOTICE
OF OBJECTION was filed by Appellant Pangburn June 1,2007. APPELLANT'S BRIEF was
filed by Appellant October 4,2007. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was filed by RespondentOctober
25,2007. APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was filed by Appellant Pangburn December 7, 2007.
The CONCLUSIONS OF LAW found that Appellant Pangburn has violated Idaho Rules
of Professional Conduct 8.1 in conjunction with his admission that he violated Oregon DR-II03(C), failure to cooperate and failure to respond to disciplinary authorities as set forth in the
Sixth Cause of Action in the Third Formal Amended Complaint.
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of T.W., the Committee concludes
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated
LR.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, lA, 1.5(£), 1.16(d), and 8.4(c).
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of R.K., the Committee concludes
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated
LR.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, lA, and 1.16(d).
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of W.E., the Committee concludes
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated
LR.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, lA, and I.l6(d).
DISCIPLINARY ORDER- ISB v.
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With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of M.B., the Committee concludes
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated
I.R.P.e. 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of M.S., the Committee concludes
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn has
violated I.R.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of C.B., the Committee concludes
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn has
violated I.R.P.e. 1.2 and 1.4.
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of T.S., the Committee concludes
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn has
violated I.R.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.l6(d).
Further, the Committee also considered the ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, (hereinafter, "ABA Standards") to determine the appropriate sanction to recommend
in this case. ABA Standard 3.0 addresses the factors to be considered and the Committee has
considered the duties violated, if any, Defendant's mental state, the actual or potential injury
caused by Defendant's misconduct, if any, and the existence of aggravating or mitigation factors.
(ld.01.815).
The recommended disciplinary action includes suspension from the practice of law in the
State of Idaho for a period of five (5) years, with three (3) years being withheld. Further,
Appellant Pangburn shall be placed on probation for a period of three (3) years following his
reinstatement, if any, upon the terms and conditions imposed.
After review of the BRIEFS and the CERTIFICATE OF RECORD, this Court upholds
the Recommendation of the Committee; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant, BOBBY E. PANGBURN, be suspended
from the practice oflaw in the State ofIdaho for a period of five (5) years, with three (3) years
being withheld.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant, BOBBY E. PANGBURN, be placed on
probation for a period of three (3) years following his reinstatement, if any, upon the following
terms and conditions:
DISCIPLINARY ORDER - ISB v. Pan
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1. Probation should be imposed pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission 506(c).
Probation
under Rule 506(c) is appropriate since there is little likelihood that Defendant will harm
the public during the period of probation and the conditions of probation can be
adequately supervised by Bar Counsel's Office. Further, conditions of probation should
include: (1) If Defendant admits or is found to have violated any of the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct for which a public sanction is imposed for any conduct between the
date of Defendant's actual suspension through the three year period of probation,
regardless whether that admission or determination occurs after the expiration of the
suspension and probation, then the withheld suspension should be immediately imposed
and served by Defendant, in addition to any other sanction that is imposed for any such
admission or determination of misconduct during that time. (Thus, by way of example, if
Defendant admits or is found to have violated any of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct in any formal charge case relating to his conduct during the period of his actual
suspension and probation, then the withheld portion of his suspension shall be
automatically and immediately imposed upon Defendant regardless whether that
admission or determination is after the expiration of his probation); (2) That Defendant
conduct his practice and representation of his clients in a manner so as to avoid any
grievances or complaints being submitted to Bar Counsel's Office.
However,
recognizing that such grievances and/or complaints are beyond the control of the
attorney, Defendant must fully cooperate with Bar Counsel's Office in the investigation
of any such complaints or grievances; (3) Defendant be required to maintain errors and
omissions legal malpractice insurance during the probation period, providing at least
$100,000/$300,000 coverage in a form that the reinstatement Hearing Committee
determines is appropriate as a condition of Defendant's reinstatement; (4) Defendant
should make arrangements satisfactory to the Idaho State Bar for a supervising attorney
to supervise Defendant's law practice during the probationary period. In addition,
Defendant should be required to comply with the following terms and conditions relating
to such supervision during the period of probation:
a.) The supervising attorney shall be approved by the Idaho State Bar and shall indicate
to the Idaho State Bar his or her willingness to supervise Defendant during the term
of his probation, consistent with the terms and conditions set forth above and that
follow. The Hearing Committee recommends that the supervising attorney should not
be expected to assume any personal responsibility for the handling of Defendant's
cases nor serve as a co-counsel in the sense of counter signing pleadings;
b.) Defendant shall meet on a regular basis, but no less than monthly, with the
supervising attorney regarding Defendant's representation of clients to ensure that
Defendant is acting with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his
clients and that Defendant is keeping his clients reasonably informed about that status
of their matters and promptly complying with any reasonable requests for information
about Defendant's representation of his clients;

DISCIPLINARY ORDER - ISB v. Pangburn, Supreme Court Docket No. 34173

c.) The supervising attorney shall report to the Idaho State Bar, on a quarterly basis, that
Defendant is complying with the previous condition and Defendant is arranging to
meet with the supervising attorney on a regular, but not less than monthly, basis and
that Defendant has demonstrated to the supervising attorney reasonable assurance that
Defendant is complying with the conditions of probation; and
d.) Defendant shall certify in writing to the Idaho State Bar, under oath on a monthly
basis, that he is acting with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his
clients, is keeping his clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and
promptly complying with any reasonable requests for information about Defendant's
representation of his clients, and that his representation of his clients is consistent
with his responsibilities under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. To be reinstated, Defendant must show that he has fully complied with the requirements
ofIdaho Bar Commission Rules 506(j) and 517(a)-(d).
3. As a condition for reinstatement under LB.C.R. 518, Defendant shall be required to fully
comply with LB.C.R. 517 and shall be required to take and pass the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination.
4. The Hearing Committee recommends that as a condition of reinstatement, Defendant
shall reimburse Plaintiff for the costs associated with this proceeding, including, without
limitation, the costs of the hearing and the hearing transcript, certified mailings and all
other expenses related to this disciplinary proceeding.

Dated this

I7

day of January 2008.
By Order of the Supreme Court

ATTEST:
1; Stephen W. Kenyon. Clerk of the sup~eme
.'
Of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify
above is 8 true and coneet copy of the '

ttntered in 1he above entIIIed cause and

on

record i~my offioe. . :
J:; ...;
'WITNESS my hand
Sea~of this Cou~

cc:

Bobby E. Pangburn, pro se
Counsel of Record

lI...

NW.

$y:~~~~;ta~~2Ol1ie! Oepld}&
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH JOHNSON,

)

)
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV 2006-0324

)
) ORDER REGARDING POST) TRIAL BRIEFING AND
) CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
")
)

Defendants.
THIS MATTER came before the court on the court's own motion. This
case was tried between December 7 and December 10, 2010. At the conclusion of
the trial the court set forth a post-trial briefing schedule and commented upon
the need to review the 6000+ page transcript as part of this court's decisionmaking process in the case. This court also referenced the need for counsel to
"pin-point" the areas in the transcript where the issues are referenced and
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l~

supported. The court, having reviewed portions of the transcript, and
considering the state of the record, feels that clarification is necessary and
therefore modifies and/or clarifies its prior pronouncements as set forth herein.
As Idaho's Court of Appeals has recently recognized:
A post-conviction proceeding is not an extension
of the criminal case from which it arises. Rather, it is a
separate civil action in which the applicant bears the
burden of proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. . . .
No part of the record from the criminal case becomes
part of the record in the post-conviction proceeding
unless it is entered as an exhibit. Exhibits, as well as
transcripts of the pre-trial proceedings, the trial, and
sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even if
previously prepared as a result of a direct appeal or
otherwise, are not before the trial court in the postconviction proceeding and do not become part of the
record on appeal unless presented to the trial court as
exhibits, . .. or unless the trial court takes judicial
notice of such records from the criminal case. . . .
Although the district court may have reviewed
portions of the record from the underlying criminal
action on its own initiative, if the petitioner does not
include such material in the record on appeal from
the denial of post-conviction relief, the appellate court
will not consider it. ...

Esquivel v. State, __ Idaho - - ' --,233 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2010).
Thus, it is noteworthy that Ms. Johnson carries the burden of proof in this
case. It is incumbent upon her to establish those parts of the record which
support her claims. While this court may, "on its own initiative, review portions
of the record from the underlying criminal action," such material must be
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identified by the parties; "this Court will not go in search of it." LaBelle v.

State, 130 Idaho 115, 118-119,937 P.2d 427, 430 - 431 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis
added) (quoting Munster v. State, 129 Idaho 65,68,921 P.2d 765, 768 (Ct. App.
1996».
The court is concerned that it left the impression, direct or otherwise, that
it was intending to read the entire transcript and search for the relevant evidence

in this case. To the extent that the court left that impression with counsel, it
erred.
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that, as it pertains to motions for
summary judgment, "the trial court is not required to search the record looking
for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing
the summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the court's
attention./I Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912,
919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008).
In regard to a motion for summary dismissal in the post-conviction
context, the Court of Appeals ruled similarly: I/[I]f the applicant facing such a
motion fails to present evidence making a prima facie case, i.e., establishing each
essential element of the claim, then summary dismissal is appropriate./I Barcella

v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 475, 224 P.3d 536,542 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Roman v.
State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994».
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Given a post-conviction applicant's burden to establish his or her claims
by citation to admissible evidence at the summary judgment stage, it is even
more incumbent upon an applicant to make such a showing at the trial stage. See

Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, __ Idaho - - ' - - ' 234 P.3d 699, 707 (2010)
(where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and
to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are
too indefinite to be determined by the Court.); Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340,
344, 179 P.3d 303,307 (2008) ("We will not require the trial court to search the
record to determine if there is any new information that might change the
specification of facts deemed to be established."); Cf Idaho Dept. of Health &

Welfare v. Doe, 2010 WL 4342147, 8 (Idaho App. 2010) (A general attack on the
findings and conclusions of a trial court, without specific reference to evidentiary
or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.).
Accordingly, this court does not intend to read the entire transcript of the
criminal trial, although it was admitted into evidence. The court expects counsel
to direct this court, with citations to the record!, to the evidence which supports
that party's claims. This is particularly crucial regarding those claims which
require a showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, the result would have been different, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s.
I The "record" includes all evidence admitted at trial. Citations to any transcript must include the page
number and relevant lines.

ORDER R.E. POST-TRIAL BRIEFING AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD - 4

668,687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984), or a showing that newly discovered
evidence, not previously presented and heard, "will probably produce an
acquittal. . ..

/1

State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 150-151, 191 P.3d 217,228 -

229 (2008) (quoting State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976)).
The court will therefore await receipt of the parties' post-trial memoranda,
including citations to the record as specified herein, before continuing a review
of the trial transcript from State v. Johnson. Should either party request
clarification of this order, the court will schedule a status hearing at the earliest
opportunity by telephone.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

/:2 ~ ofJan

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

Ja

I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the
day of January, 2011, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or
hand-delivered to the following persons:

Mr. Christopher Simms
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID 83333

Ms. Jessica M. Lorello
Deputy Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box R3720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FlFIH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
. StATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SAR.lUI M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

)
)

Case No~ CV -2006~324

)

STIPULATION AND ORDER
RELATING TO BRIEFING .
SCHEDULE

)
)

VS.

)

STATE OF IDAHO)
~

).
)

______~Re==s~~m=rum=-t________~)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, and the
ll~spective

State~

by and through their

counsels of record, and file this STIPULATION RELATING TO BREIFn-IO

SCHEDULE and state as follows:
1..

Pc~titioner's

Pt.wt.ition for Post-Conviction Rellef'was heard by this Court from.

December 6,2010 through December to,201O.
2.

The Court aroered Petitioner and the State to file Proposed Findings ofFacts and

Conclusions of Law, as well as Rebuttal Briefs! to be filed on January 31, 2011, and
February 14,2011, re:spectively.
3.

Due to unforeseen factual oircumstances beyond the control of either party or

counsel,:the. partiefi have mutually agreed
.

to continue the deadline of January 31.2011,

to

Feb'nlary 14,2011, for the filing of Proposed Findings o~Facts and C~nclusions of Law
alld for rebuttal briefing from February 14, 2011. to February 28, 2011.
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LAWRENCE G. ,WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General

FILE

STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Chief, Deputy A~omey General
Criminal Law Division

FEB 14 2011
Jolynn Drags, Clerk DI6trlct
Court Blaine County, Idaho

JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051
Deputies Attorney General and
Special prosecuting Attorneys
P.O. Box 83720:
Boise. Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH JOHNSON
Petitioner,'
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO.
Respondent

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

)
)

Case No. CV-06·324
RESPONDENT'S POST·
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits the Respondent's PostEVidentiary Hearing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

BACKGROUND
Johnson filed a Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (HPetltion")
on January 11, 2010, alleging a number of different claims,

The state moved for

summary dismissal of Johnson's Petition and Johnson filed a cross-motion for summary
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disposition. Following briefing and oral argument on the parties' motions, the Court
denied Johnson's motion and granted in part, and denied in part, the state's motion for
summary dismissal.

The non-dismissed claims that proceeded to an evidentiary

hearing were1 ;

Claim 4(a) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a

FEB. 14.2011
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NO. 343
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With respect to the claims that were the subject of the evidentiary hearing held
December 7 -10,2010, the state now offers the following proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

PROPOSED FINDINGS Of FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Claim 41a}

A.

In Claim 4(a). Johnson contends trial counsel were ineffective for failing to move
for a continuance after discovering "that a comforter, that would have contained physical
evidence, had been discarded and not gathered as physical evidence." (Petition. pp.78,

'If

a.)

According to Johnson, she was prejudiced by counsels' failure to do so

because it left counsel "inadequately prepared to cross-examine the State's witnesses
about the alleged comforter" and "[slpecifically, whether a hole on the comforter was a
bullet hole and whether a sheet and or comforter covered the head of Diane Johnson
thereby effecting blood spatter." (Petition, p.8, 1115.a.) Johnson failed to meet her
burden of establishing deficient performance or prejudice to support this allegation.

1.

Proposed Factual Findings Relevant To Claim 4(a)

At trial, Officer Ross Kirtley, the first member of law enforcement to arrive on the
scene, and Marshal Randy Tremble, who arrived shortly after Officer Kirtley, testified
that the comforter was covering Diane's head and Officer Kirtley had to use his asp to

IIflip[ ] the covers back," (Trial Tr} Vol. III, p.1793, Ls.19-21.) The comforter from
Diane and Alan Johnson's bed, where Diane was murdered, was not collected as
evidence. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1986, L - p.1987, L.6, p.2016, Ls.21-24.) No evidence

The trial transcript was admitted in CD form as Exhibit 2 at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing.

2
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was presented regarding precisely when trial counsel, Bob Pangburn and Mark Rader,
became aware of this fact; however, Mr. Rader testified at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing that it was "close" to trial, but he could not recall how close. (Tr.,
p.158, L.24 - p.!159, L.10.) Although counsel did not move for a continuance on the
basis of the timing of counsels' discovery that the comforter had not been collected, the
defense capitalized on the state's failure to collect the evidence, highlighting it as a
deficiency in the state's case. (See,!!!WL., Trlal Tr., Vol. III, p.2073, L.7 - p.2075, L.24;
Trial Tr., Vo!. IV, p.2464. L.3 - p.2467. L.17; Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p,4605, Ls.5-8.)
When asked at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing why a continuance would
have been helpful, Mr. Rader testified they could have "back[ed] up and re-examlne[d]
some of this material and tr[ied] and find a better way of presenting it at trial," like
"things involving what happens to a head when it's shot at close range, those kinds of
things." (Tr. p.161, L.6 - p.162" L.S.) Johnson did not, however, present any evidence
t

at the post-conviction hearing indicating what additional evidence could have been
submitted to the jury had such a request for a continuance been made, much Jess what
information she could have presented to the court in order to get the continuance in the
first instance. (See generally Tr.)

2.

Conolusions Of Law Relevant To Claim 4(a)

In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel,
Johnson was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsels'
perlormance was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

Strickland v.

"Because of the distorting effects of

hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is
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a strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance - that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). It was
Johnson's burden to present evidence at the hearing sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" in order to establish that
counsels' performance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance."

Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting,

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

Because "[s]trategic and tactical decisions will not be

second-guessed or serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel," it was also Johnson's burden to prove that counsels' decisions
were the result of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcoMings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372~373.
941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368
(1994); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct.Ap,p. 1994»). In
order to prove prejudice, Johnson was required to show that counsels' deficient
performance actually had an adverse effect on her defense; i.e., but for counsels'
deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would
have been different Strickland,466 U.S. at 693; Cowger Vo State, 132 Idaho 681, 685,
978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second element, Johnson had the
burden of showing that her trial counsels' deficient conduct "so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
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produced a just result." Strickland., 466 U.S. at 686; 'vey v. state. 123 Idaho 77,80,844
P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to file
a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the probability of
success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity
constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. Sta.te, 127 Idaho 709,713,905 P.2d
642, 646 (Ct. App_ 1995). As with other decisions made by counsel. Johnson must
overcome the presumption that the decision not to file a particular motion was strategic
ortactical. See ·Statev. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) (trial
counsel's choice of witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his
lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions).
Johnson failed to present any evidence at the post-conviction hearing to support
her claim that counsel was ineffective for falling to request a continuance in order to
"back up and re-examine" how to address the missing comforter. Specifically, there is
no evidence from which this Court can conclude that a request for continuance on such
vague grounds would have even been granted, much less that the continuance would
have made a difference in the evidence presented or the approach taken at trial. It was
objectively reasonable for counsel to do precisely what they did in this case - attack the
state's failure to collect the comforter, along with other Items of evidence the state fajled
to collect from the crime scene, rather than request a continuance on some vague,
unsubstantiated basis.
Johnson failed to meet her burden of demonstrating she is entitled to relief on
Claim 4(a) and the claim should be dismissed.
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Claim 4(c)
In Claim 4(c), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective because, she asserts,

they were «(inadequately prepared to present adequate support for [their] proffered
expert testimony regarding the blood splattering [sic] evidence;" specifically, their
"experiment using a coconut [to] re-create the alleged crime {sic]." (Petition, p.8, ~
15.c.) Johnson further asserts, as an "example," "Trial Counsel was unable to consult
with any experts and properly present an experiment that would have met evidentiary
standards and would have been admissible .... " (Id.) Relief should be denied on this
claim because it is partially disproven by the record of the criminal trial and because
Johnson otherwise failed to meet her burden of proving deficient performance or
prejudice in relation to these allegations.

1.

Proposed Factual Findings ReJevant To Claim 4(c)

The defense retained a number of experts, including three forensics experts,
Michael Howard, Keith Inman, and Rocky Mink. (See Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp,4346-4482.)
During trial, prior to the defense case-in-chief, the court conducted an extensive hearing
on the state's motion to exclude an experiment conducted by the defense in an effort to
replicate, using a coconut, the blood spatter that would have occurred when Johnson
shot Diane in the head. (Tr., Vol. VI, pp.4291-4328; Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp,4336-4503.)
The court ruled the experiment was inadmissible, crediting forensic pathologist Glen
Graben's testimony that there was insufficient similarities between the coconut used in
the experiment and a human head.

(Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.4503-4508,) The court,

however, advised the defense that if they wanted to "try to re-replicate th[e] test" in the
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(Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.4508,

Ls.17-22.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Mr. Rader testified that, in response to
the court's ruling, he asked his experts "to go back and find, see if there's something
else [they] could do, n whether there was "some other object that [they] could shoot," but
his experts "didn't come up with anything." (Tr., p.i66, L.i3 - p.167 L.2.) In hindsight,
j

Mr. Rader testified he could have "gone out to ... various defender agencies in various
places around the COUntlY" to usee if [he} could find different experts or different
information somehow." (Tr., p.i69, Ls.9-24.) Johnson presented no evidence at the
hearing regarding what experts counsel would have located had he "reached ouf' nor
did she present any evidence on what other experiments or reconstruction options CQuid
have been presented to the trial court. (See generally Tr.)

2.

Conclusions Of Law Relevant To Claim 4(0)

Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she i$ entitled to relief on
Claim 4(c). The trial record belies her assertion that counsel were "unable to consult
with any experts. n (Petition, p.8,

,-r 15.c.)

Counsel clearly had adequate time to consult

with experts and, In fact, did so. Any request for additional time or resources for the
purpose of consulting with additional experts would have certainly been denied. In any
event, Mr. Rader's ideas about what he could have done differently does not establish
that the actions he did take were anything but strategic or that they were based upon
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or any other shortcoming capable of
objective evaluation. Indeed, Mr. Rader's assertion that he could have "reached out"
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and probably "should have" (Tr., p.169, Ls.22-24), is precisely the sort of hindsight that
is insufficient for establishing a claim of deficient perfonnance.
Johnson also failed to prove she was prejudiced by counsels' alleged failure to
"properly present an experiment that would have met evidentiary standards and would
have been admissible" because she failed to present any evidence of what that
experiment would have been, much less prove that it would have been admissible. Nor
can Johnson establish that evidence of some other experiment, even if introduced.
would have made a difference. This is particularly true in light of the fact that Johnson
actually presented extensive evidence regarding how blood spatter would have gotten
on the murderer, which was ultimately the point of the coconut experiment, but was
clearly not persuasive to the jury in light of all the evidence presented.
Johnson failed to meet her burden of showing error in relation to Claim 4(0) and
the claim should be denied.

C.

Claim 4(e}
In Claim 4(e), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective with respect to the cross-

examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkins,
Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky
Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson.

(Petition, pp.9-13,

1f

16.)

Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsels' decisions regarding crossexamination were anything but strategic and tactical and objectively reasonable.
Johnson also failed to meet her burden of proving a reasonable probability that any
cross-examination she now believes shOUld have been conducted would have resulted
in a different outcome.
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Proposed Factual Findings And Conclusions Of Law Relevant To

Claim 4(,)
Of the fourteen witnesses Johnson claims were inadequately cross-examined,
only seven were called as witnesses at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing - Walt
Femling, Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Raul Ornelas.
and Stu Robinson. (Tr., pp.2-3.) Johnson failed to call Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, KJell
Eliison, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez. Becky Lopez. or Carlos Ayala and failed to
present any evidence regarding counsels' decisions regarding their examination of
these witnesses, or any substantive evidence of how their testimony would have been
different. (See generally Tr.) Johnson, therefore, failed to meet her burden of showing
counsel was ineffective in cross-examining these witnesses.
With respect to those witnesses Johnson did call, the state proposes the
following factual findings and conclusions of law:

a.

Walt FemJing

In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "failed to adequately cross-examine
the Blaine County Sheriff," Walt Femling who allegedly "made a statement during the
early stages of tre investigation to the effect that it was vital that police find a suspect in
order to prevent a negative perception of the Sun Valley area from outsiders who may
have decided not to visit if the crime went unsolved." (Petition, pp.1 0-11, 1116.a.iii.) At
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked Sheriff Femling whether he
recalled "making statements to the press very shortly after [the murders], assuring the
public that there was no concern for their public safety." (Tr., p.328, Ls.4-7.) Sheriff
Femling answered:
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Yes. J thought that was very important to let my community know
that I did not believe that this was a random act of violence or we had
some killers out there running, that were just randomly picking homes and,
you know, shooting people.
So the crime scene definitely told me that probably was not the
case.
(Tr., p.328,Ls.8-15.)

Sheriff Femling further explained his initial impressions based

upon the crime scene:
I think what the crime scene was telling me pretty quick was that it
was not committed from, by somebody from the outside as a random killer
or killers that came into the scene. It was somebody that was familiar with
the house and the contents of the house and that the information that I
was getting from investigators who had talked to [Johnson] was n01 adding
up to what the crime scene was telling me. So at that time, it was, you
know, something's not right here from potentially my only witness to these
two homiqides.
(Tr., p.326, Ls.12-2.3.)
\

Sheriff Femling also testified that he did not, on the day of the murders, "form[ ]
the theory" that Johnson murdered her parents "out of revenge," (Tr., p.338, Ls.11-25.)
In fact, it was ''weeks'' before Sheriff Femling ruled out Johnson's boyfriend, Bruno
Santos, as a su~pect. and he did not want to believe Johnson committed the murders
because she we.nt to school with his son and it was hard to believe that she could have
done it, but a crucial piece of evidence leading him to believe she was involved "came in
six weeks after thIe] case started." (Tr., p.340, L.17 - p.342, LA, p.350, L.20 - p.351,
L.25.) That evidence was Johnson's DNA on lithe gloves that were wrapped in the
bathrobe found in the garbage can."

(Tr., p.341, Ls.10-14.)

Sheriff Femllng further

testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing about the scope of the investigation
surrounding the murders:
You know, I can't give you a time when I, you know, absolutely felt
confident that it was - [Johnson] acted alone. I can tell you, once again, is
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rsic] that we worked reaJly hard to make sure that we covered every basis
that we could, and Bruno Santos was not involved. We believe very
strongly that he was not involved. There is no evidence at all to put him at
that scene of that crime . . ..
(Tr., p.349, Ls.5-13.)
In addition to investigating Santos, law enforcement also investigated (1) Janet
Sylten, the cleaning lady Johnson claimed to have heard at 2:00 in the morning outside
her house the morning of the murders (Tr., p.354, L.23 - p.356, L 1, p.358, Ls.2Q-22);
(2) Mel Speegle, the owner of the murder weapon (Tr., p.356, Ls.2-7, p.361, L.3 p.362, L.1); (3) the possibility of a robbery, which there were no signs of at the
residence (Tr., p.356, L.8-24); and (4) whether someone escaped up the embankment
behind the house based on Johnson's claim that the killer went out the back door (Tr.,
p.356, L.25 - p.357, L.19).
Consistent with his testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Sheriff
Femling testified at trial that, on the day of the murders, he identified four persons of
interest - Speegle, Santos, Johnson, and the cleaning lady. (Trial Tr" Vol. IV, p.2417,
L.10 - p.2418. L2.) Also consistent with his post-conviction testimony, Sheriff Femling
testified at trial that he did hot want to believe Johnson committed the murders and he
continued to investIgate other possibilities. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2424, Ls.1-7.) In fact,
just as Sheriff Femling indicated at the post-conviction hearing, at trial he testified law
enforcement interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports,
spent $517,000 investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, ass.igned
3.5 people to the case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-Up on all
investigative leads. (Tria! Tr., Vol. IV, p.2458, LA ~ p.2461, L.16.)
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Mr. Rader cross-examined Sheriff Femling at trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2461·

2496; VoL VI, ppA057-4059.) Johnson did not ask Mr. Rader any questions at the postconviction evidentiary about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Sheriff
Femling. (See generally Tr., pp.138-195.)
Cross-examination of witnesses is a tactical deciSion. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho

548, 563, n.2, 199 P.3d 123, 138 n.2 (2008). As such, the scope of Mr. Rader's crossexamination is entitled to the presumption that it was sound trial strategy. Johnson has
failed to rebut that presumption. Indeed, Johnson failed to even Inquire of Mr. Rader
regarding his strategic decisions regarding Sheriff Femling's testimony, much less prove
that the strategy was objectively unreasonable. Johnson also failed to prove she was
prejudiced as a result of the allegedly inadequate cross-examination. In

fact,

given the

similarities between Sheriff Femling's trial testimony regarding the scope of the
investigation into the Johnson murders and his testimony at the post-conviction
evidentiary heartng, It is difficult to imagine how Johnson could establish prejudice. She
Is not entitled to relief on this claim.

b.

Steve Harkins

At trial. in response to a question on direct about how many "calls or interviews"
were conducted with Bruno, Detective Steve Harkins testified: "I don't know if 1 can give
you an exact number. I talked to him a number of times. Numerous interviews. Weekly
contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We made contact over the phone, met
in person. I didn't document every contact I had with him." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2191,
Ls.1-6.) Detective Harkins further testified he had spoken to Santos u over a hundred"
times "[o]ver the last year and a half," "maybe a lot more." (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2114,
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Ls.20·23.) Johnson alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to "adequately crossexamine" Detective Harkins about this statement, claiming "police reports and
supplements do not support this bald assertion." (Petition, p.10, 1]" 16.a.i.)
Johnson further alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to adequately crossexamine Detective Harkins "regarding the lack of depth to the search of Santos [sic]
residence [or] outside dumpster," his "failure to acquire fingerprints from [Santos'}
known associates," "the inconsistencies in statements made by Santos [sic] family
members, including his mother and cousin," or about "the fact that .25 caliber
ammunition was found in Bruno Santos [sic] residence and in the pink robe found in the
trash can at the crime scene." (Petition, p.10,1l16.a.i, p.12, 11 16.a.vi.)
At trial, Mr. Pangburn cross..examined Detective Harkins.
pp.2169-2222, 2235-2244.)

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV,

Mr. Pangburn did not cross-examine Detective Harkins

about the number of times he indicated he had spoken with Santos. nor did Mr.
Pangburn ask Detective Harkins about any alleged inconsistencies in statements made
by Santos or his family members or the ammunition found in Santos' residence or the
Johnson's garbage can.

(See generally id.) Although Mr. Pangburn did not cross-

examine Detective Harklns about his failure to "fingerprint[

J'

Santos' "known

associates," Mr. Pangburn did ask Detective Harkins about his investigation of Santos'
uassociates.1i3 Specifically, the following exchange occurred between Mr. Pangburn and
Dete'ctive Harkins:
Q:
Did you make any efforts to -- You have described, I think, Christian
Ayala, Carlos Ayala, maybe another person or two. How widely did you
look into Bruno's associates?

3 Marshal Tremble was also asked about his investigation bf Santos' "associates." (Trial
Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1861, L16 - p.1863, L.24.)
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A:

Pretty extensively.

Q:

How extensively?

A:

I would say - Well, we interviewed a number of kids at school that
knew him. I would 'say real extensively.

What about people who may be law breakers, potentially? Did you
find any of those?

Q:

A:

May be what?

Q:
May be law breakers, somebody who would do criminal activity?
Did you find any of those related to Bruno?

A:

I'm not sure. I'm sure that we talked to some people that were
involved in criminal activity, yes.

Q:
You're an experienced investigator. We have established that. If a
person is a suspect regarding the oommission of a crime -- And you have
indioated .that Bruno at some point was a suspect in this, as it relates to
this case, correct?
A:

Initially, yes.

Q:
Okay, and is it fajr to say that you look into - When a person is a
suspeot. you're trying to determine whether that person committed the
crime, or was involved in a orime, like assisting a person committing a
crime, correct?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Okay, did you go to kind of [sic] next step - Is it fair to say that Have you ever known of a person who has had someone else

commit a crime for them?
A:

Yes.

Q:
Did you do anything to try to figure that out as it related to Bruno
Santos?

A:

I'm not sure I understand the question.

Q:
The question is did you look for someone who may, at the request
of Bruno Santos, kill these people?
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I would say through the investigation, yes. We followed every lead
we possibly had to exclude that or to see if It was true; if there was any,
you know, truth to it.
Q:
Did you look - Did you establish some kind of protocol or a plan,
course of action?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Wnat was the plan or course of action?

A:
Assigning leads to officers to track down people that knew him,
conduct interviews; conduct 30, 40, 50 interviews at the high school. To
gather information.
Q:

But did you look into his drug dealer connection?

A:

No·, I did not.

Q:
Okay, did you look into - How exten&ively did you look into his
gang connections? I know you talked yesterday that you did some things.
I think you said that someone contacted some people from Salt Lake, and
someone contacted some officers form the Boise area.

Did anybody that you know of - and you're the one looking into
Bruno Santos, thafs what you have told us -- talk to anybody else about
gang related activities on Bruno Santos' part?

A:.

The connections in - The contacts made in Boise and Salt Lake
and through the Northwest Gang investigators Association was done
primarily on the placement of the knives, where the knives were found.
The contacts - or the connection with Bruno being involved in any
gang related [sic] in Blaine County, we don't have a gang problem up
there. And I did ask him, and I felt that was cleared. I'm pretty familiar
with the area.
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2198, L.17 - p.2202, L.15 (bolding omitted).)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Mr. Pangburn any
questions about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Detective Harkins.
(See generally Tr., pp.237-279.)

Johnson did, however, call Detective Harkins as a
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witness at the post--conviction evidentiary hearing but did not ask him any questions
about his testimony regarding the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See
generally Tr.• pp.378441.)

Johnson also did not introduce any "police reports" or

"supplements" at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing to rebut Detective Harkins' trial
testimony about the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See generally Tr.)
Johnson did ask Detective Harkins about the extent of his search of Santos'
residence. Detective Harkins testified in that regard that he did not recall what his role
in the search was, I.e., whether he "actually did the searching or instructed other officers
to, to search the residence." (Tr., p.406, Ls.20-24.) DetectiVe Harkins acknowledged
the "trash receptacles" at the apartment complex where Santos lived were not
searched. (Tr., p.407, Ls.17-22.) Detective Harkins explained the "trash receptacles"
were not searched "because [he] and ten other detectives probably didn't think it was
necessary," (Tr.• p.410, Ls.1-3.) Johnson did not introduce any evidence regarding
what a more extensive search of Santos' residence or a search of the "trash
receptacles" would have uncovered. (See generally Tr.)
Johnson also asked Detective Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing
about whether .25 automatic shells were found at Santos' residence and Detective
Harkins agreed that tho,se were found. (Tr.• p.410, Ls.11-25.) Detective Harkins further
testified that he was aware that .25 shells were found in the pocket of the robe
discovered in the garbage can at the Johnson's house.4 (Tr., p.411. Ls.1-6.)

Exhibit 20, admitted at trial, was a photograph of five rounds of .25 ammunition found
in the pocket of Johnson's robe. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1900, L.19 - p.1901, L.13.) Exhibit
103, also admitted at trial. was a photograph of a box of Remington .25 automatic shells
with five missing rounds. (Trial Tr" Vol. III, p.2048, Ls.1-16.)
RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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With respect to his involvement in the investigation of Consuela Cedeno and
Jane Lopez, D.etective Harkins testified at the evidentiary hearlng that he did not recall
interviewing them, but he was sure he talked to them "at one point." (Tr., p.411, LS.1014.) Johnson did not ask Detective Harkins about any inconsistencies in Ms. Cedeno's
testimony but did ask him questions about Jane Lopez's testimony.
Johnson asked:

Specifically,

"[I)f I told you that those phone numbers [that were subpoenaed]

verified that Jane Lopez did not in fact call Bruno nor the home phone number when
she originally told you and when she testified before the court, do you think I'd be
mistaken about that?" (Tr., p.413, Ls.7-12.) Detective Harkins responded that he had
"an explanation of why they weren't recovered."

(Tr., p.4i3, Ls.13-14.)

That

explanation was' that if a call was made from uQwest to Qwest numbers, local carriers,
[they] would not be recorded," and that "in 2003 the whole valley's local phone carrier
was Qwest." (Tr., p.414, Ls.3-5, 15-17.) So, If Jane Lopez had "called from the school
to a home number, it wouldn't be recorded." (Tr. t p.416, Ls.3-4.)
Johnson also asked Detective Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing
whether he "learned quickly" who Santos' "close associates were." (Tr., p.422, LS.1618.) Detective Harkins answered: "I don't know which ones you're referring
was several interviewed that were friends of his."

(Tr., p.422, Ls.19-21.)

to. There
Johnson

specifically asked about "Ayala," and Detective Harkins agreed he was Interviewed.
(Tr., p.422, Ls.22-24.) Johnson then asked whether Detective Harkins ever "took any
DNA swab from Ayala." (Tr., p.422, L.25 - p.423, L.1.) Detective Harkins testified that
he could not recall. (Tr., p.423, lo3.) Johnson did not ask Detective Harkins about
fingerprinting Ayala, nor did she ask him about any other of Santos' "associates. n (See
generally Tr., pp.377-441.)
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A review of the evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing
reveals Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's cross-examination
of Detective Harkins at trial was anything but strategic and tactical. In fact, Johnson
failed to present any evidence to support a number of the deficiencies she alleged in
relation to Dete~ive Harkins' cross-examination. Johnson also failed to demonstrate
any proof of prejudice resulting from the cross-examination that was conducted,
particularly when Detective Harkins' trial testimony is compared to his post-conviction
testimony. This claim should be dismissed.

c,

Bruno Santos

Johnson's Petition alleges counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine
Bruno Santos about the "abundant information" that Santos "was dealing drugs," "had
gang connections," and had "committed the crime of statutory rape." (Petition, p.13, ~
16.d.)
At trial, prior to Santos testifying, the state moved, in limine, to preclude the
defense from asking Santos about his arrest on October 30. 2004, or about "statutory
rape" or "having sexual relations with Sarah Johnson." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2739, L.8-

p.2740, L.3.) The prosecutor objected to any inquiry on the arrest as irrelevant and on
the grounds that Santos would "be claiming the Fifth" on any "pending case" and would
also "invoke his privilege not to incriminate himself' on his sexual relationship with
Johnson. (ld.) The state also objected to any questions on a previous battery charge
when Santos was a juvenile. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2740, L24 - p.2741, L.7.) Counsel for
Santos confirmed that he advised Santos to "invoke his privilege against self~
incrimination with respect to any questions relating to drug activity" and any questioning
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(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2743, Ls.12-15,

p.2751, L.24 - p.2752, L.18.)
Mr. Rader responded to the state's motion and ultimately agreed not to inquire of
Santos regarding his October 30 arrest or the "juvenile information." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2745,Ls.4-17.)

Mr. Rader, however, stated he was "going to ask questions about

[Santos'] gang involvement" and "the fact that he admitted having sexual relations with
Sarah Johnson seven times, and she was

a minor at the time and he was an adult."

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2747, Ls.1-6; see also p.2748, L.1 - p.2749, L.6 (Mr. Rader
explaining in detail why Santos' gang involvement and "other bad acts" should be
admitted), p.2750, L.4 - p.2751, L 1 (Mr, Rader offering further argument regarding why
he believes certain evidence relating to Santos should be admitted).)
The court limited cross-examination of Santos as follows:

, .. 1will allow you to ask the questions outside the presence of the
jury and make an offer of proof.
What my research is is that if the defendant intends - I mean the
witness intends to invoke the Fifth and you know that, you cannot ask him
those questions; because the Fifth is not an answer -- it's not evidence, I
mean.
It's an answer, but it's not eVidence; and it's designed solely to
support an improper inference in front of the jury. And I won't let you do
that.
You also represented that you have this same evidence available
through other witnesses; and you have also - it's also in the record that
this same evidence is before the jury, undisputed.
So having Santos get on the stand and take the Fifth can only be,
from my view, for an improper purpose, and that's to try to cause an
improper inference in front of the jury. And that's why ( won't let you do it.
You tell me that you have this evidence from a variety of sources,
so we're not going to go there. But if you people want to reach that little
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stipulated fact [that there was a sexual relationship between Santos and
Johnson], then we'll go from there.
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV. p.2754, L.21 - p.27S5, L 19.)
Although the trial court limited the scope of cross-examination of Santos, much of
the information that was subject to the state's motion in limine had already been elicited
through cross-examination of other witnesses. For example, during cross-examination
of Sheriff Femling. Mr. Rader elicited that Santos was a "look-out" for a fight, which
resulted in a suspension. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2474, L.8 - p.2475, L.3.) Mr. Rader also
asked Sheriff Femling about Santos' reported drug use, to which Sheriff Femling
responded: "I think we did show that he does have involvement in drugs" and that he
had "used illegal drugs." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2475. L.21 - p.2476., L.7.)
On direct examination at trial, Santos testified (1) he was dating Johnson when
the murders occurred (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2761, Ls.15-19); (2) Alan Johnson came to his
apartment the weekend before the murders and threatened that if he did not "'eave his
daughter alone, ... he was gOing to hit [him] and ... put [him] in jail" (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.Z762, Ls.S-1B); (3) he saw Johnson the Monday before the murders and she was
acting "weird" (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2763, L.9 - p.2764, L.7); (4) he spent the night at
home the night before the murders (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2764, Ls.16-20); (5) his cousin,
Jane Lopez, called him about the murders the morning they occurred (Trial Tr' Vol. IV,
j

p.2764, L.24 - p.2765. L.S); (6) he was surprised about the murders and went to the
Johnson's home to see what happened (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.Z765, L.6 - p.2766, L.9); (7)
he allowed law enforcement to search his car and apartment, he submitted to fingerprint
and blood testing, and gave them his clothes (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2766, L.16 - p.2767,
L.3); (8) he saw Johnson at the hospital the day of the murders at which time she
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hugged him and told him she loved him and said she was sorry and "not to worry" (Trial
Tr. Vol. IV, p.2768, L.7 - p.2768, L.5); (9) he was deported in September 2003 and
t

returned to the United States to testify (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2768, L.17 - p.2769, L.4);

(10) he was not at the Johnson's hOllse the night before the murders and did not
remember Johnson telling him there were guns in the guest house (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2769, Ls.5-10); and (11) there was a wedding at the Johnson's house the weekend
before the murders th.at Johnson wanted him to attend, but Alan would not let him,
which upset Johnson (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2770. L.21 - p.2770, L6).
having anything to do with murdering Alan and Diane. (Trial

Santos denied

Tr" Vol. IV, p.2769, Ls.11-

13.)
When asked about details regarding his relationship with Johnson and her
feelings towards: her parents, Santos was vague and non-commIttal:
Q:
Did Sarah ever talk to you, Bruno, about living together and buying
a house, and your family coming to live with you?

A:.
On,e day, we were just playing around, and we were just saying
things. .
Q:
Did Sarah eVer tell you, Bruno, that she wanted to move out of her
parents' house?
A:

I don't remember.

Q;

Did Sarah ever talk to you about how she felt about her parents?

A:

A few times. I'm not really sure.

Q:
Was Sarah -- Did Sarah ever talk about being upset or not liking
her dad?
A:

One time, I think. I'm not really sure. I don't know.

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p_2770, Ls.7-21 (bold omitted).)

RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 22

FEB. 14.2011- 4: 14PM

lDAHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

NO. 343

P. 24

After Santos testified on direct examination, Mr. Rader advised the court that the
defense "decided not to enter into a stipulation" and "decided not to cross examine Mr.

Santos," (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2771. Ls.11-13.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked both Mr. Rader and
Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to cross-examine Santos. Despite Mr. Raders
vigorous response to the state's motion in limine regarding the scope of Santos' cross·
examination, Mr. Rader claimed at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. Pangburn would,
without any "warning," have Mr. Rader cross..examine witnesses he had not planned on
cross-examining. (Tr., p.172, Ls.19-24.) Although Mr. Rader could not recall how many
witnesses he cross-examined, or even recall the witnesses he was responsible for, he
claimed Mr. Pangburn gave him the responsibility of cross-examining Santos without
any prior notice. (Tr., p.172, L13-p.173, L.2, p.188, L.5-p.189, L2.)
Mr. Pangburn denied Mr. Rader's assertions, testifying that the deciSion to have
Mr. Rader cross-examine Santos and other witnesses was not made at the last minute,
and that Mr. Rader did not object to cross-examining any particular witness. (Tr., p.282,
L.19 - p.283, L.19.) Mr. Pangburn's testimony in this regard is more credible than Mr.
Rader's given Mr. Rader's Involvement in arguing the motion in limine, during which he
demonstrated extensive knowledge of the information available on which Santos could
be cross-examined and the reasons why he believed such cross-examination should
have been permitted (see generally Trial Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2741-2743, 2747-2754), and in
light of Mr. Rader's general inability to remember who he cross-examined; most
significantly, Mr. Rader still believed at the time of the post-conviction hearing that he
handled the fingerprint evidence even though the record clearly Indicates Mr. Pangburn
handled that evidence (TL, p.188,

L.S - p.189, L.2; Trial Tr' Vol. V,
j

pp.3058~3072; Vol.
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VII, pp.5045-5100 (Mr. Pangburn examining witnesses regarding the fingerprint
evidence).)
Johnson also called Santos as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing. (Tr., pp.472-490.) As the trial court did, this Court concluded that Santos
could invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (See id.) When
asked about his "gang connections," Santos did just that, declining to answer any
questions on that subject. (Tr., p.482, Ls.10-14.) Johnson did not ask Santos about the
other topics she claimed in her Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
inquIre into, i.e., "dealing drugs" and whether he had "committed the crime of statutory
rape.'rS (Petition, p.13, 4fi 16.d; Tr., pp.472-490.)
Johnson failed to meet her burden of proving counsel's decision not to crossexamine Santos was anything but strategic or that the decision was objectively
unreasonable in light of the testimony Santos offered on direct and the limitations on
cross-examination. Johnson likewise failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the
failure to cross-examine Santos,

Santos provided no additional testimony at the

evidentiary hearing that would have aided in Johnson's defense and there is no reason
to conclude that cross-examination of Santos at trial would have resulted in a different
outcome in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Johnson and the
complete absence of any evidence implicating Santos in the murders. Johnson failed to
meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief on her claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to cross-examine Santos.

Nor did Johnson ask either Mr. Rader or Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to enter
into a stipulation regardIng the sexual nature of Johnson's relationship with Santos.
(See generally Tr., pp.138-187, 196-198, 237-279.)
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Consuelo Cedeno

With respect to Ms. Cedeno, Johnson alleges in her Petition:
Mr~ Pangburn had been provided information based on prior
statements of Consuelo Cedeno wherein she insisted her son Bruno
Santos had not driven the car the morning of the murders because there
was dew on the windshield. Further, Ms. Cedeno asserted in pre.trial
statements that she checked the mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno
was lying about where he had been .... Ms. Cedeno testified at trial that
she didn't pay attention to such thjngs. Yet, Trial Counsel failed to crossexamine Ms. Cedeno.

(Petition, p.12. ~ 16.a.v. (capitalization original. citations omitted).)

At trial, Ms. Cedeno testified (through an interpreter), in relevant part, as follows:
Q:
Okay, the morning Alan and Diane Johnson were killed, Tuesday
morning, did you go to work that morning?

A:

Yes.

Q:
Do' you recall seeing Bruno in the house that morning when you
went to work?

A:

Yes.

Q:

What was he dOing?

A:

He was sleeping.

Q:

All right, and about what time do you go to work?

A:

Well, exactly, I couldn't really tell you, I don't remember, but I think
around 7:30, 8:00. I always leave around 7:30 or 8:00.
Q:

Okay, where was Bruno sleeping at that time?

A:

In a mattress in the living room. And then my bedroom is right next

to it.
Q:
And when you left to work that morning, the morning Alan and
Diane were killed, did you see Bruno's car in the parking lot?

A:
It's actually my car, and I always take it; and sometimes he does
take it, too. But it's usually just me, because I am the one that has the
key I so it was parked.
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Q:
And could you tell whether or not It looked like the car had been
driven that morning before you got into it?

A:

No.

Q:

And how could she tell?

A:

Because I have the key. r have the key.

Q:
Miss Cedeno, was there anything on the window, was there dew on
the window?

A:
Well, no, no. I don't pay attention to things like that. But no, I didn't
look.
But it's her car and she had the keys to it? It's your car, and you
had the keys to it, is that correct?

Q:

A:

Always.

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2774, L.19 - p.2776, L.9.)
Mr. Rader indicated the defense would not be cross-examining Ms. Cedeno.
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2ne, Ls.12-13.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Pat Dunn, trial counsels' lead
investigator, testified that he made counsel aware of information that Ms. Cedeno "gave
statements to the police concerning ... the condition of Bruno's vehicle, which was
actually her vehicle," that there was "dew on the window, that she checked the odmoter,
and various things like that." (Tr., p.62, Ls.18-23.)

Mr. Dunn also testified that he

"consulted with some weather people and found out that there was, in fact, no dew in
the Hailey area on the other side of the airport that day, so there would have been no
dew on the windows," (Tr., p.63, Ls.3-7.)
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While examining Mr. Rader at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson
asked Mr. Rader about his decision not to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno.

(Tr., p.178,

Ls.15-21.) Mr. Rader testified that he did not "remember doing that. but [he] wouldn't b.e
surprised if [he] did." (Tr., p.178, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Rader further testified that, although he
did not remember that Ms. Cedeno made certain statements to police about keeping
track of the mileage on the car or that Stantos "was always lying to her," he was not
prepared 'to cross-examine her because Mr. Pangburn "handed off that witness." (Tr.,

p.179, L.i3 - p.180, L.5.)
Johnson called Ms. Cedeno as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing. (Tr., pp.457-468.) Ms. Cedeno largely denied any recollection of the events
surrounding the murders of Alan and Diane. (Tr., pp.460-468.) With respect to the only
claim in Johnson's Petition regarding the cross-examination of Ms. Cedeno - that
counsel failed to cross-examine her regarding her statements to law enforcement that
she checked the mileage on the car and saw dew on the windshield the morning of the
murders - Ms. Cedeno testified she did not remember making either statement to law
enforcement. (Tr., p.464, L.7 p.468, L.7.)
Regardless of whether Mr. Rader felt prepared to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno,
Johnson has failed to establish he was deficient for failing to impeach her regarding a
pre-trail statement she made to law enforcement that she directly contradicted on direct
examination. Johnson also failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Mr. Rader's
failure to inquire into this topic at trial because, regardless of what Ms. Cedeno's answer
would have been at that time, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of
Johnson's trial would have been different as a result. This claim should be dismissed.
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Jane Lopez

AS to Jane Lopez, Johnson's Petition alleges:

[A] discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial testimony and proof to
the contrary found in phone records, indicating Bruno Santos was not at
his mother's house. Trial Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy,
yet, Trial Counsel failed to utilize the records on cross-examination.
(Petition, p,12,

1f 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted).)

At trial, Ms. Lopez, who is Santos' cousin, and who worked at the Blaine County
High School at the time of the murders, testified that after she heard about the murders,
she called Santos around 8:30. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV~ p.2789. L 14 - p.2791, L.20.) Ms.
Lopez testified that first she called Santos' house, i'and he didn't answer," so she "called
his cell phone, and he answered." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791, Ls.22-24.) She asked
Santos "where he was, and he said, 'At home.'" (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791, Ls.24-25.)
When Ms. Lopez asked why he did not answer the home phone, Santos stated he was
sleeping and told Ms. Lopez that if she did not believe him, she should call him again at
the home number. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV. p.2791, L25 - p.2792, L.S.) Ms. Lopez testified
that she then did call Santos at home, "he answered the phone," and she told him about
the murders.

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p,2792, Ls.S-B.) According to Ms. Lopez, Santos

"seemed really surprised and really shocked." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2792, Ls.22-25.)
Mr. Rader cross-examined Ms. Lopez at trial. asking whether those were the
"only phone calls" she made to Santos. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2794, Ls.6-7.) Ms. Lopez
answered. "yeah." (Trial Tr.. Vol. IV, p.2794. L.15.)
Ms. Lopez reiterated this version of events at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing. (Tr., p.370, L.22 - p.372, L.10, p.374, L.19 - p.375, L1.) Ms. Lopez did not,

however. remember the actual phone numbers she called.

(Tr., p.375. Ls.1-25.)
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Johnson did not attempt to impeach Ms. Lopez with any phone records. (Tr., pp.368376.)
Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's decision regarding
the cross-examination of Ms. Lopez was anything but strategic, much less that it was
defioient, and she failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Mr. Rader's failure to
try and impeach Ms. Lopez with the phone records.

Indeed, Johnson did not even

attempt to do so at the post~conviction evidentiary hearing. Consequently, she cannot
demonstrate hoW any such impeachment would have made a difference.

Because

Johnson has falted to meet her burden of showing counsel was ineffective in his crossexamination of Ms, Lopez, this claim should be dismissed.

f.

Raul Ornelas

Johnson's Petition alleges trial counsel "faIlIed} to adequately cross-examine
Officer Raul Ornelas who testified regarding footprints allegedly observed in wet grass
in the back yard." and U[s)pecifically, ... failed to point out the [sic] Tim Richards, the
neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked the very area of the back yard
later observed by Ornelas," and counsel ''further failed to highlight the fact that Ornelas
concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person, thereby pointing
blame from fjohnson1 alone and onto unidentified murders." (Petition, p.10,

11 16.a.ii.)

At trial, TIm Richards, who was not called as a witness at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing, testified that after Johnson came to his home reporting that her
parents had been shot, he walked down the "gravel road" by the Johnson residence and
"peered into the backyard," then "went around the back side of the guest house" where
"there's a little bit more gravel." (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1586, Ls.7.1D, p.1607, Ls.15-25.)
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Mr. Richards further testified that there is a dirt hill behind the guest house and that he
did not see any footprints going up the hill. (Trial Tr" Vol. III, p.1608. Ls.4.18.)
With respect to footprints, Officer Ornelas testified on direct examination at trial
that, after responding to the Johnson residence, he was "looking around" and "noticed
that there were tracks in the lawn."

(Trial Tr., Vol. 11/, p.1735, Ls.17-18.) The prints

were IIdue north 'to the back of th[e] guesthouse" and "disappeared there by the stairs."
(Trial Tr., Vol. III. p.1736, Ls.10-12.) In all, Officer Ornelas saw "two or three sets of
footprints" because the grass was dewy, "including "footprints that led back to the
garage." (Trial Tr., Vol. III. p.1736, L.20 - p.1737, L.15.) Officer Ornelas could not,
however. tell whether the prints belonged to more than one person. (Trial Tr., Vol. /II,
p.1737, Ls.20-22.)

Officer Ornelas did not observe any footprints going up the

embankment behind the house or from the "patio that leads off of the bedroom ... on
the northeast side." (Tria/Tr., Vol. III, p.1738, Ls.14-25, p.1739, Ls.11-19.)
Mr. Pangburn cross-examined Officer Ornelas at trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. /Il, pp.17591772.) On cross-examination, Mr. Pangburn specifically asked Officer Ornelas about
the footprints he observed in the yard and his failure to conduct an "extensive search" of
the hillside for footprints. (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, pp.1765-1771.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary healing, Johnson did not ask Mr. Pangburn
about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Officer Ornelas. (See Q..enerally
Tr., pp.239-279.)

Johnson did, however. inquire of Officer Ornelas regarding his

recollection of the footprints he observed on the morning of the murder.

(Tr.,

p.205,Ls.15-18.) Officer Ornelas reiterated that he observed footprints in the backyard
and again described those plints. (Tr., pp.205-209.) Officer Ornelas further testified
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that he was not aware of "anybody else" who had "been in the backyard looking for a
possible perpetrator prior to [his} arrivaL" (Tr., p.209, Ls.8-1S.)
Contrary to the assertions in Johnson's Petition, there is no evidence that Mr.
Richards "walked the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas." Rather,
Mr. Richards only testified that he walked down the gravel road, not that he walked in
the grass, whicA is where Officer Ornelas obseNed the footprints.

Also contrary to

Johnson's assertion, Officer Ornelas did not "conclude[ ] the footprints were made by
more than one person;') in fact, he specifically testified that he could not tell. Thus,
Johnson failed to prove

it was either deficient performance or prejudicial to fail to I'point

out'l or "highlight" Information that was not actually in evidence. Further, Johnson failed
to offer any evidence, let alone prove, that Mr. Pangburn's cross--examination of Officer
Ornelas was anything but tactical. Johnson's claim regarding Officer Ornelas should be
dismissed.

g.

~tu

Robinson

In her Petition, Johnson alleges trial counsel "should have been aware" that
"Officer Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted that no latent prints were found
at the crime scene" but "[d]lscoverable documentsI

J made

absolutely clear

that this

testimony was inaccurate and false testimony, in that the record reveals that thirty nine

(39) latent prints were found at the scene .... " (Petition, p.13, 1T 16.b.)
Mr. Rader cross-examined Mr. Robin'son at trial and did not attempt to impeach
him with his grand jury testimony. (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, pp.2069-2082.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson read the following excerpt
from his grand jury testimony to Mr. Robinson:
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Mr. Robinson, that [grand} juror asked: You say you found a .264
casing in the garage and one in the chamber. r'm wondering If any prints
were taken and found on those casings.
[fhe prosecutor] interjected, as it's his right to do, and said: Good
point. Let me ask you this, Detective Robinson. Did you collect the gun,
the scope, the casings, and probably a whole host of other things to send
for fingerprint analysis?
And you said at that time - this is back
we did.

in October of 2003 -- yes,

Question [by the prosecutor]: Now, on the gun and the scope and
the casing, did your Idaho State Police lab do that analysis or attempt to
do that analysis?
Mr. Robinson: Yes, that's correct.
[The prosecutor] asked you the question: Now, based On your - on
your, I guess, investigation and as part of your case review, as far as you
know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the scope, or the
casings?
And you answered: They could not locate any prints that could be
identified .

(Tr., p.230, L.19 - p.231, L.17.)
Johnson then asked Mr. Robinson to agree that the testimony was inaccurate.

(fr., p.232, Ls.15-17.)

Mr. Robinson did not agree and explained that, contrary to

Johnson's interpretation of the testimony, his testimony accurately stated that the prints
could not. at that time, be identified. (Tr., p.232. L.18 - p.234, l,2; see also Tr., p.236,
L.21 - p.237, L.3.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Mr. Rader about
his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Mr. Robinson.

(See generally Tr.,

pp.138-187, 196-199.) Johnson, therefore, failed to establish Mr. Raders decisions
regarding cross-examination of Mr. Robinson were anything but tactical. Johnson also
failed to prove any prejudice resulting from Mr. Rader's failure to attempt to impeach Mr.
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Robinson based upor1 post-oonviction oounsel's erroneous Interpretation of Mr.
Robinsonis grand jury testimony. This olaim should be dismissed.
Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing either defioient
perionnanoe .or prejudjce with respect to the cross-examination .of any witness, the
Court should dismiss Claim 4(e) in its entirety.

D.

Claim 4(f)
In Claim '4(f), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present

evidence .of an audio reoording that allegedly illustrates the police IIfocused" on Jchnson
''to the exclusion of all .other pcssible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] was the
easiest target." (Petition, p.13,

11

16.c.) The recording tc which Johnsen presumably

refers was a recording from Officer Kirtley's micr.ophone and dashboard camera, which
recorded from the moment he was dispatched to the crime scene to approximately two
hours later, when he was still at the scene. (Exhibit 12.) The audio porticn of the
recording reveals a number of conversations among members .of law enforcement,
many of which are inaudIble. (Id.) Johnson played the entirety of the recording at the
evidentiary hearing (Tr., p.332, L.18, p.334, L.13), and asked Sheriff Femling about
some of the voices he could identffy en the recording (Tr., p.335, L 17 - p.336, L12).
Johnson then inquired about Sheriff Femling's theory about what happened, the details
of which are set forth in Section C.1.a., supra, and are incorporated by reference herein.
Johnson failed to meet her burden of proving that Officer Kirtley's audio recording
demonstrates any "f.ocus" other than an effort to "follow the evidence" as opposed to
jump to conclusions that there was a murder-suicide - a theory not even the defense
pursued, Further, Johnson failed to establish that the decision not to introduce such

RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 33

FEB.14.2011

NO. 343

4:15PM

P. 35

evidence was objectively unreasonable or that introduction of such evidence, assuming

it could even be correctly characterized as Johnson has chara'cterlzed it, would remotely
undermine confidence in the outcome of her case.
Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel was
ineffective for failing to introduce the entirety of Officer Kirtley's audio, the Court should
deny relief on Claim 4(f).

E.

Claim 12'
In Claim 12, Johnson alleges there is newly discovered evidence Warranting a

new trial. (Petition, pp.22-25,

mr 27-30.)

Specifically, she alleges that latent fingerprints

on Mel Speegle's rifle, scope and an insert on a box of .264 caliber ammunition were
identified as belonging to Christopher Kevin Hill. Johnson failed to meet her burden of
establishing the identification of Mr. Hill's fingerprints requires a neW trial.

1.

Proposed Factual Findings Relevant To Claim 12

At trial, TIna Walthall, a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho State Police, testified
that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos, Alan Johnson, Diane
Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (the cleaning lady), Russell Nux (the cleaning
lady's boyfriend). and Robin LeHat (the cleaning lady's employer).

(Trial Tr. t Vol. V,

p.3009, Ls.16-2Q.) Ms. Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints lifted
from the crime scene. s (Trial Tr., Vol. V p.3018, Ls.2-5.) After those comparisons,
j

certain fingerprints taken from the crime scene remained unidentified, including
fingerprints found on the stock of the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3027, L.20 - p.3028, L.22) ,

e None of the fingerprints taken from the crime scene matched Santos or Sylten. (Trial
Tr., Vol. V, p.3020. Ls.15~24.)
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the scope from the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3042, L.Z2 - p.3044. L.2), and two boxes of
.264 shells (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3049, L.8 - p.3052, L.3). A search of the Automated
Fingerprint Identification System prior to trial using three of the unidentified prints also
revealed no matches to

any of the unidentified fingerprints. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3045,

L.1 - p.3046, L.10, p.30S3, Ls.5-11, p.3066, Ls.1-13.)
Ms. Walthall also repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to
determine when it was left (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3028. Ls.13-17, p.3044, Ls.22-25, p.3052,
Ls.22-25, p.305S, L.19-p.3062. L.11, p.3073, Ls.5-15.) Ms. Walthall specifically stated:
(1) "many, many years can pass and you might still find usable fingerprints on" paper or
cardboard (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3060, Ls.1 0-11); (2) she has discovered prints off of
nonporous surfaces more than a year later (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061, Ls.4-5); (3) one
would expect to' find fingerprints more than a year old if nothing happened between
"when they were deposited and when [they were] processed" (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061,
Ls.20-25); and (4) "it is probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a
year, providing there has been rrothlng to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which
is true even on a nonporous surface (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3062, Ls.3-6).
Johnson called Robert Kerchusky at trial to rebut Ms. Walthall's testimony. (See
generally Trial Tr.. Vol. VII, pp.5044-5132.)

With respect to the length of time a

fingerprint will remain on a gun, Mr. Kerchusky testified: "WeU, we can't be sure how
long they're going to last. The only thing. as far as a gun is concerned, pretty much on
my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm concerned." (Trial Tr"
VoL VII, p.5070, Ls.9-12;

~

also Tr., Vol. V, p.5128, L.22 - p.5129, L.1.)

Mr.

Kerchusky, howevert acknowledged that aging of fingerprints on nonporous surfaces is
a controversial subject because "there's so many variables as far as weather, where it's
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located. I mean there's so many things that come into It, there's no way in the world
anybody could write any article on it."

(Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5107, Ls.3-6.)

Mr.

Kerchusky also acknowledged that fingerprints on porous surfaces can last for years
and that there are some "rare" instances where a latent prlnt that was over a year old
could be found on a nonporous surface.

(Trial Tr.. Vol. VII, p.5130, Ls.8-16.)

Mr.

Kerchusky further testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is,
he "stili would have an opinion as far as whether ifs a fresh print or not." (Triar Tr., Vol.
VII, p.5108, Ls.1 6.)
u

Mel Speegle, the owner of the .264 rifle Johnson used to murder her parents,
testified at trial that (1) he kept the rffie in his closet along with three other guns (Triar
Tr., Vol. IV, p.2702, L.B - p.2703, L.2); (2) the guns were not locked (Trial Tr. t Vol. IV,
p.2703, Ls.3-8); (3) he saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the
scope was still on the .264 rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2704, L.6 - p.2706, L.B); (4) he had
only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2706, Ls.17-21); (5)
he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (Trial Tr" Vol. IV, p.2708, Ls.2-9); and (6) he has no idea
how many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a friend helped him move into
the guesthouse (Trial TL, Vol. IV, p.2707, Ls.11-22).

Mr. Speegle also testified that

Johnson had access to his apartment, that Johnson knew he would be gone the
weekend before the murders, and that the .264 rifle, as well as his other guns and
ammunition, were in the closet when Johnson cleaned his apartment and stayed there
with friends. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2693, Ls.17-20, p.2694, L.25 - p.2696, L.6, p.2715,
Ls.12-25.)
In 2009, approximately four years after Johnson's criminal trial. Ms, Walthall
compared the unidentified prints from the murder scene to prints belonging to Mr. Hill.
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(fr., p.652, Ls.2-21.) Ms. Walthall testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing
that, of the previously unidentified fingerprints, Mr. Hill's matched those that were found
on the scope, the boxes of ammunition, and the rifle. (fr., p.654, Ls.2·22; see also
p.SS9, Ls.11-14.)

Ms. Walthall also testified, as she did at trial, about "aging"

fingerprints and how long fingerprints can last. (See generally Tr., pp.661--67D.) Ms.
Walthall reiterated the opinion previously expressed at trial that fingerprints can last
longer than a year. (Tr., p.670, Ls.4-11.)
Mr. Kerchusky also testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.

(fL,

pp.538-638.) Mr. Kerchusky's post-conviction testimony was substantially similar to his
trial testimony in that he testlfled that fingerprints left on nonporous surfaces "will be
gone within a year." (fr., , p.553, L.15 - p.554, L1D.) Mr. Kerchusky also referred to
the prints on the rIfle, scope, and ammunition as "fresh" because, according to him, any
prints left on the gun before Mr. Speegle put them in his closet would have been wiped
off by the clothes hanging in his closet and because the prints were not "etched.» (Tr.,
p.589, Ls.2-15; see also Tr., p.609, L.22 - p.610, L 17, p.612, L.21 - p.613, L21.) With
respect to the new information that some of the previously unidentified fingerprints had
been matched to Mr. Hill, Mr. Kerchusky testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Hill was the
last person to touch the .264 rifle and scope and that it was Mr. Hill who removed the
scope. (Tr., p.615, L23 - p.616. L.19.) However, Mr. Kerchusky admitted on crossexamination (as he did at trial) that he has no way of knowing when fingerprints are
placed on any given item. (Tr., p.627, Ls.1117.)
Mr. Speegle and Mr. Hill also both testified at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing. (fr., pp.699-724. 726-739.) Mr. Speegle testified that he moved into the guest
house on the Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (fL, p.699, Ls.10-15,) Mr, Hill

RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 37

FEB.14,2011

NO. 343

IDAHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

4:16PM

P. 39

helped Mr. Speegle move from his uranch house" into the Johnson guest house. (fr.,
p.700, Ls.18·20, p.703, Ls.20-23.) Mr. Hill was

a "good friend" of Mr. Speegle's and had

been a caretaker at Mr. Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Mr. Speelge's
.264 rifle. (Tr., p.704, Ls.1-4, 11·13, p.724, Ls.10-20.) To Mr. Speegle's knowledge,
Mr. Hill did no have access to the Johnson guest house. (Tr., p.704, Ls.8-10.)
Mr. Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Mr. Speegle's ranch and that he
helped Mr. Speegle move Ita few things" into the Johnson guest house.

(Tr., p.726,

Ls.14-17, p.727, Ls.S.12.) Mr. Hill also confinned that he did not have access to the
guest house.

(Tr., p.727, Ls.13-16.)

involvement in the murders of Alan

Mr. Hill specifically, and credibly, denied any

and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the

murders until about one week after they occurred because he had been camping. (Tr.,
p.728, Ls.5~20.)

In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other than

having possibly left them when he helped Mr. Speegle move, Mr. HilI testified that,
during the springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Mr. Speegle's ranch. he "took

it out, tried to sight it," and shot it "six or seven times" using Mr. Speegle's ammunition.

(fr., p.728, L.21- p.729, L.7; ~also p.729. L.24 - p.731, L21.)
2.

Conclusions Of Law Relevant To Claim 4(eJ

In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme
Court arttculated a four-part test a defendant must satisfy In order to be entitled to a new
trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show
that the evidence offered (1) is "newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at
the time of trial"; (2) is material. not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably
produce an acquittal; and (4) could not have been discovered through the exercise of
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diligence on the part of the defendant. ld. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. In announcing this
four~part

test, the Court cited Professor Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure

and specifically noted his comment, "after a man has had his day in court, and has been
fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial." Id. (citation omitted).
Consistent with. the four-part test in Drapeau and Professor Wright's comment, the
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence known to the defendant at the
time of trial cannot be considered newly discovered. See,.§,Jh, State v. Weise, 75 Idaho
404,410,273 P:2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which defendant was aware of prior to trial
but chose not to present is not newly discovered); State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99, 11
P.2d 619, 622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial is not newly discovered); State v.
Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts unknown at time of trial could be
considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho 45, 88 Po 240, 242 (1907)
(concluding evidence that colts were not stolen but actually belonged to rancher for
which defendants worked was not newly discovered).
Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing that the discovery that Mr.
Hill's fingerprints on the .264 rifle, scope, and ammunition boxes is material or would
likely produce an acquittal. At trial, evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the
scope, the box and elsewhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (Trial Tr., Vol.
VII, p.5045, L.15 - p.5132, L15; Vol. VIII, p.580a, L.1 - p.5843, LA; p.5846, L16p.5858, L17; Vol. V, p.2994, L10 - p.3077, L25.) It was establ·ished that unidentified
fingerprints were on the scope, gun, some of the shells, and the box containing the
shells. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3077, Ls.1-17.) Thus, it was established at tria! that Johnson
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Because evidence that people other than Johnson had at some point handled the
scope and the ammunition box, and had left fingerprints thereon. was well established
at trial, the only evidence that is even arguably newly discovered is the identity of one of
the previously unidentified persons to handle the scope and the box of ammunition.
Knowing his name, however, is not material to this case or likely to produce an acquittal.
Evidence at trial that someone (who was unknown at that time) other than Johnson had
touched the scope and ammunition bOle did not create a reasonable doubt as to
Johnson's guilt. . The jury had no reasonable doubt that the person who had deposited
those fingerprints was in fact the actual killer, instead of Johnson - otherwise the Jury
would have acqUitted. Knowing a name to associate with those prints does not change
that calculus in the slightest
In addition, both Mr. Speegle and Hill testified at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing regarding When, how and where Mr. Hill had touched the gun. Being able to do
so made the fingerprint evidence of even Jess value to Johnson than it was at trial when
the state was not able to provide any information about how the unknown fingerprints
could have gotten where they were found. Even Mr. Kerchusky acknowledged at the
evidentiary hearing that fingerprints alone are not evidence of guilt; rather, prints are
often obtained, as they were in this case, for the purpose of eliminating individuals as
suspects. (Tr., pp.632-635.) Matching the previously unidentified prints to Mr. Hill, in
conjunction with the evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing
regarding his whereabouts at the time of the murders and his (and Mr. Speegle's)
credible explanations regarding why Mr. Hill's prints would be found on the rifle, scope,
and ammunition, does nothing to aid Johnson's defense.
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Indeed, whether an unknown person who had left fingerprints on the scope and
ammunition box could have been the killer was one of the issues at trial. The jury
clearly rejected the argument that the prints created reasonable doubt as to Johnson's
guilt. That we now know the source of at least some of those prints in no way indicates
that a jury would view the presence of those prints any differently. Because the jury
necessarily rejected the argument that the "real killer" left the fingerprints, newly
discovered evidence that the prints belong to a friend of the gun owner who used the
.264 rifle well before the murders is not material or Hkely to produce an acquittal.
Johnson also alleges the newly discovered fingerprint evidence somehow shows
that uTina Walthall's trial testimony asserting that Ms. Eguren has provided all latent
print lift cards was false" and that jf "this truth" had been known it is "reasonably likely"
that she would not have been convicted? (Petition, p.23, ~ 28a.) Johnson, however,
failed to establish Ms. Walthall's trial testimony was false and there are no reasonable
g·rounds to believe that any evidence regarding what fingerprint cards Ms. Eguren was
provided would have in any way been important to the verdict.
Because Johnson is not entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence, the Court should deny relief on Claim 12 as well as all other claims that have
not been previously dismissed.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2011.

Maria Eguren works for the idaho State Police and is responsible for "entering latents
in theAFIS system." (Tr., p.492, Ls.11-12.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW &
ORDER

__________~R=e~sp~o=n=d=e=nt~___________)
COMES NOW Petitioner and files this, her PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and in support thereof states as follows;
THIS MATTER having come on for bench trial before the undersigned judge on
December 6, 2010 for adjudication of a Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, plaintiff appearing personally and with her attorney, Christopher P. Simms, and
the State appearing by Deputy Idaho Attorneys General, Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth
K. Jorgensen, acting as Special Prosecuting Attorneys, and the Court having heard
testimony and received certain documents, deposition testimony, recorded statements and
events into evidence, and having considered same,
NOW THEREFORE the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order:

PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Petitioner, Sarah Johnson, was tried and convicted by an Ada County jury of two

counts of Murder in the First Degree, with Firearm Enhancement, in Blaine County Case
No. CR-2003-1820, as a result of the death of her parents.
2.

On or about June 30, 2005 Petitioner was sentenced to two (2) terms of

Determinate Life, Plus Fifteen years.
3.

Trial Counsel failed to timely file notice of appeal.

4.

On or about April 19,2006 Petitioner filed her initial Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, from which relief was granted, to pursue direct appeal, with proceedings on other
issues stayed.
5.

On or about June 26, 2008 the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion affirming

convictions in State v. Johnson, Case No. 33312, which decision can be found at 188
PJd 912 (ID 2008).
6.

On or about August 15, 2008 this Court lifted the previously entered stay and

thereafter granted leave to file a First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
7.

On or about December 28, 2009 this Court entered its Order granting leave to file

a Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
8.

On or about February 8, 2010 Petitioner and the State filed Cross-Motions for

Summary Disposition.
9.

On or about April 30, 2010 oral argument was heard relating to said motions for

summary disposition, after which certain matters were taken under advisement and
certain matters ruled upon from the bench with a request to counsel to submit a proposed
order as directed.
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10.

On or about May 20, 2010 the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order

Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement, and thereafter on or about July 19,2010,
the court issued it Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Disposition.
11.

The State filed a Motion for Reconsideration which motion was granted on or

about December 2, 2010, by this Court's Memorandum Decision Granting Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration.
12.

On December 6, 2010, Petitioner filed her Memorandum Dismissing Claim.

13.

The remaining claims at issue for trial were those asserted in the Second

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief paragraphs 14, ISa., IS.c., 16.a.i., 16.a.ii.,
16.a.iii.,16.v., 16.vi., 16.b., 16.c., 16.d., 18.vi., I8.vii., and 29 and summarized as follows:
a. Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall lack of
diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case,
chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings,
including trial, all of which together resulted, cumulatively and
individually, a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict;
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a
continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine state's
expert, after learning the comforter had not been collected as
evidence;
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately
investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing
on blood splatter opinion evidence;
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d. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately crossexamine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez,
Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart
Robinson;
e. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present evidence
of an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross
Kirtley, which recording clearly proved the theory that police
focused on Petitioner Sarah Johnson, to the exclusion of all other
possible suspects and theories, because she was the easiest target;
f.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether
certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh;"

g. Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously
unidentified latent prints.

UNDISPUTED UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE FACTS
14.

On the morning of September 2, 2003, Alan and Diane Johnson were found shot

to death in their home, where they lived with their sixteen year old daughter, Sarah.
(!Inderlying Murder Trial Transcript "UMTT" pp. 1512-1514, 1593-1605)
15.

Almost immediately after the rifle blasts Sarah Johnson ran from the house

screaming that someone had shot her parents. CUMTT pp. 1518-20)
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16.

The first people at the house, initially neighbors and then police, found a

gruesome scene of blood and tissue literally dripping from the walls and ceilings of the
master bedroom and adjoining hallway.

(UMTT pp. 1593-1605, 1654-1663)

Mrs.

Johnson's body was found in the bed, with her head almost entirely blown off. (UMTT
pp. 1667-1668, 1795) Mr. Johnson's wet, naked body was found by the side of the bed,
with the master bath shower running. (UMTT pp. 1662, 1792)
17.

A .264 caliber rifle was on the floor in the doorway of the master bathroom.

(UMTT pp. 1600 & 1849, Exhibit 36)
18.

A more complete inventory of the crime scene located a pink robe, a pair of

surgical gloves, and five (5) .25 caliber automatic rounds in a trash can by the curb.
(UMTT

pp. 1673, 1894, 1900-01, 1949-52, Exhibit 37, see also property/evidence

location diagram Exhibit 35) A scope, which had been attached to the .264 caliber rifle,
was found on the bed in the garage apartment.

(UMTT pp. 2057, Exhibit 38)

Ammunition for the .264 was found in the closet of the garage apartment. (UMTT pp.
2029, Exhibit 39) In Sarah's room, across the hallway from the master bedroom, were
found a leather glove, two (2) live .264 rounds, and a 9mm magazine wrapped in a red
bandana. (UMTT pp. 2038-2040) In the garage attached to the main house a .22 rifle
was found sitting on top of a freezer with a box of .25 auto rounds, and a spent .264
casing was found on the floor. (UMTT pp. 1730,2038-49,5705)
19.

Further investigation revealed that one Mel Speegle was renting the garage

apartment, where he normally stayed from Sunday through Wednesday. The .264 murder
weapon belonged to Mr. Speegle. Speegle moved into the apartment approximately one
year prior to the murders. Speegle told police and testified he moved the .264 rifle into
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the apartment; and a few weeks prior to the murders, had held it and generally checked it
out. (Exhibit 40, Exhibit 41, Exhibit 42 & UMTT pp. 2694-2721)
20.

Sarah Johnson had been dating one Bruno Santos, an adult illegal immigrant, who

had been threatened with statutory rape prosecution in the weeks prior to the murders.
(UMTT pp. 3358-59, 5433-34) A search of Bruno's home revealed .25 automatic rounds
in the closet of his bedroom. (Exhibit 13) The surgical gloves held DNA from Sarah
Johnson. (UMTT pp. 3096-3110) The robe was spotted with a mixture of DNA, Mr. and
Mrs. Johnson's, Sarah's and an unknown male. The blood spots on the robe were from
Mr. and Mrs. Johnson and the same unknown person. (UMTT pp. 3436-3451) The .264
rifle, ammunition and ammunition containers, as well as the scope all had unidentified
latent finger and or palm prints, which have now been identified as those of one
Christopher Kevin Hill. (Exhibit 43, Exhibit 44, Exhibit 45, Exhibit 46 & Exhibit 47)
21.

During the underlying murder trial Bruno Santos testified that in August of 2003

he was dating Sarah Johnson; that Sarah had stayed the night at his house; that Sarah's
father came over and threatened him with bodily injury and jail if Bruno didn't leave
Sarah alone; that he was not at the Johnson home the night/morning of the murders, but
was at his house with his mother, sister and brother-in-law; that he was sleeping at home
when his cousin called on the phone, woke him and told him of the murders; that he was
not aware of any guns at the Johnson residence; that he had nothing to do with the
murders. (UMTT pp. 2760-2770)
22.

The defense team did not cross examine Bruno Santos. (UMTT pg. 2771)

23.

During the underlying murder trial Bruno Santos mother, Consuela Cedeno

testified that Sarah Johnson stayed over night at her house the weekend of the murders;
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that Sarah's father came over Saturday morning; denied that Mr. Johnson and Bruno had
a fight, or discussed that Bruno shouldn't be seeing Sarah because she was only sixteen
years old; that Bruno was at her house all afternoon 'and evening the day before the
murders; that Bruno was sleeping in her apartment when she woke up the morning of the
murders around 7:30 or 8:00 a.m.; that she couldn't tell whether her car had been driven
overnight because she didn't pay attention to things like dew on the windshield. (UMTT
pp. 2772-2776)
24.

The defense team did not cross examine Bruno Santos mother Consuela Cedeno.

(UMTT pg. 2776)
25.

During the underlying murder trial Bruno Santos cousin, Jane Lopez testified that

she learned of the murder of Sarah's parents by an announcement at Wood River High
School where she worked; that, at approximately 8:30 a.m., she called Bruno at the home
number, got no answer so she called on his cell phone, which he answered; that she didn't
believe Bruno was at home so she called him back on the home land line and spoke with
Bruno. (UMTT pp. 2789-2793)
26.

The defense team did not present documentary evidence that purportedly proved

Jane Lopez did not make the phone calls to Bruno as she claimed. (UMTT pg. 2794)
27.

During the underlying murder trial Robert Kerchusky, fingerprint expert, testified

on behalf of the defense. Lead trial counsel, Bobby Eugene Pangburn did not inquire of
Kerchusky his expert opinion that latent unidentified fingerprints found 011 the murder
weapon, scope, and ammunition packaging, were "fresh" prints. (TT 5045-5130)
28.

Petitioner was represented at the underlying murder trial by Bobby Eugene

Pangburn, as lead trial counsel, who testified before this Court at the post-conviction trial.
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29.

Petitioner was represented at underlying murder trial, by Mark Rader, as co-

counsel, who testified before this Court at the post-conviction triaL
30.

Patrick Dunn worked for trial counsel as the Defense investigator and testified

before this Court at the trial on Petition for post-conviction relief.

SUMMARY OF POST-CONVICTION TESTIMONY & EVIDENCE
31.

Mr. Pangburn is suspended from the practice of law in the State of Idaho, and in

the State of Oregon. Mr. Pangburn testified at the Post-Conviction trial (hereinafter
referred to as and/or cited as, "PCT" or "PCTT" £,ost Conviction Trial Transcript) and
denied the loss of his license to practice law was due to a charge of dishonesty, deceit or
misrepresentation, including conversion of client funds.

However, Exhibit 15, Idaho

Supreme Court Disciplinary Order In the Matter of Bobby E. Pangburn, conclusively
establishes that the suspension of Mr. Pangburn's license to practice law was a result of a
violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit of misrepresentation; and rule 1.16(d), " ... refunding any
advance payment of fee or expense not earned ... "
32.

Mr. Dunn testified that Mr. Pangburn failed to share discovery; attend defense

team meetings, and that Pangburn was unprepared, almost never present or was
chronically late. (PCTT pp. 40,41,42,44,94)
a. Mr. Dunn testified that the lawyers agreed Mr. Rader would deal with
forensic witnesses and examine those witnesses at trial while Pangburn,
would deal with and examine at trial all lay witnesses. (PCTT pg. 46)
b. Mr. Dunn testified the Defense team lacked a well communicated working
strategy but it was understood "they wanted to go after Bruno Santos," an
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adult illegal immigrant who was having a sexual relationship with Sarah
Johnson, and had been threatened with statutory rape prosecution. (peTT
46,48,51)
c. Mr. Dunn testified upon review of the pre-trial statements by Bruno
Santos that Santos told police he had been into the Johnson residence prior
to the day of the murders; that he'd had sex with Sarah Johnson; initially
that Alan Johnson hadn't threatened him with a statutory rape charge, but
later admitted to the threat; that he had admitted owning guns and trading
for "weed"; that Santos' car may have been in the area of the Johnson
residence the night of the murders; and that this information was given to
the trial lawyers. (peTT pp. 82, 83, 84, 85,90, 91, Exhibit 34, 35, 36, 37)
d. Mr. Dunn testified upon review of pre-trial statements by Jane Lopez,
Bruno Santos' cousin, and review of documentary phone records, it
became apparent Ms. Lopez testimony providing an alibi for Bruno Santos
was false, and could not exclude Bruno Santos from the scene of the
murders, which information was given to the trial lawyers. (peTT pp. 75,
76, 77, UMTT pp. 2789, 2791, 2792, peT Exhibits 9, 10, 11, & 40)
1.

Specifically, Ms. Lopez testified at the underlying trial, consistent
with her pretrial statements that she called and spoke with Santos
on his cell phone at 8:30 a.m. the morning of the murders;
immediately thereafter called and spoke with Santos on the home
phone he shared with his mother, and that Santos seemed shocked
by the news that Mr. and Mrs. Johnson had been murdered.
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(UMTT pp.2791-2793) The phone records Dunn made Pangburn
aware of would have shown the phone calls were not made, yet
trial counsel failed to utilize this evidence for cross-examination.
(PCTT pp. 71-78, UMTT pg. 2794)
e. Mr. Dunn testified upon review of the pre-trial statements of Consuela
Cedeno, Bruno Santos mother, it became apparent the statements were
obviously inconsistent with testimony Cedeno provided at trial, which
information was given to Pangburn. (PCTT pg. 60, 61 Exhibit 13, UMTT
2776)
1.

Specifically, Ms. Cedeno told police that her son Bruno always ran
around at night, and that she checked the odometer on the car, and
dew on the windshield. Dunn tabbed pages of the prior statements
and pointed out to trial counsel during trial the inconsistencies with
Cedeno's trial testimony, that she doesn't pay attention to things
like that. (PCTT pg. 62, 79, UMTT pg. 2776)

f.

Mr. Dunn testified he prepared witness books for trial that included pre-

trial statements, and documentary evidence, indexed and highlighted for
use by trial counsel during examination of witnesses, that included the
PCT Exhibits 1, 11, 13,29,34,35,36,37,40. (PCTT pp. 77, 92, 93)
g. Mr. Dunn testified that at the last minute Pangburn decided not to examine
Bruno Santos and family, and without warning handed the witnesses off to
Rader to examine. (PCTT pp. 96-97)
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h. Mr. Dunn testified he came into possession of an audio visual recording
made by Officer Ross Kirtley depicting police conversations during the
initial call to the murder scene on September 2,2003, which Dunn caused
to be enhanced for audio clarity.

According to Dunn the enhanced

recording clearly showed Sheriff Femling told other officers to
concentrate on the girl, they had to act fast, worried the community would
think a murderer was running around, which information was made known
to the trial lawyers. (PCTT, pp. 97-106) Additionally, officers could be
heard stating they didn't think it was possible for Sarah to have committed
the crime because she didn't have blood on her, when blood was
everywhere in the bedroom where the murders occured, which was made
known to the trial lawyers. (PCTT pg. 104)
33.

Mr. Rader testified that Mr. Pangburn made it clear that he, Pangburn, was lead

counsel; that Pangburn failed to communicate with the defense team but assured Mr.
Rader he was prepared. (PCTT pp. 150, 151, 153, 154)
a. Rader testified that the defense team was not competent. (PCTT 181-82)
b. Rader and Pangburn agreed Rader would handle and examine at trial
expert and forensic witnesses while Pangburn would handle and examine
attriallay witnesses. (PCTT pp. 152-153)
c. A few days prior to the time Robert Kerchusky, defense fingerprint expert,
was to testify Pangburn informed Rader he, Pangburn, would examine the
witness at trial. (PCTT pg. 153-54)
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d. Without warning, during trial, Pangburn demanded Rader examine Bruno
Santos, when Rader had not reviewed all the material, and was not
prepared to cross-examine the witness. (PCTT pp.173-174, 178)
e. Rader was not prepared to cross-examine Santos family members, when
Pangburn, without warning, demanded he do so. (PCTT pp. 172, 173,
179-181)
f.

Rader testified he did no legal research as to the legal standard for
admission into evidence of the blood splatter recreation test which was not
allowed to be shown to the jury. (PCTT pg 170)

34.

During the post-conviction trial, Petitioner offered into evidence, and played for

the Court, Exhibit 12, the recording, made by Officer Ross Kirtley during his initial
response to the scene of the murders beginning at approximately 6:30 a.m. on September
2,2003. The enhanced audio quality version of the recording was lost, thus the recording
played was the original. (PCTT pg. 1350)
a. The recording did not clearly depict Sheriff Femling stating the police
should focus on Sarah 10hnson to the exclusion of other witnesses, but
does clearly show police officers stating they didn't think Sarah could
have done it because she had no blood on her, and the murder scene was a
"rainstorm of blood."

The recording does portray Sheriff Femling

expressmg SusplClOn

of Sarah 10hnson not providing complete

information, and concern with involvement with Bruno Santos, within one
half hour of his arrival at the scene. (PCT Exhibit 12)
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35.

Steve Harkins, a Blaine County Sheriffs Detective during the underlying Johnson

murder investigation testified during the post-conviction trial.
a. Harkins testified he concluded Sarah Johnson was the prime target of the
investigation by 11.30 a.m., the day of the murders.
1.

Harkins confirmed he told Bruno Santos he was not a suspect in
the murders on September 3, 2003. (PCTT pp. 391- 394, Exhibit
34)

11.

Harkins admitted that Bruno Santos told him during the September
3,2003, interrogation that Santos car might have been the area the
night of the murders; that Santos had prior gang affiliations yet he
denied same during examination at the underlying trial; that Santos
told him he might find .25 caliber ammunition in his apartment,
which were in fact found; and that Santos had owned a gun and
traded for weed. (PCTT pp. 396- 421, Exhibit 34)

111.

Harkins testified the trash receptacles at Santos residence were not
searched because the police didn't think there was any evidence to
be gathered. (PCTT pp. 407-408)

b. Harkins confirmed he was the officer who performed the investigation into
the newly discovered fingerprint identification evidence verifying the
previously unknown latent fingerprints on the murder weapon, the scope
and ammunition packaging were those of one Christopher Kevin Hill.
(PCTT pg. 427)
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1.

Harkins testified he did not find any inconsistency with the
statements given to police by Mel Speegle and Christopher Hill,
even though Hill told police his prints must have gotten on the gun,
scope and ammunition packaging when he took the murder
weapon from Speegle's home in the Spring of 2000 and shot it,
and Speegle told police Hill's prints must be on the stuff because
Hill helped him move it into the apartment over the Johnson's
garage. (PCTT pp. 427-436)

11.

Harkins testified that police did not attempt to confirm; Hill's
statement that his prints got on the murder weapon, scope and
ammunition packaging when he shot the murder weapon; Hill's
whereabouts at the time of the murders; Hill's known associations;
or work history. (PCTT pp. 432 - 436)

36.

During the post-conviction trial Sheriff Walt Femling, who was the lead law

enforcement officer overseeing the Johnson murder prosecution, testified at the postconviction trial. (PCTT pp. 308-366)
a. Sheriff Femling admitted he concluded, after being at the scene for
approximately an hour, there was an issue and a problem with a boy friend
named Bruno Santos, (PCTT pg. 337) who was ruled out as a suspect
because no evidence could be found to place him at the scene. (PCTT pp.
340-342)
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37.

During the post-conviction trial Officer Raul Ornelas, who was one of the first

law enforcement personal to arrive at the murder scene, testified at the post-conviction
trial. (PCTT pp. 201-217)
a. Officer Ornelas, who observed Sarah Johnson very early on the morning
of the murders, saw no blood on her person, with the single exception of
the on the bottom of her socks. (PCTT pg. 215)
b. Officer Ornelas testified he did not know neighbors had walked around the
backyard, earlier in the morning. (PCTT pg. 207) Officer Ornelas testified
the foot tracks visible in the matted grass came to an end where the grass
ended towards the northeast comer of the Johnsons yard. (PCTT pg 208)
38.

During the post-conviction trial Officer Stuart Robinson, who was a lead law

enforcement officer overseeing evidence collection during the Johnson murder
prosecution, testified at the post-conviction trial. (PCTT pp. 218-237)
a. Officer Robinson was asked about his Grand Jury Testimony wherein he
testified that no identifiable fingerprints had been found on the gun, scope
or casings. (PCTT pp. 230-23, Exhibit 1, pg 189-190) Robinson denied
the Grand Jury testimony was inaccurate despite the fact that latent
identifiable fingerprints were found by Idaho State Police Laboratory prior
to his testimony.
39.

During the post-conviction trial recordings of police interviews of Mel Speegle

and Christopher Kevin Hill, conducted February 10 & 11,2009, dealing with the newly
discovered fingerprint identification evidence, were accepted into evidence as Exhibits 29
and 30, and played for the Court.
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a. Mel Speegle told police Chris Hill was a family friend who had lived with
Speegle for a few years prior to his move to the Johnson apartment in
2002, when he recalled Hill helping him move items, including his guns
and ammunition. (Exhibit 29)
b. Christopher Hill told police he had helped Speegle move large items to
Boise; didn't remember moving anything to the Johnson apartment; but
that he had handled the murder weapon years before the murders in order
(

to site the rifle. Police, during the interview, told Hill where his
fingerprints were found (Exhibit 30)
40.

Consuela Cedeno, Bruno Santos mother, testified during the post-conviction trial.

Ms. Cedeno claimed not to know why she had been called to testify; to use multiple
names; to have no memory of having testified in the underlying murder trial; that she
didn't remember telling police her son Bruno lied to all the time, checked odometer
readings, and dew on the windshield, to see if Bruno had driven the car in the overnight
hours; that Bruno was always out late at night. (PCTT pp. 457- 468; Exhibit 13)
41.

Bruno Santos testified during the post-conviction trial.

Mr. Santos refused to

answer a host of questions that may have led to direct or circumstantial evidence of
criminal conduct or clues leading to evidence of criminal conduct if he would have
answered, including; whether he was born in the U.S.A; how long he had been in the
U.S.A.; whether Sarah Johnson was his girlfriend; whether the police found him at the
scene of the crime on the morning of the murders; whether he was found by police to
possess .25 caliber rounds of ammunition; whether he once belonged to a gang; whether
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he has a number "13" tattooed on his body; whether he had lied to the police during an
investigative interview. (PCTT pp. 472-490)
42.

Maria Eguren, Idaho State Police Latent Fingerprint Identification Unit staff

person, testified at the post-conviction trial. Ms. Eguren testified that in January of 2008
she identified a match of previously unidentified latent fingerprints in the Johnson case,
to be those of Christopher Kevin Hill. (PCTT 524-531)
43.

Robert Kerchusky, fingerprint expert, testified at the post-conviction trial.

Kerchusky testified he began his fingerprint career with the FBI in 1952, with work
experience including District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Idaho State
Police and private consulting. (PCTT pp. 540-542)
a. Kerchusky testified he reviewed certain materials as part of his work for
the trial defense team including the Grand Jury transcript wherein Officer
Stuart Robinson testified no latent prints of value were found at the scene,
which information he highlighted to the trial lawyers. (PCCT 577-581,
Grand J.ury Transcript "GJT" pp. 189-90)
b. Kerchusky testified regarding the attributes of a "quality print" including
quality of "ridge detail" clarity for purposes of identification. (PCTT pp.
549-551)

Kerchusky testified regarding environmental conditions that

impact the a latent print over time, and concluded latent prints left on a
non-porous surface, that are not "etched prints" are gone within a year.
(PCTT pp. 551-554, 558-559, 567-570)

Kerchusky testified that the

pattern of latent prints on an object can explain how a person touched or
grasped an object. (PCTT pp. 568) Kerchusky testified that over time a
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latent print left on a non-porous surface will lose quality. (PCTT pp. 555556)
c. Kerchusky testified that latent fingerprints found on the murder weapon,
rifle scope, inner plastic box of Winchester Super-X .264 ammunition, and
live round, were "fresh prints," which opinion was based upon the fact that
Mel Speegle stated he had handled the weapon within a few weeks of the
murders, that Mel Speegle's prints were not on the gun or scope, that the
weapon had been moved more than a year prior the murders, that clothing
or material had been used to cover and uncover the rifle in the closet, high
print quality indicating lack of dissipation over time, and that the latent
prints were not "etched prints," indicating the acids had not yet had time to
set into the metal. (PCTT pp.587-591) Kerchusky emphasized to the trial
lawyers that his opinion regarding the "freshness" the latent prints was the
most important fingerprint issue.

(PCTT pp. 592-593)

Kerchusky

testified that he told trial counsel Pangburn after he had testified at the
underlying murder trial that Pangburn had forgotten to inquire regarding
Kerchusky's opinion as to "freshness" of the latent prints, yet Pangburn
did not recall his expert. (PCTT pp. 593-594)
d. Kerchusky testified that he concurred with the Idaho State Police opinion
that previously unidentified latent prints found on scope were those of
Christopher Kevin Hill. (PCTT pp. 608-609 ) Kerchusky confirmed his
opinion the prints found on the scope were "fresh" and in a position
indicated it had been held tight while Hill was unscrewing the scope, not
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attempting to site the scope. (PCTT pp. 610-612) Kerchusky testified that
Hill's print on the live .264 round was fresh, based upon the fact that it
was of high quality and not an etched print. (PCTT pp. 612-614)
Kerchuusky testified Hill's latent palm print on the stock of the .264
murder weapon was fresh, based on the stated history of handling, being
draped with clothing, and the high quality of the print. (PCTT pg 614)
Kerchusky testified that in his opinion it was Christopher Kevin Hill who
removed the scope from the rifle and who was the last person to touch the
murder weapon. (PCTT pg. 616)
44.

Tina Walthall, an Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory Scientist testified at the

post-conviction trial on behalf of the State.
a. Ms. Walthall testified, and Exhibits 21, 22 & 23 confirm, that in early
2009 she compared and matched three latent prints found on the rifle
scope, three latent prints from .264 ammunition packaging, and a latent
print from the stock of a .264 caliber murder weapon and a live .264
round, to the known prints of Christopher Kevin Hill. (PCTT pp.654)
More specifically, two of Mr. Hill's right middle finger prints and a right
ring finger prints were found on the rifle scope, Mr. Hill's left thumb print
was found on the .264 live round of ammunition, Mr. Hill's right middle
finger prints were found on two different ammunition package inserts, and
Mr. Hill's left palm print was found on the stock of the murder weapon.
(PCTT pp. 654-661)
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b. Walthall testified that the scientific literature reveals two cases where
prints lasted on objects more than a year. (PCTT pg 668) Ms. Walthall
provided her opinion that under the circumstances of this case it was
possible that Hill's prints could have remained on the evidence for more
than one year. (PCTT pp. 669-670) Ms. Walthall also testified that she
was not made aware the murder weapon had been wrapped and
unwrapped and rewrapped with clothing, and handled by Mr. Speegle
within a few weeks of the murders, and these factors could obliterate
latent prints.

(PCTT pp. 682-686)

Ms. Walthall agreed with Mr.

Kerchusky that Hill's prints on the scope were of excellent quality. (PCTT
pg. 687) Ms. Walthall testified that etched prints on metal shell casings
are relatively common. (PCTT pg 692)
45.

Mel Speegle, who lived in the Johnson garage apartment at the time of the

murders, and who owned the murder weapon, testified at the post-conviction trial.
a. Mr. Speegle testified he did not have specific recollection of Christopher
Kevin Hill touching the murder weapon, while moving nor was he ever
told Hill had ever fired the .264 rifle used in the murders. (PCTT pp. 699725)
46.

Christopher Kevin Hill, who had been the care taker for Mel Speegle Bellevue

ranch residence prior to Speegle's move to the Johnson garage apartment, testified at the
post-conviction trial.
a. Mr. Hill testified he assisted Mel Speegle with moving of large items from
Speegle's ranch to a Boise residence. (PCTT pp. 727)
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b. Mr. Hill testified that in the Spring of 2000 he took a .264 rifle from the
ranch residence and shot it six or seven times, and he might have touched
the scope, but he did not specifically recall having done so, nor did he
remember removing the end caps. (PCTT pp. 728-734)
c. Mr. Hill was arrested for Driving Under the Influence in 2002 and was
without an address during the summer of 2003 while he lived in his pickup truck at Magic Reservoir. (PCTT pp. 735-737)

FINDINGS OF FACT
47.

Bobby E. Pangburn is not a credible witness.

48.

The post-conviction trial testimony of Patrick Dunn and Mark Rader, regarding

inadequate preparation of the underlying murder trial defense team is unrebutted and
reliable.
49.

The attorneys in the underlying murder trial were inadequately prepared and

ignorant of relevant law and fact due to an incomplete investigation.
a. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of
Bruno Santos to be prepared to effectively cross-examine the witness.
Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the law concerning witness's
assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in light
of the trial judge's ruling on the subject, to effectively cross-examine
Bruno Santos.
i. Bruno Santos is not a credible witness.
b. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of
Consuela Cedeno to be prepared to effectively cross-examine the witness.
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1.

Consuela Cedeno is not a credible witness.

c. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of
Jane Lopez, and documentary evidence relating to phone records, to be
prepared to effectively cross-examine the witness.
i. Jane Lopez is not a credible witness.
d. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of
Bruno Santos to be prepared to effectively cross-examine Detective Steve
Harkins.
e. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the content of the Kirtley
recording in order to make an informed strategic decision whether or not
to play said recording to the jury.
f.

Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the law concerning the legal
standard for admission of the blood splatter recreation test which test was
not allowed into evidence.

g. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the facts and law concerning
fingerprint evidence and therefore failed to inquire of their expert witness
regarding the freshness of unidentified latent prints found on the murder
weapon, a live .264 caliber round of ammunition, the scope and .264
ammunition packaging.
h. The thumb print on the live .264 round was not an etched print, nor
allegedly touched since the spring of 2000, leads to the only reasonable
conclusion that the print was left more recently than the spring of 2000
and was in fact a fresh print.
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1.

The fmgerprints of the scope were not etched prints, and the scope and
weapon were covered, uncovered and recovered with clothes, and handled
leading to the only reasonable conclusion that the prints on the scope were
left more recently than the Spring of 2000 and were in fact fresh prints.

J.

The palm print of the stock of the .264 rifle used to kill Alan and Diane
Johnson were covered, uncovered and recovered with clothes, and handled
within weeks of the murder, leading to the only reasonable conclusion that
the prints on the scope were left more recently than the spring of2000 and
were in fact fresh prints.

k. The fingerprints found on the murder weapon, scope and ammunition
packaging were those of Christopher Kevin HilL

1.

The latent fingerprints found on the murder weapon, scope and
ammunition packaging were unidentified at the time of the trial, were
found to match Christopher Kevin Hill in early 2009.

m. Christopher Kevin Hill is not a credible witness.

LEGAL STANDARDS & CRITERIA
(GENERAL STANDARDS)

46.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 177 P.3d 362

(2008), stated, "An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature.

Like a

plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction
relief is based. Baldwin at 367. [citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 79-80, 57
P.3d 787, 790-91 (2002).]

A court is required to accept the petitioner's umebutted
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allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. Saykhamchone v.
State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995).
(INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL)

47.

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant

must show the attorney's performance was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by
the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 206465, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984) To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the
burden of showing the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988) To
establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.
No bright line test for deficient performance of counsel, or prejudice exists.
Clearly, trial counsel's strategic decisions will not be second guessed. In Murphy v.
State, 143 Idaho 139 at 747-48, 139 P.3d 741 (2006), the court elaborated on and
clarified the standards as follows;
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffectiveness is "whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just
result." It is well established that we will not attempt to second-guess trial
counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions are made upon the
basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Perez, 99 Idaho
181,184-85,579 P.2d 127, 130-31(1978); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4,10,
539 P.2d 556, 562 (1975). Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be
sufficient to show deprivation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10, 539 P.2d at 562. Strategic choices made
after incomplete investigations are reasonable only so far as reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2541, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, 492
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(2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2463,
162 L.Ed.2d 360, 372 (2005) (failure to investigate material relied upon by
prosecution was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396,
120 S.Ct. 1495, 1514, 146 L.Ed.2d 389, 419 (2000) (unreasonable failure
to conduct thorough investigation); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794,
107 S.Ct. 3114,3125,97 L.Ed.2d 638, 657 (1987).

In addition to those standards and criteria referenced by the Murphy Court it
should be noted that evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a close
examination of the evidence, both the evidence which was admitted during trial and that
which was not. Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649 at 653, 946 P.2d 71(Idaho App. 1997)
FurthernlOre, in assessing the potential prejudice the Court will consider in aggregate the
various decisions and omissions of defense counsel that are alleged to have been
unreasonable. The Court should also take into account the totality of the evidence that
was before the jury in the criminal trial. Milburn at 653. The Court cautioned that each
case must be judged according to the significance of the evidence each witness has to
offer. Id at 654.
In summary, the Murphy and Milburn opinions leave this court with the essential
question: Considering all the circumstances ofthe case, was justice served?
(NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE)

50.

Newly discovered evidence will warrant a new trial only if it satisfies a four-part

test, showing that: (l) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the
defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the
evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Hayes,
144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d 288 (Idaho App. 2007) citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,
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691,551 P.2d 972,978 (1976); State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 146, 730 P.2d 1064, 1066
(Ct. App. 1986).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
51.

Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall lack

of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic tardiness and
unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all of which together resulted,
cumulatively and individually, in a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict. Petitioner
supports the general claim with several specific instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel. These arguments are well taken. Petitioner has met her burden and proven, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsels' performance was deficient, and she
was thereby prejudiced.
52.

Had counsel performed up to the objective standard of reasonableness, the jury

would have viewed crucial blood splatter evidence, cross-examination of several very
important witnesses, and critically, heard the persuasive expert opinion of Robert
Kerchusky, that the fingerprints on the tools of murder were fresh.

Together, this

evidence is likely to have produced a different jury verdict.
53.

This Court has no reason to question the veracity of trial co-counsel, Mark Rader,

or Patrick Dunn, the investigator.

Bobby Eugen Pangburn, on the other hand, is

suspended from the practice of law, and was proven to have given false testimony to this
court regarding the reason he no longer practices law. Both Rader and Dunn testified
Pangburn failed to communicate with the team and doubted Pangburn's preparedness.
Rader and Dunn both testified Pangburn had agreed he would be examining the lay
witnesses, yet when the time came he utterly failed at this task. Clearly, the defense was
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not properly prepared.

Failure to raise the proper issues during cross-examinations

cannot be said to be a matter of informed strategy. Nor, can the decision not to crossexamine witnesses be considered tactical, based upon full knowledge of the facts.
Likewise, no reasonable defense strategy, only unpreparedness, can explain the failure to
elicit the defense expert's ultimate opinion, or to have admitted into evidence the defense
blood splatter experiment evidence.
54.

During the post-conviction trial several of these witnesses were cross-examined,

and the crime scene recording was played. The witnesses were confronted with
inconsistencies in their trial testimony with pre-trial statements. Petitioner presented her
fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky, who gave convincing testimony regarding the
freshness of prints on the murder weapon and associated items of evidence. Had the jury
experienced a proper cross-examination of Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Jane Lopez,
Sheriff Femling, Detective Harkins, Officer Robinson, Officer Ornelas, together with
having viewed the crime scene recording and heard the expert's opinion, it is reasonably
probable the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758 (1988), Murphv v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 139 P.3d 741 (2006), Milburn v. State, 130
Idaho 649, 946 P.2d 71, (Id. App. 1997), State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556
(1975). Given the bare circumstantial evidence upon which Petitioner was convicted,
presentation of the above evidence is likely to have produced reasonable doubt, and
prevented conviction as charged.
55.

Petitioner's prayer for relief

IS

granted based on the claims contained in

paragraphs 14, 15.c, 16 and 18, of her Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief.
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56.

Petitioner also claims entitlement to a new trial based upon the discovery of new

evidence early the year, 2009, when previously unidentified latent fingerprints found on
the .264 caliber rifle used in the murders, .264 ammunition packaging, a live .264 round,
and on the scope removed from the murder weapon, were determined to be those of one
Christopher Kevin Hill.

Petitioner argues that had the jury known, first that these

unidentified latent prints were fresh, that fact alone would have changed the jury's
verdict. Petitioner further argues, had the jury also known the prints were those of a
homeless man, with possible motive of financial gain, access to the scene of the crime, no
alibi, and whose explanation of how his prints got on the tools of murder was highly
unlikely, reasonable doubt would have prevented conviction. Again, this argument is
well taken.
57.

Clearly, the identification of previously unknown latent fingerprints on the tools

of murder is "newly discovered" material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, under
the Drapeau standard. The State, not the Defense, has complete control of the known
inked fingerprint data base.

Failure to discover that the latent prints belonged to

Christopher Kevin Hill was in no part due to a lack of diligence by the Defense. The
final test, whether the evidence would probably produce an acquittal, is a more difficult
assessment.

If considered with the "freshness" opinion evidence, the conclusion is

clearly, yes. Given the State's expert opinion, that it is only "possible" for a latent print
to last more than a year, can a jury reach the standard, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Coupled with the fact that the print on the live .264 round is not an etched print and the
pattern of prints on the removed scope, too much doubt is present to be confident justice
was served.

PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER

28

RNEY AT LAW

RlSTOPHERP. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

! c.-I day of _-,-/_£_,_$_ _ _ _ _ 2011, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to the Office of Attorney General
& Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074;

PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey,
Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile
number 208.736.4155, and by email jcall@co.twin-falls.id.us.POBox126.Twin Falls,
Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US

Mail

- - - Hand

Deliver

facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155
- -/Via
-

PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER

29

l~"'"

FILED ~. ~. ;i;t!

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 2087882300

I

FEB 2 8 2011

I

JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun ,Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

__________~R=e~sp~o=n=d=e=nt~___________)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, by and through counsel, and files this, her Reply to
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in support thereof
states as follows;

INTRODUCTION
1.

On or about the 14th day of February 2011, Respondent, in compliance with the

Court's order filed its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law subsequent to
the trial of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief over four (4)
days beginning on December 6, 2010. This memorandum is intended to comply with the
Court's direction to file final reply briefs to be submitted on or before February 28, 2011.

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
2.

TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE - PREJUDICE BY AGGREGATE OF ERROR:

The State ignores Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from
an overall lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic
tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all of which together
resulted, cumulatively and individually, in a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict.
The State attempts to isolate each of Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, as if each such act or omission occurred in isolation of the others. Clearly, the
theater of trial is an integrated set of acts built chronologically, all interdependent upon
one another, designed to persuade a jury. This concept is supported by the standard for
evaluating prejudice, "the court must consider the totality of the evidence before the
judge or jury." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, (1963); State v.
Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 173, 857 P.2d 649, 652 (Ct. App. 1993)
In State v. Milburn, l30 Idaho 649, 946 P.2d 71 (Idaho App. 1997) the Court
stated "review of Milburn's claim requires a close examination of the evidence, both the
evidence which was presented at trial and that which was not." The prejudice prong of
the Strickland test was described thus, "(t)o satisfy the prejudice element, an applicant
must show a reasonable probability that but for the attorney's unprofessional errors, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. This does not require proof that
counsel's errors more likely than not altered the outcome of the case. Rather, a
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
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outcome." Milburn, at 658-659. Critically, the Milburn court stated, "In assessing the
potential prejudice in Milburn's case, we will consider in aggregate the various
decisions and omissions of defense counsel that are alleged to have been
unreasonable. We also take into account the totality of the evidence that is before
the jury in the criminal trial." Id at 659. (emphasis added)

3.

ADMISSION OF BLOOD SPATTER RECREATION:

The State seems to

misconstrue Petitioner's argument and the evidence in support of the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel as asserted in paragraph 15(c) of her Second Amended Petition.
The claim includes both a failure to become knowledgeable of the relevant law regarding
the necessary foundation for admission of the scientific evidence, and a failure to
adequately investigate or consult with experts in order to present an experiment that
would have rebutted the State's expert opinion evidence regarding blood spatter.

The

State addresses only the second prong of the claim.
Rader testified he did no legal research as to the legal standard for admission of
the experiment. (PCCT pg 170) Had the research been accomplished the defense would
have known the law, and could have more effectively argued for its admission. In fact,
the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to admit the proffered experiment, when
the proper ruling would have been to admit the evidence, and allow jury argument
regarding the weight to be given the experiment. Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 40
P.3d 11 0 (Idaho 2002), State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Idaho App. 1988),
Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho 666, 662 P.2d 538 (Idaho 1983),

The state argues that the

Defense offered extensive blood spatter evidence, and this somehow offsets the failure to
have admitted a test that would have conclusively proven the murders could not have
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occurred in the manner opined by the State's experts. No amount of expert opinion
evidence can replace a visual depiction of the spherical mist of explosive force created
by a contact shot on a closed surface, such as a skull, or a coconut.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
4.

SHERIFF FEMLING: The State argues that Petitioner's claim that trial counsel

failed to adequately cross-examine Sheriff Femling must fail essentially because crossexamination is a tactical decision, not subject to review. The State completely ignores
the testimony of Patrick Dunn and Mark Rader that lead trial counsel was unprepared,
and that Rader was unprepared when Pangburn, without warning handed over lay
witnesses for Rader to examine. (PCCT pp. 96-97, 154, 172-73) The State ignores the
testimony of Patrick Dunn regarding the content of the lost enhanced version of the
Kirtley recording, and the content of the unenhanced Kirtley recorded admitted to
evidence at the post-conviction trial. (PCCT pg. 135)
5.

DETECTIVE HARKINS: In regard to effectiveness of trial counsel's cross-

examination of Detective Harkin, the State again concludes simply that Petitioner
" ... failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's cross-examination of Detective
Harkins at trial was anything but strategic and tactical." The State argues that because
trial counsel, during post-conviction trial examination, did not admit failure due to ill
preparedness, or otherwise, the burden cannot be met. On the contrary. Here, DmID and
Rader both testified that Pangburn was unprepared. The only prospect of placing before
the jury Bruno Santos' dishonesty, prior bad acts, gang affiliation, motive, and
opportunity to commit the murders was lost when trial counsel did not ask Detective
Harkins about the statements made to him by Santos. The post-conviction court received
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in evidence Exhibits 34,35,36 and 37 containing damning pre-trial statements of Bruno
Santos. The Court observed the cross-examination of Detective Harkins and revelation

I
of Santos statements. \Vhile Detective Harkins attempted to downplay the seriousness of
the statements, the information would have been before the jury, had a complete crossexamination been conducted at the underlying murder trial. Why would any trial lawyer,
who is truly familiar with such statements, not get that information to a jury? Only
unpreparedness can explain such a failure. Presented with perhaps the only opportunity
to prove Bruno Santos gang affiliation, past drug and weapon's possession, commission
of statutory rape, trial counsel did not perform up to a minimum standard.
6.

BRUNO SANTOS: The question of whether the failure to cross-examine Bruno

Santos constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is complicated by the fact that the
trial court entered an order prohibiting trial counsel from calling Santos for the sole
purpose of having him invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
(TT pg 2739-2758) Yet, Santos was permitted to testify at trial on direct examination as
to "direct" matters without challenge. (TT pp 2760-2771) The law in this area is clearly
stated in State v. Mantanez, 523 P.2d 410 (Kan. 1974) quoting extensively from United
States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2 nd Cir. (1963), " ... where the assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination prevents effective confrontation of the witness by the accused,
the situation is remedied by striking the testimony of the witness." The trial defense
team did not move to strike, nor call Santos to confront him for bias, or improper motive.
It should also be noted that once a matter is inquired into on direct examination, the door
has been opened and the witness cannot decline to answer on the topic during cross.
Mantanez, Cardillo, and Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624. (5th Cir. 1967) The
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

5

record is void of any indication the trial defense team even attempted to assert
Defendant's right to confront Santos given these standards of law. The evidence in this
regard is limited to Rader's unrebutted testimony that he was not prepared to crossexamine Bruno Santos.
7.

CONSUELO CEDENO:

The State concludes that Petitioner has failed to

establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to cross-examine Consuelo
Cedeno, due to failure to utilize pre-trial statements directly contradictory to her trial
testimony.

Ms. Cedeno's demeanor and comportment during her post-conviction

testimony was clearly untrustworthy. It is clear that Rader's unpreparedness led to the
failure to challenge Cedeno for bias, interest or motive in front of the jury. Had the jury
witnessed a proper cross-examination the jury it is reasonably probable the trial outcome
would have been different.
8.

JANE LOPEZ: The state argues, that Petitioner did not attempt to impeach Ms.

Lopez with any phone records, citing to the PCTT pp. 368-376. The State ignores
Petitioner's post-conviction Exhibit 9, identified and admitted during the testimony of
Patrick Dunn, and utilized during the testimony of Jane Lopez. The State also ignores
the fact that Exhibits 10, 11 and 40, were admitted into evidence during the postconviction testimony of Patrick Dunn, and that the records prove the Lopez testimony
was and is false. (PCCT pp. 61, 75-77, 372-375) Clearly, the phone calls Ms. Lopez
claims to have made to Bruno Santos on the morning of the murders did not occur.
Because Ms. Lopez claimed not remember the relevant phone numbers during her postconviction trial testimony does not change the facts, or the impact that could have been
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made at the underlying murder trial had the proper cross-examination and phone record
evidence been offered.
9.

STU ROBINSON: The State concludes that Petitioner failed to establish that

decisions regarding cross-examination of Stu Robinson were anything but tactical.
Again this conclusion completely ignores Rader and Dunn's testimony that Rader was
not prepared to cross-examine lay witnesses. Stu Robinson was examined, during the
post-conviction trial, on the topic of his inconsistent grand jury testimony, and he was
not credible. Clearly, Robinson attempted to and succeeded in misleading the grand jury
regarding the fingerprint evidence. The record is empty of any reason for counsel's
omission in this regard. Again, small items such as this, compounded over the course of
trial, add up to "reasonable doubt." Creating any doubt regarding the credibility of the
State's witnesses, especially police officers, is critical in finding hesitation to convict
among Jurors.
10.

FAILURE TO PLAY KIRTLEY RECORDING:

Once more, the State,

reviewing the claim in isolation, only for the purpose of impeaching Sheriff Femling,
concludes Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance
of counsel. Trial Counsel Rader testified at the post-conviction trial he had not reviewed
the recording, either the lost enhanced version or the original, and he was unaware
whether Pangburn had personally reviewed the recording. (PCCT pg 184-185) The
enhanced recording has been lost. (PCCT. Pg.135)

Patrick Dunn testified with

unrebutted clarity, that Sheriff Femling could be heard making a statement to the effect,
"that he was concerned about the community, or the valley, being concerned with a
murderer running around, that they had a -- had to act fast on this, and they should
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concentrate on the girl." (PCCT pp. 106) The unenhanced recording was offered into
evidence and played during the post-conviction trial, and officers could be clearly heard
repeatedly stating, the girl could not have done it because she had no blood on her.
Obviously, these statements straight from the mouths ofthe first officers on the scene are
extraordinary and hyper beneficial to the defense when the defense theme is "no blood
no guilt." Yet, lead defense counsel did not play the recording for the jury. The record is
silent for an explanation why the recording was not played. Clearly, Bob Pangburn had
not bothered to sit through the several hour recording in order to apprise himself of its
contents.
11.

FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE:

Petitioner rruses two related claims involving

fingerprint issues. The first, as ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to inquire
of his fingerprint expert regarding the "freshness" of latent prints found on the tools of
murder. The second, as a newly discovered evidence claim, based on the identification
of a local homeless man as the person whose prints matched the previously unidentified
latent prints found on the murder weapon. The State does not address the first claim in
its proposed findings, but deals extensively with the second.

The State concludes,

essentially, that because the unidentified latent prints were known of at trial, the mere
identification of those prints is neither material nor likely to produce an acquittal,
reasoning these prints were dealt with extensively at trial.
It is true the jury became aware that unidentified latent prints were found on the

murder weapon, scope and ammunition packaging during the underlying trial. It is also
true the jury was presented with opinion testimony by the State's expert, Tina Walthall,
to the effect, latent prints cannot be precisely dated. However, and notably, the jury did
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not hear the defense expert's opinion that the prints were fresh, because trial counsel was
not prepared to examine his witness.
The post-conviction court had an opportunity to view both experts fully discuss
this issue. Robert Kerchusky candidly stated that a latent print, without additional
information cannot be dated, but under most conditions will not last a year. (PCCT pp.
551-556, 558-559, 567-570)

Kerchusky at length discussed conditions and

circumstances that impact whether a latent print will remain on a particular item of
evidence, and recounted the basis of his opinion that the prints on the tools of murder in
this case were fresh. (PCCT pp. 587-591) Furthermore, Kerchusky described in detail
the basis of his opinion that the prints of Christopher Kevin Hill, found on the scope
removed from .264 caliber rifle used to murder Diane and Alan Johnson, were left when
the scope was being removed from the rifle. (PCCT pp. 568)
The jury heard none of these opinions, nor did the jury hear decisive nuanced
opinion testimony from Tina Walthall, elicited at the post-conviction triaL Ms. Walthall
could point to only two cases in the literature where latent prints in field, lasted more
than a year. (PCCT pp.667-668) Ms. Walthall agreed that a whole host of factors can
adversely affect a latent print. (PCCT pg. 675) Ms. Walthall was unable to describe the
details of the environmental conditions or other circumstances of the case studies cited.
(PCCT pg. 678) Ms. Walthall conceded that etched prints are often seen on soft metal.
(PCCT pp. 680-681) Ms. Walthall conceded she had not reviewed the police reports or
witness statements and therefore had no knowledge of how the tools of murder had been
handled or stored. (PCCT pp. 682-685) Ms. Walthall testified that it was possible that
Mel Speegle's handling and wrapping of the murder weapon and scope would wipe off
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old prints. (PCCT pp. 684-685) Ms. Walthall agreed with Kerchusky that the latent
prints were of excellent quality, (PCCT pp 686-687) and that is only "possible" that the
latent prints were more than a year old. (PCCT pg 669-670)

CONCLUSION
The ultimate question for this Court to consider is whether it is confident the
underlying trial concluded with a just result. Two thirds of the trial defense team has set
ego aside and confessed to its incompetence. The defense presentation was riddled by
errors and omissions, all of which can be explained only by unpreparedness of counseL
Taken in the aggregate can this court be confident in the outcome of the trial, knowing
the person or persons who pulled the trigger have not been brought to justice.

YATLAW

~~g!1
DATED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of February 2011, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to the Office of
Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile
number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second
Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G.
Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, and by emailjcall@co.twin-falls.id.us.
PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH JOHN.sON
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Respondent

)
)

Case No. CV-06-324
RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW &
ORDER

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits its response to I'Petltioner's
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law & Order [sic]" (hereinafter
"Petitioner's Brief').
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Johnson's "Undisputed Underly,ing Substantive Facts" Are- Not Entirely
Accurate
Beginning at page four of Petitioner's Brief, Johnson sets forth a number of

assertions she characterizes as "undisputed underlying substantive facts." (Petitioner's
Brief, pp.4~8.) These ''facts'' are not, however, entirely accurate. 1 Specifically, the state
notes the following dIscrepancies and omissions with respect to Johnson's "undisputed
underlying substantive facts:"
1.

Johnson contends a "more complete inventory of the crime scene located

a pink robe, a pair of surgical gloves. and five (5) .25 caliber automatic rounds in a trash
can by the curb." (Petitioner's Brief, p.5,

'U

18.) The gloves found in the trash can

where not, however, "a pair of surgical gloves, ,I as Johnson claims; rather, there was
one latex glove and one brown leather glove, both of which were wrapped inside of the
robe. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.' 894, L22 - p. , 895, L3.) The matching leather glove was
found in Johnson's bedroom.

(Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2036. Ls.1-9; Trial Exhibit 83.)

Further, and not insignificantly, the five rounds of .25 ammunition in the garbage can
were found in the pocket of the pink robe, which robe belonged to Johnson. (Trial Tr.,
VoL II, p.1901, Ls.9-13.) While Johnson notes there was a box of .25 ammunition found
on the freezer at the Johnson residence (Petitioner's Brief, p.5, 1118), she fails to note
the box of ammunition was missing five rounds (Trial Tr., Vol. III. p.2048, Ls.4-21).
Which could account for the five rounds found in the garbage can.

1 Also inaccurate is the statement in the opening paragraph of Johnson's brief in which
she states the Court "received certain documents,n including "deposition testimony."
(Petitioner's Brief, p.1.) While Johnson included Bob Pangburn's deposition transcript in
her list of exhibits for the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the transcript was never
admitted as an exhibit at the hearing ~ Tr., ppA-5); as such, the transcript was not
"received" for any evidentiary purpose and may not be considered as evidence.
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Johnson claims Bruno Santos "had been threatened with statutory rape

prosecution in the weeks prior to the murders" (Petitioner's Brief, p,6, ~ 20), implying
that there was a threat made to Mr. Santos personally. This is not entirely incorrect.
While Linda Vavold, Diane Johnson's sister, testified that she encouraged Diane to
"press charges" if she wanted Mr. Santos and Johnson to stop seeing each other (Trial

Tr., Vol. V, p.3358 Ls.3-15), Mr. Santos testified only that Alan, when confronting Mr.
j

Santos about Johnson staying the night at his house, told him if he "didn't lave his
daughter alone, that he was going to hit me and that he was going to put me in jail."
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2762, Ls.16-18).2

3.

Johnson asserts the "blood spots on the robe were from Mr. and Mrs.

Johnson and [an] unknown person." (Petitioners Brief, p.S, 1120.) While there were a
number of "stains" tested from the robe,

all of the DNA present did not necessarily

indicate blood;'rath'er, the DNA could have been from skin cells, saliva, tears, urine, or
other bodily fluids. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3440, L.16 - p.3441, L.1.) Although Johnson
fails to mention it, the unknown DNA found on the robe was only

a

partial profile, with

just a "few minor arleles" that were not consistent with any of the known samples, which
included not only Alan and Diane, but also Mr. Santos. (Trial

Tr., Vol. V,

p.3441, L2-

p. 3442, L1.) Notably, Johnson's DNA was also discovered on the robe. (See, e.g.,
Trial Tr. t Vol. V, p.3442, Ls.11-1S.)

2 In support of this assertion, Johnson cites Mrs. Vavold's testimony as well as pages

5433-5434 of the trial transcript, but does not cite to Mr. Santos' testimony. Pages
5433-5434 of the trial transcript are unrelated to any threats made by Alan Johnson (or
anyone else) to Mr. Santos. Those pages of the transcript relate the testimony of Gina
Thomas, an acquaintance of Johnson's, who claimed that one time in grade school, a
kid named "Andy" threatened to kill her and Johnson if they told anyone he had a gun.
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Johnson asserts that Jane Lopez, Mr. Santos' cousin, testified at trial that

when she called Mr. Santos at home after learning about the murders "she didn't
believeD

Mr.

Santos when he answered his cell phone and said that he WaS at home.

(Petitioner's Brief, p.7, 4f125.) Ms. Lopez's actual testimony was that she first called Mr.
Santos on the home phone and he did not answer, so she called him on his cell phone.
which he answered. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791, Ls.22-24.) When he answered, she
asked him where he was and he said he was home and did not answer the home phone
because he was sleeping. (rrial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791. L.24 - p.2792, L.1.) Ms. Lopez
then hung up and called Mr. Santos again on the home phone after Mr. Santos said, "If
you don't believe me, call me at home." (Trial Tr. t Vol. IV, p.2792, Ls.2-5.) While one
could infer that Ms. Lopez called Mr. Santos back on the home phone because she did
not "believe" he was at home. it is not uundlsputed tf that this Is, in fact, true. Moreover,
the inference Joh~son undoubtedly seeks from this testimony - that Mr. Santos' trial
testimony was not credible - is disputed.
5.

In paragraph 26, Johnson asserts: liThe defense team did not present

documentary evidence that purportedly proved Jane Lopez did not make the phone
calls to Bruno as she claimed." (Petitioners Brief, p.7.) The state does not dispute the
defense did not present "documentary evidence" of the phone calls between Ms. Lopez
and Mr. Santos but does dispute that such documentary evidence exists.
6.

According to Johnson, Mr. Pangburn "did not inquire" of Robert

Kerchusky, the defense fingerprint expert, regarding his "opinion that latent unidentified
fingerprints found on the murder weapon, scope, and ammunition packaging, were
'fesh' prints." (Petitioner's Brief, p.7, 4f127.) While Mr. Pangburn never asked a question
using the word "fresh prints," it is not "undisputed" that he never inquired into the subject
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of the freshness prints. Clearly, he did. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5070. L.6 - p.5074, L.9,
p.5128, L.18 - p.5129, L.16.)

B.

Johnson's "Summary of Post-Conviction Testimony &. Evidence" Is Not
Entirely Accurate
Beginning at page eight of Petitioner's Brief, Johnson purports to summarize the

testimony and
(Petitioner's

evidence presented

Brief,

pp.8-21.)

The

at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
state

disputes

Johnson1s

summarl

and

characterization of the testimony and evidence as follows:
1.

Johnson asserts "Mr. Pangburn is suspended from the practice of law in

the State of Idaho, and in the State of Oregon.

Mr. Pangburn testified at the Post-

Conviction Trial . . . and denied the loss of his license to practice law was due to a
charge of dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation, including conversion of client funds."
(Petitioners Brief, p,e, 1T 31.) To be clear, Mr. Pangburn testified that he surrendered
his license to practtce law in the State of Oregon during his representation of Johnson
because he did not want any issues related to his licensing status in that state to
interfere with his representation of Johnson. (Tr., p.240, L.12 - p.241, L.18.) The only
information provided to the Court regarding the nature of the Oregon State Bar
proceedings involving Mr. Pangburn, other than his testimony that he surrendered his
license, was the Disciplinary Order of the Idaho Supreme Court entered in conjunction
with Mr. Pangburn's Idaho license suspension that states Mr. Pangburn ~fanled] to
cooperate and fail[ed] to respond to disciplinary authorities" in Oregon (Exhibit 15),

3 Of course, Johnson's "summary" of the evidence and testimony presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing is not an actual summary of all the evidence and
testimony, but purports to be a summary of the evidence and testimony she believes is
favorable to her claims.
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which is not inconsistent with Mr. Pangburn's testimony that he surrendered his Oregon
license. Thus, any implication by Johnson that Mr. Pangburn was suspended in Oregon
"due to a charge of dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation, inoluding conversion of
client fundsn Is unsupported by any evidence. (Petitioner's Brief, p.S.
2.

1f 31.)

Johnson incorrectly claims that Patrick Dunn, the defense Investigator in

her underlying criminal case, testified that Mr. Pangburn "failed to share discovery."
(Petitioner's Brief, p.8,

1f

32.)

Mr. Dunn's actual testimony was that Mr. Pangburn

''would obtain discovery, and he would carry it around in his trunk for sometimes
weeks." (Tr., p.42, Ls.17 19.) While Mr. Dunn may have believed he should have
M

received discovery sooner, he never testified that he did not reoeive discovery and, in
fact, admitted he was unaware of any information that he did not receive. (Tr., p.119,
Ls.22-24.)

As for Johnson's assertion that Mr. Dunn testified Mr. Pangburn was

"unprepared, almost never present or was chronically late" (Petitioners Brief, p.8, 1132),
Mr. Dunn's actual testimony was that he thought Mr. Pangburn was unprepared (Tr.,
p.41, L.22 - p.42, L.1), although he offered no actual evidence of unpreparedness; he
met with Mark Rader. Mr. Pangburn's co-oounsel more than he met with Mr. Pangburn

(Tr., p.40, Ls.15-17); and Mr. Pangburn did not meet with him and Mr. Rader on the
mornings before trial like Mr. Dunn thought he should (Tr., p.94, Ls.6~21).

3.

Although Mr. Dunn testified, as did Mr. Rader and Mr. Pangburn, that the

general division of labor between the attorneys was that Mr. Rader would handle expert
witnesses and Mr. Pangburn would handle lay witnesses (Tr., pA6, Ls. 3-7) , Mr. Dunn
had no personal knowledge of all conversations between Mr. Rader and Mr. Pangburn
regardIng any changes to that arrangement (Tr., p.121, L.24 - p.122, L.22).
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In purporting to summarize the testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing, Johnson asserts Mr. Dunn testified that the defense wanted to "go after Bruno
Santos." (Tr., p.46, Ls.23-35.) This is true insofar as it goes. What Johnson fails to
mention is that, although the defense wanted to "go after Bruno Santos." a point with
which Mr. Pangburn agreed (Tr., p.256, L.24 - p.257, L.2), in the end there was no
evidence implicating Mr. Santos in the murders (see id.; p.341, Ls.3-9 (Sheriff Femling
testifying that law enforcement "worked very, very hard to put Bruno at that scene of
that crime. And every piece of evidence that we tried to uncover to put him at that
scene of the crime, we were unable to. We were unable to put him there, any way, any
how.

There was absolutely no evidence."».

Thus, the defense strategy ultimately

focused not on Mr. Santos, but on the absence of any blood on Johnson (the same
theory Johnson relies on in post-conviction), and the deficiencies in the state's
evidence. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.4603-4610 (defense opening statement).)
5.

In paragraph 32.c., Johnson asserts "Mr. Dunn testified upon review of the

pre-trial statements by Bruno Santos" that Santos made a number of statements, which
he advised "the trial lawyers" about, namely, that Mr. Santos said he had been in the
Johnson residence the day of the murders, he had had sex with Johnson. he "admitted"
Alan "threatened him with a statutory rape charge," he "admitted owning guns and
trading for 'weed,·n and that his "car may have been in the area of the Johnson
residence the night of the murders." (Petitioner's Brief, p.9.) However, Mr. Dunn did not
actually testify that Santos "admitted" Alan "threatened him with a statutory rape charge"

- Mr. Dunn testified that he recalled drawing counsels' attention to the fact that Mr.
Santos told police Alan had not "threatened him to stay away from [Johnson] the
weekend prior to the murders." (Tr., p.83, L.23 - p.84. L.3.) Nor did Mr. Dunn testify
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that he told counsel Mr. Santos "admItted" his car was "in the area of the Johnson
residence the niyht of the murders."

In fact, Mr. Dunn's testimony was quite the

opposite - he testified that he did not remember drawing counsels' attention to Mr.
Santos' alleged statement that ((his car might have been in the area of the murders on
that morning." (Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83. L.5.) Most importantly, none of Mr. Santos' pretrial statements were admitted at the post-conviction hearing for the truth of the matter
asserted. (Tr., p.66, Ls.4-20, p.82, Ls.18-21 (interviews not admitted for truth of matter
asserted but "for the basis that rMr. Dunn] took some steps based upon what was
contained In them").)

6.

According to Johnson, Mr. Dunn also testified that "upon review of pre-trial

statements by Jane Lopez .. " and review of documentary phone records, it became
apparent Ms. Lopez [sic] testimony providing an alibi for Bruno Santos was false, and
could not exclude Bruno Santos from the scene of the murders, which Information was
given to trial lawyers." (Petitioners Brief, p.e,

11 32.d.)

While Mr. Dunn testified to his

belief that the phone records he obtained "indicated to [him] ... that Jane Lopez was
not telling, not -- was lying" (TL, p.76, Ls.14-15), the assertion that the phone records t in

fact, established that (Petitioners Brief, p.10,
evidence for at least two reasons.

11 32.dJ.),

Is unsupported by any actual

First, the phone records admitted at the post-

conviction evidentiary hearing were not admitted for the truth of any information
contained therein (Tr., p.70, Ls,14-19), nor was there any testimony attributing any
particular phone number to any particular person or location other than Mr. Dunn
testified that he believed he recailed Mr. Santos' cell phone number (Tr., p.71, Ls.1318). Second, Detective Harkins testified that calls from the school to Mr. Santos' home
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phone were likely not logged because both numbers were "Qwest to Qwest numbers,
local carriers, [and} would not be recorded." (Tr., pA14, Ls.3-17.)
7.

Johnson asserts the audio recording made by Trooper Ross Kirtley when

he first responded to the murder scene, "portray[s] Sheriff Femling expressing suspicion
of Sarah Johnson not providing complete information, and concern with involvement
with Bruno Santos, within one half hour of his arrival at the scene." (Petitioner's Brief,
p.12, 11' 34.a.) Although Johnson played the audio recording (Exhibit 12). at the postconviction evidentiary hearing (Tr., p.332, L.18, p.334, L.13). Johnson did not link any
particular statement made on the recording to any particular individual at the hearing,
nor does she cite to any portion of the transcript in which she did so (see Petitioner's
Brief, p.12, 1[ 34.s (only citing Exhibit 12»).
8.

Johnson incorrectly contends that Detective Harkins c'testified he

concluded Sarah Johnson was the prime target of the investigation by 11 :30 a.m., the
day of the murders."

(Petitioner's Brief, p.13,

11

35.a.)

Detective Harkins' actual

testimony on this point was that he considered Johnson a suspect at that time, not the
"prime target." (Tr., p.388, Ls.2-24.)
9.

Although Johnson correctly notes that Detective Harkins told Mr. Santos

that law enforcement did not think he was involved in the murders when they
interviewed him on September 3, 2003 (Petitioner's Brief, p.13. ~ 35.a.), Johnson falls to
also note that Detective Harkins explained at the evidentiary hearing that Just because
he told Mr. Santos that at the time of the interview, does not mean he did not view Mr.
Santos as a suspect at that time (Tr., pADS, Ls.3-23).

In fact, Detective Harkins

testified that Mr. Santos ('was a suspect in thee] investigation." (Tr., p.4D5, Ls.12-13.)
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Johnson incorrectly characterizes Detective Harkins' testimony at the

post-convlction hearIng regarding what Mr. Santos told him prior to trial.

Detective

Harkins did not "admit[ ] that Bruno Santos told him during the September 3, 2003,
interrogation that Santos [sic] car might have been [sic] the area the night of the
murders." (Petitioner's Brief, p.13,

11 35.a.ll.)

Although Detective Harkins acknowledged

Mr. Santos made a statement relating to his car being seen in the area the night of the
murders, he also testified that post-conviction counsel was taking the conversation out
of context. (Tr., p.396, L8 - p.397, L.2.) During an interview of Mr. Santos> Detective
Harkins asked, "What if I told you that someone said that they seen your velUcie in the
area that morning?"

(Exhibit 34, p.13.)

Mr. Santos said, "I don't know, maybe

someone, some guy get my car I don't know, I don't think so.

I was sleep on

(inaudibie)." (Exhibit 34, p.13 (verbatim).) Detective Harkins explained at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that the question to Mr. Santos suggesting that someone
saw his car in the area was a "lie" he used as an "interview technique" because "[n]o
one ever told [him] that." (fr., p.409, Ls.15-22.) With respect to Mr. Santos admitting
"prior gang affiliations" (Petitioner's Brief, p.13,

1l 35.a.iL),

Detective Harkins explained

that while Mr. Santos flsaid that he was involved in a gang," there was no actual,
documented gang of which Mr. Santos was a member (fr., p.401, L.S - pAOS, L.2),
which was consistent with his trial testimony.

Johnson also incorrectly claims that

Detective Harkins "admitted that Bruno Santos told him during the September 3, 2003,
interrogation" that "he might find .25 caliber ammunition in his apartment. , . and that
Santos had owned a gun and traded for weed," (Petitioner'S Brief, p.13,

11 35.a.Ii.)

What actually happened at the evidentiary hearing was post-conviction counsel read
from the interview transcript (although he left out portions), and at times had Detective
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Harkins read excerpts from the transcript, which Included references to bullets, guns,
and weed. (Tr., p.417, L.4 - p.420, L.S.) Detective Harkins testified he only "[v)aguely"
remembered the interview and did not recall the "exact details of it." (Tr., p.420, LS.617.)

Moreover, none of Mr. Santos' statements made during the Interview were

admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. (Tr., p.84, Ls.14-22.) Thus, any reliance
on Mr. Santos' statements as substantive evidence is improper.

11.

Johnson's claim that there is an inconsistency between Mel Speegle's

statements relating to when Christopher HIlI may have left his prints on the .264 rilfe, the
scope, and the ammunition, and Mr. Hili's statements regarding the same is
unsupported by the portion of the transcript she cites for that assertion (Petitioners
Brief, p.14, 11 35.bj.), or by any other evidence.

12.

Johnson asserts Detective Harkins "testified that police did not attempt to

confirm: Hill's statement that his prints got on the murder weapon, scope and
ammunition packaging when he shot the murder weapon; ,Hili's whereabouts at the time
of the murders; Hill's known associations."

(Petitioner's Brief, p.14,

11

3S.h.H.

(punctuation original).) What Detective Harkins actually testified to was (a) he did not
remember asking where Mr. Hill had taken the gun to sight it in because he did not "see
what there would be to gain from that" since Mr. Hili could have done that "out in a field"
(Tr., p.434,

L.a - pA35,

L.1); (b) to the best of his recollection, Mr. Hill did not remember

where he was at the time of the murders "because it would have been six years before"
(Tr., p.435,

Ls.2~6);

and (c) of Mr. Hill's "known associates," he did look into Mr.

Speegle, but did not look into anyone else because he "didn't think there was a reason"
(Tr., p.435,

Ls.15~20).
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"Sheriff Femling admttted he

concluded, after being at the scene for approximately an hour, there was an issue and a
problem with a boyfriend named Bruno Santos, who was ruled out as a suspect
because no evidence cpuld be found to place him at the scene. n (Petitioner's Brief,
p.14.) While Sheriff Femling undoubtedly testified that, while at the scene, he was
"getting statements that there was an issue and a problem with a boyfriend named
Bruno Santos" (Tr., p.337, Ls.10-12), to the extent Johnson is implying that

Mr.

Santos

was "ruled out as a suspect" that same day, any such claim is not supported by the
evidence.
14.

Johnson's characterization of Stu Robinson's grand Jury testimony as

"inaccurate" Is Incorrect and contradicted by the record.

(Petitioner's Brief, p.15. ,

38.a.)
15.

Johnson correctly states that the recorded interviews of Mr. Hill and Mr.

Speegle, conducted in 2009, were admitted into evidence. (Petitioner's Brief, p.15,

11

39.) However, those recordings were admitted "solery for the purpose of establishing
th[e] alleged inconsistency [asserted In the Second Amended Petition] and the scope of
the investigation. The assertions made as to their truth are not going to be relied on by
the [C]ourt." (Tr., p.440, L.16 - p.441 , LA.)
16.

Contrary to Johnson's assertion, Conseulo Cedeno did not testify that she

uses "multiple names." (Petitioner's Brief, p.16, 1140.) Rather, Ms. Cedeno testified that
her "name in Mexico is Maria Dominguez," but when she came to the United States she
was told she "couldn't use [her] name." (Tr., pA58, Ls.7-12.) Ms. Cedeno denied uSing
any other names. (Tr., pAS9, Ls.18-21.) Johnson also cites Exhibit 13, which is the
transcript of the interview of Consuelo Cedeno conducted on September 12, 2003, in a
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manner that suggests she is doing so for the truth of the statements Ms. Cedeno made
during that interview.

(Petitioner's Brief, p.16,

,-r 40.) However, as with the other

interview transcripts I Exhibit 13 was not admitted for the truth of any statements made
during that interview, "but only for the basis that [Mr. Dunnl took some steps based
upon what was contained in them." (Tr., p.66, Ls.16-22.)
17 _

In paragraph 41, Johnson asserts that, at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing, Mr. Santos Hrefused

to answer a host of questions that may have led to direct

or circumstantial evidence of criminal conduct or clues leading to evidence of criminal
conduct If he would have answered." (Petitioners Brief, p.16.) Johnson's assertion that
Mr. Santos' answers would have led to such evidence or such "clues" is entirely
speculative.
18.

Mr. Kerchusky did not testify at the post-conviction hearing. nor did Mr.

Robinson testify at the grand jury, that uno latent prints of va rue were found at the
scene." (Petitioners Brief, p.17, ~ 43.a.) Mr. Robinson testified before the grand jury
that the Idaho State Police "could not locate any prints that could be identified" on the
gun, the scope\ or the casings. (Exhibit 1, p.189, Ls.17-22.) At the post-conviction
hearing I Mr. Kerchusky characterized this testimony as stating ''there was no latent
fingerprints of value." (Tr.• p.578, Ls.14-15.)
19.

Johnson's assertion that the rifle was "wrapped and unwrapped and

rewrapped with clothing" is not a correct statement of the testimony. (Petitioner's Brief,
p.20,

,-r 44.b.) Mr. Speegle never testified that he uwrapped" his .264 rifle in clothing.

Mr. Speegle's testimony at trial was that the guns in his closet were "in the corner with
Clothes, robes covering them."

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2702, Ls.17-20.)

At the post-

conviction hearing, counsel simply re-read Mr. Speegle's trial testimony and had him
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agree that was what he said. (Tr., p.705, L.16-p.707, l,1, p.713, Ls.6-17.) Thatpostconviction counsel attempted to characterize Mr. Speegle's actions as IIwrapping it in
clothingll does not mean Mr. Speegle testified to that effect; in fact) he did not. (See Tr.,
p.723, Ls.2-8; see also p.702, Ls.11-13 (denying he used clothes as a ''wrap'').}

20.

While Johnson correctly notes that Tina Walthall testified that etched

prints are "relatively common" on "metal types of casings," she omits Ms. Walthall's
testimony that "it's very rare that you get one thafs very good quality," and there's "no
guarantee" that touching such

a casing will

leave an etched print. (Tr., p.691, L.25 -

p.692, L.9; see also Tr., p.690, L.24 - p.691, L.22 (discussing "highly variable factors"
that effect whether an etched print will be left).)
21.

Mr. Hill did not testify, as Johnson claims, that he only helped Mr. Speegle

move "large items from Speegle's ranch to a Boise residence." (Petitioner's Brief, p.20,

1l46.a.) Rather, he testified he helped Mr. Speegle move some "things" to Boise and
helped him "move a few things" to the apartment on the Johnson property. (Tr" p.726,

L.24 - p.727. L.12.)
22.

Although Mr. Hill testified that he "lived in his pick-up truckn "during the

summer of 2003" (see Petitioner's Brief, p.21! ~ 46.c.), he was doing so "by choice
[because hel was camping out" during that period on BlM land located on East Magic
Road (Tr., p.736 l.18 - p.737, L.12).
7
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Johnson's Proposed Findings Of Fact Contain Assertions That Are Not
Supported By The Evidence
Johnson's proposed findings of fact contain the following assertions that are not

supported by any evidence: 4
1.

Contrary to Johnson's assertion, U[t)he post-convidlon trial testimony of

Patrick Dunn and Mark Rader, regarding inadequate preparation of the undertying
murder trial defense team" is not "unrebutted." (Petitioner's Brief, p.21, 1148.) Mr. Dunn
certainly never characterized his performance as inadequate.

To the contrary, the

entire gist of Mr. Dunn's testimony was that he was very prepared and made efforts to
prepare counsel as well based upon the information he obtained. While Mr. Rader was
willing to "fall on his sword" in relation to certain things, the record of the underlying
criminal case reveals counsel were, in fact, prepared, Further, Mr. Pangburn testified
that he was prepared and devoted a large amount of time to Johnson's defense,
spending ''{h]undreds and hundreds" of hours on the case. (Ir., p.279, L,25 - p.280,

L20.)
2.

The evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing does not support

Johnson's claims that counsel were not "sufficiently apprised" of "the pre-trial
statements of Bruno Santos," "the law concerning [sic} witness's assertion of [sic] Fifth
Amendment prMlege against self-incrimination," "pre-trial statements of Consuela {sic]
Cedeno," "pre-trial statements of Jane Lopez, and documentary evidence relating to
phone records," "the content of the Kirtley recording," lithe law concerning the legal

Included within her proposed factual findings, Johnson asserts the following witnesses
are not credible: Bob Pangburn, Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Jane Lopez, and
Christopher Hill. (Petitioner's Brief, pp.21-23, m1 47, 49.a.i., 49.b.i., 49.o.i., 49.m.)
Credibility is, of course, ultimately to be decided by the Court; however, the state
obviously disputes Johnson's blanket assertions that these witnesses are not credible.
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standard for admission of the blood splatter [sic] recreation [sic] test/' or "the facts and
law concerning fingerprint evidence,175

(Petitioner's Brief, pp.21-23,

1f 49.)

To the

contrary, with respect to most of this information, Mr. Dunn testified that he told counsel
about this information and that the Information was available to counsel in the witness
notebooks he prepared. Regarding the fingerprint evidence, Mr. Kerchusky insisted he
made counsel aware of the "important" information regarding such evidence.

(Tr.

y

pp.591-594.) Further, with respect to most of the information Johnson claims counsel
was not "apprised" of, she failed to even ask counsel about their knowledge of the
Information. That post-conviction counsel thinks trial counsel should have used the
information available to counsel differently does not mean counsel was not "sufficiently
apprised" of the information.
3.

Contrary to Johnson's assertions, the "only reasonable conclusion," based

on the evidence presented, is not Mr. Kerchusky's opinion that Mr. Hill was the last
person to touch the .2.64 rifle, scope, and ammunition, or that he did so within one year
ofthe murders. (Petitioner's Brief, pp.22-23,

D.

W49.h.-49.j.)

Johnson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Establishing She Is Entitled To
Post-Conviction Relief On Any Of Her Claims
In its Respondent's Post-Evidentiary Hearing Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law ("Respondent's Brief'), filed February 14, 2011, the state set forth,
in detail, on a claim-by-claim basis, the reasons Johnson has failed to meet her burden
of establishing she is entitled to post-conviction relief. Johnson has articulated nothing

The state is unaware of what "law" Johnson thinks counsel should have been
"apprised" of in relation to the fingerprint eVidence, nor did she present any evidence or
argument of what that law might be.
5
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in her Petitioner~ Brief that would compel a contrary conclusion. In addition to citing an
incorrect legal standard (Petitioner's Brief, p.25 (claiming the "essential question" is
whether "justice [was] served")), Johnson's "Conclusions of Law" are just as bare and
conclusory as are the allegations in her Second Amended Petition (see Petitioner's
Brief, pp.26-28).
For example, Johnson quotes the general allegation that counsel was ineffective
as alleged in paragraph 14 of her Second Amended' Petition and then states: "These
arguments are well taken.

Petitioner has met her burden and proven, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsels' performance was deficient. and she
was thereby prejudiced." (Petitioner's Brief, p.26, f( 51.) Not only has Johnson failed to
rebut the presumption that counsels' decisions were strategic and tactical, she has
failed to explain, as she must (see Order Regarding Post-Trial Briefing and Citations to
the Record, dated January 12, 2011), how the result of her trial would have been
different but for counsels' alleged deficiencies.

Rather, she simply argues, in

conclusory fashion:
During the post-conviction trial several of these witnesses were crossexamined and the crime scene recording was played. The witnesses
were confronted with inconsistencies in their trial testimony with pre-trIal
statements. Petitioner presented her fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky,
who gave convincing testimony regarding the freshness of prints on the
Had the jury
murder weapon and associated Items of evidence.
experienced a proper cross-examination of Bruno Santos, Consuela [sicJ
Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Sheriff Femling, Detective Harkins, Officer
Robinson, Officer Omelas, together with having viewed the crime scene
recording and heard the expert's opinion, it is reasonably probable the
outcome of the trial would have been different.
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(Petitioner's Brief, p.27. 6 )
Johnson falls to explain why or how playing the crime scene recording would
have made a difference (assuming the trial court would have even admitted it), nor does
she explain how using the word "fresh" would have actually made a difference in Mr.
Kerchusky's trial testimony.

Finally, Johnson has failed to explain why there is a

reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different had trial counsel
conducted the same cross-examination post-conviction counsel conducted.

This is

particularly true in light of the answers that were given in conjunction with postconviction counsefs cross-examination, which answers revealed nothing that would
undermine confidence in the verdicts. See Harrington v. Richte!. 131

S.Ct.

770, 788

(2011) (citation and quotations omitted) ("It is not enough to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.").
Johnson also claims that 'ThJad counsel performed up to the objective standard
of reaso.nableness, the jury would have viewed crucial blo.od splatter [sic] evidence."
(Petitioner's Brief, p.26, ~ 52.)

However, as was noted in the Respondent's Brief,

counsel attempted to admit an experiment relating to blood spatter, but the trial court,
after an extensive hearing, ruled the experiment was inadmissible, crediting forensic
pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between the

Because Johnson failed to offer any evidence to support her claim that counsel were
Ineffective in cross-examining Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, KJeli Eliison, Glenda Osuno r
Luis Ramirez. Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala and because Johnson fails to address the
cross-examination of those individuals in her brief, the state assumes she is abandoning
those claims and no further argument is necessary with respect to those allegations. It
also appears Johnson has abandoned her claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to
seek a continuance because she has offered no proposed findings or conclusions with
respect to that allegation.
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coconut used in the experiment and a human head. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.4503-4508.)
While Mr. Rader testified at the post-conviction hearing that he could have "gone out to .
. . various defender agencies in various places around the country" to "see if [he] could
find different experts or different information somehown (Tr., p.169, Ls.9-24), Johnson
presented no evidence at the hearing regarding what experts counsel would have
located had he "reached ouf nor did she present any evidence on what other
experiments or reconstruction options could have been presented to the trial court.
(See generally Tr.)

As such her claim that some unknown "blood splatter [sic]
j

evidence" should have been presented and that such unknown evidence would have
made a difference is unsupported by any actual evidence and falls far short of
establishing she is entitled to relief based upon her claim that counsel were deficient In
this regard.
The United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated:
Sunnounting strickland'S high bar is never an easy task. An
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of
waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and 50 the
Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest intrusive
post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the
right to counsel is meant to serve.
Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (citations and quotations omitted).
Simply put, Johnson has failed to surmount the "high bar" under Strickland with
respect to any of her ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

As such, this Court

should deny relief on all such claims.
Johnson has likewise failed to establish she is entitled to a new trial based upon
the discovery of the identity of the individual who left the previously unidentified prints
on the .264 rifle, the scope, and a box of ammunition. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.34-
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41.) Nevertheless, Johnson argues "that had the jury known, first that these unidentified
latent prints were fresh, that fact alone would have changed the jury's verdict."
(Petitioner's Brief, p.28, ~ 56.) This argument, however, relies on the false premise that
the jury was not aware of Mr. Kerchusky's opinion in this regard. This premise is belied
by the record. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5070, L6 - p.5074, L9, p.5128, L 18 - p.5129,

L16.)
Johnson further argues, "had the jury also known the prints were those of a
homeJess man, with possible motivation of financial gain, access to the scene of the
crime, no alibi, and whose explanation of how his prints got on the tools of the murder
was highly unlikely, reasonable doubt would have prevented conviction." (Petitioner's
Brief, p.28, 1T 56.)

These assertions are not only contradicted by the evidence

presented at the post-conviction hearing they are, frankly, borderline ridiculous. That
Mr. Hill decided to spend his summer camping does not make him a "homeless man" as
Johnson asserts or as that term is commonly understood.

Johnson's claim of a

upossible motivation of financial gain" is without any evidentiary support and appears to
be based solely on her false characterization of Mr. Hill as a "homeless man." It is also
Inconsistent with the uncontradicted testimony that there was absolutely no evidence
that Diane's and Alan's deaths were the result of a robbery or any other financial
motivation. (Tr., p.356, Ls.14-24.) Aiso contrary to Johnson's attack on Mr. Hill is the
fact that Mr. Speegle specifically denied Mr. Hili had access to his apartment on the
Johnson property. (Tr., p.704, Ls.8-10.) Indeed, Mr. Hill had no greater "access to the
scene of the crime" than anyone else who lived in Bellevue, and his access was
certainly not as great as Johnson's. As for Johnson's assertion that Mr. Hill had "no
alibi," this is simply incorrect to the extent she is implying that he had no explanation for

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER - 20

FEB.2B.2011 4:17PM

IDAHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

NO. 360

P. 22

his whereabouts at the time of the murders - he clearly did. (Tr., p.728, Ls.S-14, p.736,
L18 - p,738, L19.) Finally, there is nothing "unlikely" much less "highly unlikely" about
Mr. Hill's explanation as to how his prints were found on Mr. Speegle's property. Both
Mr. Speegle and Mr. Hill testified that Mr. Hill was the caretaker of Mr. Speegle's ranch
at one time and had access to all of his property, including his guns. Both also testified
that Mr. Hili helped Mr, Speegle move, at which time he could have touched Mr.
Speegle's guns and ammunition. In addition, Mr. Hill testified that, while staying at Mr.
,

Speegle's ranch, he got "bored" and took Mr. Speegle's gun "to the Muldoon Canyon
Gun Range" and shot it ''six or seven times." (fr., p.729, L24 - p.730, L.7.) That it
does not behoove Johnson to believe Mr. Hill's and Mr. Speegle's perfectly reasonable
explanations does not mean an objective jury would have the same difficulty,
particularly in light of the weight of the evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that
Johnson was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
7

The evidence proving' Johnson was involved in the murder of her parents was
overwhelming.

Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her

relationship with Bruno Santos, a nineteen-year-old illegal immigrant, who they planned on
reporting to law enforcement the day they were murdered. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2505, L 14
- p.2509, L6; Vol. V. p.3337. Ls.7-18; p.3342, L13 - p.3343, L.6; p.3345, LSA-18;
p.3357, L 15 - p.3359, L.6.)

Shortly after the murders, Johnson fled to a neighbor's

house, where she reported that both her parents had been shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1512,
La - p.1519, L5; p.1554, L.5 - p.1555, L25; p.i58S. L.i8 - p.iS86, L.10.) Although

The jury was instructed that Johnson could be found guilty of first-degree murder
regardless of whether she pulled the trigger or aided and abetted another in the
murders. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008).
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Johnson denied any involvement, she gave several different accounts of what she
allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what she heard just prior to and after the murders.
Johnson initially claimed she heard a gunshot while she was in her room asleep, that she
sat up in bed, then heard a second shot, went to her parents' bedroom door, called for her
mother, then fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1519, L.6 - p.1521, L.7; p.1558, Ls.3.;.19.)
She stated she had not seen anything, however. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1521, Ls.3-7.) The
second time she told the story, shortly thereafter, her report differed: she stated she heard
her father in the shower before the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1528, Ls.3-18.) (See also
Tr., Vol. yl, p.S6S6, L.6 - p.3701, L15; p.3739, L24 - p.3742, L.22 (another version of
events told by Johnson).)
Upon being asked the first time by police what had happened, just a few minutes
later, she tried to reconcile these statements, stating that her father starting the shower
Initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was re-awakened again by the first
shot (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.1811, L.21 - p.1813, L.6; p. 2099, L.17 - p.2103, L21.) In this
t

statement she also for the first time claimed she had opened the door of the master
bedroom before fleeing the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1850,

Ls.1~23.)

She later told a

friend that she had ImmedIately fled the house upon hearing the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. V,
p.3297. L.22 - p.3298, l,22.) She told this friend's mother that, after hearing a shot and
going to her parent's closed bedroom door, she heard arguing, called out to her mother,
and then fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3529, L.10 - p.3530, l,15.) (See also Trial
Tr., Vol. III, p.2106, L.7 - p.2112, l,23 (version of events Johnson gave police a few hours
later).) Later that day, Johnson told her brother that she woke up upon hearing the first
shot, went to her parents' closed door and called out for them, then heard the second shot
and fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.4545, L.16 - p.4548. L.12.)
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(Trial Tr., Vol. IV,

p.2424, L.16 - p.2426, L.7.) She stated she woke up when she heard the shower come
on, and then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2426, L.8 - p.2428,
L4,) She got out of bed, went through her bathroom into the guest bedroom, out into the
hall, and to the door of the master bedroom. (Trial Tr., VoL IV, p.2428, LS - p.2429, L.9.)
She stated her bedroom door was either closed or open only a crack. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2429, Ls.10-13.) In this interview, Johnson claimed she heard the second shot while
standing outside the master bedroom door, but that the doors were open because her
parents propped it open with a pillow, and Johnson again stated she did not see or hear
anything indicating a struggle. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2429, L,14 - p.2432, L.1.) About 25
days after the murders Sarah told another version of events. She told a relative that the
first shot woke her up; she heard a second shot, ran to her parents' bedroom. and saw
blood on the walls and floor. (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3684, L22 ~ p.3690. L 12.)
Johnson's Inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did, and heard around
the time of the murders were significant in relation to other evidence.

For example,

several of the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted her hair and
appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep In bed when the
murders occurred. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1545, L.20 - p.1547, L.18; p.1559, L14 - p.1560,
L.11; p.1818, L.19 - p,1819, L19; p.2520, L15 - p.2521 , L.23,) Johnson's claim that her
parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door had been closed was also inconsistent wlth
the presence of Diane's blood and brain matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the

hallway and part of Diane's skull being in the hallway outside the master bedroom, (Trial
Tr" Vol. III, p.1619, lo20 - p.1620, lo10; p.1637, Ls.5-15; p.1655, lo2 - p.1657, L.9;
p.1868, L6.2~18; p.2019, L24 - p.2020, lo18; p.2020, lo24 - p.2022, lo3; p.2121, L7RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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p.3123, L.20.) In addition, Diane's blood was found on

the socks Johnson was wearing the morning of the murders. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.1755, L.8
t

- p.1759, L.8; Vol. V, p.3120, L.21 - p.3122, L.13; p.3423, Ls.8-14; p.3475, L.19 - p.3476,
L.3.) Johnson also had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent with a recent
impact, such as shotgun recoiLs (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2248, L.3 - p.2250, L.9; p.2317, L.6 p2318, L. 18.)
During the interview that took place the day after the murder, Johnson admitted
owning a pink bathrobe (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2436, Ls.7-18), admitted that a right-handed leather
glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother and was usually in the car
(Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2036, L.1 - p.2037, L.6; Vol. IV, p.2436, L 19 - p2437, L.1; Vol. VI,
p.3596, L.20 - p.3598, L.1), and claimed there should not have been any bullets in her
room (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2437, Ls.2-17). However, unspent cartridges of the type used in
the murders were found in her bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2033, L.11 - p.2034, L.18.)
On them was Diane's blood. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3122, L.11 - p.3123, L.24.) In addition,
the police found the spent casings to rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and
the master bedroom (still in the rifle). (Trial Tr.• Yol. \fI, p.1840. L.15 - p.1842, L.12;
p.1843, L24 - p.944, L15; p.1954, L.11 - p.1956, L.21; p.2051, L.3 - p.2053, L.8; Vol. V,
p.2912, L.6 - p.2954, L 16.) Also significant was evidence law enforcement found in a
trash can set out on the street for collection the morning of the murders: one latex glove
and one left-hand leather glove, which matched the glove found in Johnson's bedroom,
wrapped in the pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1672, L.16 -

Johnson claimed the bruises came from falling and hitting a table at Mr. Santos' house
when she stayed there two days before the murder. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2444, Ls.7-15.)
Q
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p.1673, L17; p.1826, L.16 - p.1832, L.14; p.1893. L.19 - p.1902, L.17; Vol. VI, p.4566,
l,16 - p.4568, L.25.) Inside the robe were paint chips that matched paint on the shirt
Johnson was wearing the morning of the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1755, l.8 - p.1758,
L.S; Vol. VI, p.3574, L.1 - p.35e7, L.21.) Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present
inside the latex glove (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p. 310S, L.5 - p.2114, L.1), and the robe Itself
tested positive for blood and DNA from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3114, L.2 - p.3117, L.11;

p.3434, L.11 - p.3459, L.3; p.3473. L.13 - p.3475, L.2), DNA possibly from Alan (Trial Tr.,
Vol. V, p.3434, L11 - p.3459, L.3), gun shot residue (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3229, L.15 p.3238, L.20), and tissue from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3446, L.19 - p.3448, L 18; p.3454,
L.16 - p.3455, L.Z3). The blood on the robe was consistent with the shooter having worn
it, backwards, during the shooting. (Trial Tr., vol. VI, p.4194, L.S - p.4211, L.21.)
With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had been
hidden in a closet in the guesthouse. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2418, L.8 - p.2419, L.22;
p.2702, L.3 - p.2706, L.1.) Johnson had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there
several times, including the days immediately preceding the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III,
p.20S7, L.7 - p.2038, L.6; Vol. IV, p.2257, L.7 - p.2258, l,10; p.2437, L.18 - p.2439, L.23;
p.2688 , 1.25 - p.2690, L.6; p.2715, L.12 - p.2716, L.6; Vol. V, p.3274, Ls.11-25; p.3285,
L.6 - p.3293, L.7; p.3335, L.14 - p.3336, l,22.) The scope from the murder weapon was
still in the guesthouse on the bed, and officers initially at the scene observed footprints in
the dew on the lawn going to and from the Johnson home and the guesthouse, which was
an apartment above the detached garage on the Johnson properly. (Trial Tr., Vol. III,
p.1733, L.20-p.1738, L.25, p.1842, 1.8-p.1843, l,3; p.2056, L.2-p.2057, L.22;VoI.IV,
p.2706, Ls.2-16, p.2685, L 12 - p.2686, L.25.) A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from
the guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room.

(Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2038, L.7 -
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p.2040, L.10.) A nine-mIllimeter handgun matching the magazine was in a gun safe in the
guesthouse (Trial Tr., Vol. III, L.7 - p.2062, L.12). and a .22 rifle from the guesthouse
closet was also found in the garage (Trial Tr.• Vol. /II, p.1728, L.20 - p.1731, L2Q; p.2047,
L18 - p.2050, L.18; Va!. N, p.2708, L13- p.2709, L.14). Johnson had asked her parents

for a key to the family's gun safe two days before the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3336,

Ls.10-22.)
The trial court's observations regarding the likelihood of an alternate perpetrator
or the lack of Johnson1s involvement, given the evidence presented. are also
informative:
[TJo suggest to a reasonable jury such things that somebody off of the
street could come and find that gun in the guest house, find those bullets
in the guest house, know when the parents were going to be there; find
the knives in the kitchen that are hidden, the one knife that's hidden
behind the microwave or brad box, whatever it was, in the dark no less; go
out past the family dog that the evidence was would bark, and the dog
didn't bark.
Take the same route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took
out of the house, past the trash can where the robe is found. Get her
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not awaken her or
bother her.
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the parents'
bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do all of this in the dark and not
disturb the parents just defies common sense.
I think a reasonable jury could clearly find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here. The jury heard all of the
evidence about the robe.
The jury doesn't have to believe that the crime occurred exactly the
way the defense theory is that it occurred. The argument of no blood, no
guilt; well, the converse of that Is if there's blood, there is guilt. And
there's blood. There's blood all over the robe, blood on the socks.
Your whole theory. it seems to be, the whole defense theory is an
aiding and abetting theory, because the defendanfs there and there's no
evidence that excludes the defendant. There's not one piece of evidence
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that excludes the defendant from the commission of this crime that ,
heard. She's right there. And her defense-

I mean her defense people, Howard and Mink, testify - and Inman,

I believe, all three -- at least two of them testified that the doors were
open. The door to the parents' bedroom, which Is propped open by the
pillows, and the door to Sarah Johnson's room is open.
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was taken
out of the Suburban, that's something else that this unnamed killer would
have had to have known, is where the gloves were located, the mother's
gloves in the Suburban. Located those in the dark. as well, and brought
them into the house to help commit this crime.
And leave one in Sarah Johnson's room with two cartridges for the

.264; unspent, unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson's room that part of her
mother's body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah Johnson's
room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it just doesn't make sense to
me.
And I don't think it would make sense to the jury. One of the
leather gloves found In her room, the other one found out - wrapped up In
the trash can inside the pink robe.
That's what I mean by the
circumstantial evidence here, and she admits being there.
The evidence here is overwhelming ....
(Supplemental Trial Tr., p.449, L.9 - p.451, L.19.)
The trial court further commented:
[N]ot to mention whoever this supposed killer is, what the motive is.
The jury heard a ton of evidence in this case about a motive with the
defendant, Sarah Johnson.
But I keep going back to the fact that she's present, and not
excluded. And no one else.
The fact that there's some stray DNA evidence in the house where
there were 80 people in the house a week before for a wedding, and using
a common bathroom, it's not surprising that there would be some stray
DNA in the house.
The fact that Sarah Johnson's fingerprints were not found on the
scope or the rifle when gloves are found in her bathrobe, rolled up in the
trash can outside the house, is not surprising.

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER ·27

P. 28

FEB, 28, 2011

4: 18PM

ATTY GENERAL-SPU

NO, 360

p, 29

Everybody that testified in that trial said that the pink bathrobe was
present in the environment where the shootings occurred. So eJther
Sarah Johnson put that bathrobe in the trash can, or somebody else did.
Sarah Johnson says she went out of the house where the trash can
is, $0 either Sarah Johnson went out by the trash can by herself; or
Sarah Johnson went out to the trash can with somebody else out there
putting the robe in the trash can, based on the time frame presented. . ..
The evidence is involvement. I don't know how else to say It. The
jurors heard that.
(Supplemental Trial Tr., p,453, L 15 - p,454, L 17.)
Johnson is not entitled to a new trial.

Her claims la'ck merit and her petition

should be dismissed,

DATED this 28tl1 day of FebrualY, 2011,

JESSI
Depu A orney General
Specia
osecuting Attomey
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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Christopher P. Simms, Hailey, Idaho, for Petitioner, Sarah Johnson
Jessica Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Boise, Idaho, for Respondent, state of Idaho

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-1

THIS MATTER came before the court for evidentiary hearing beginning
Tuesday, December 7,2010. The petitioner Sarah Johnson was present throughout the
hearing, represented by her counset Christopher P. Simms. The respondent, state of
Idaho was represented by Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputies
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorneys for the state of Idaho.
The hearing was conducted over four days, concluding December 10, 2010. The
parties requested to submit closing arguments in writing, which were received by the
court and reviewed as part of this court's fact-finding process. The matter was taken
under advisement on March 16, 2011, and the court hereby enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to LR.C.P. 52(a).

BACKGROUND
This case presents an application for post-conviction relief brought by the
petitioner, Sarah Johnson Oohnson) in her Second Amended Petition, filed January 11,
2010. This court previously ruled on dispositive motions in this case on or about July
19 and December 2,2010. Johnson also voluntarily dismissed certain claims prior to
trial. At this juncture the following seven claims remain for resolution by this court:
1.

Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall

lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case,
chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including
triat all of which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, in a
manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict;
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2.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a

continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after
learning a comforter had not been collected as evidence;
3.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately

investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on
blood splatter opinion evidence;
4.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately

cross-examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos
Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson;
5.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present

evidence of an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross
Kirtley, which recording allegedly proved the theory that police focused
on Petitioner Sarah Johnson, to the exclusion of all other possible suspects
and theories, because she was the easiest target;
6.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire

whether certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh"; and
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7.

Newly

discovered

evidence

relating

to

the

recent

identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously
unidentified latent fingerprints.
While the state has not delineated two of these issues specifically in its proposed
findings herein, it has acknowledged all seven of these claims in its arguments. This
court will therefore discuss the issues as set forth above and, excepting the cumulative
error issue, in the order presented by Johnson in her post-hearing memoranda.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ON POST CONVICTION
1.

Trial counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal after Johnson was

sentenced.
2.

On or about April 19, 2006, Johnson filed her initial Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief from which she was granted relief to pursue a direct appeal, with the
remaining post-conviction issues stayed.
3.

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's conviction on or about June

26,2008. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008).

4.

On or about August IS, 2008, this court lifted the previously entered stay

and thereafter granted leave for Johnson to file a First Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief.
5.

On or about December 28,2009, this court granted Johnson leave to file a

Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
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6.

On or about February B, 2010, Johnson and the state of Idaho filed cross

motions for summary disposition.
7.

The motions were heard on April 20, 2010. This court ruled from the

bench, dismissing some of Johnson's claims. The court took further issues under
advisement and issued a memorandum decision and order on May 20, 2010, regarding
those claims. The court's order concerning those claims was entered on July 19, 2010.
B.

The state filed a motion for reconsideration as to two issues. This court

granted relief in part on December 2,2010, dismissing Johnson's claim regarding
appellate counsel.
9.

On December 6, 2010, Johnson filed a memorandum dismissing an

additional claim.
10.

This court conducted an evidentiary hearing/trial (hereinafter referred to

as evidentiary) from December 7 through December 10, 2010.
11.

This court heard from the following witnesses during the evidentiary:

Patrick Dunn; Mark Rader; Raul Cornelas; Stuart Robinson; Bob Pangburn; Jerry Walt
Femling; Jane Lopez; Steve Harkins; Consuelo Cedeno; Bruno Santos; Maria Eguren;
Robert Kerchusky; Tina Walthall; Mel Speegle; and Christopher Kevin Hill.
12.

These witnesses varied in their abilities to remember and relate facts of

consequence in this case. The court notes its particular ability to observe each witness'
demeanor and credibility in making the factual findings set forth herein.
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13.

Counsel filed post-hearing briefing on or about February 14, 2011, and

again on or about February 28, 2011. The court took this matter under advisement as of
March 16, 2011.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The following Findings of Fact are based upon this court's review of the

evidence admitted at the trial of this cause, along with the court's unique opportunity to
view and observe each witness who testified, thereby making observations regarding
each witness' demeanor, credibility and reliability.l
2.

On the morning of September 2,2003, Alan and Diane Johnson were

found shot to death in their home, where they lived with their daughter Sarah Oohnson)

(See Exhibit 2 (hereinafter Trial Transcript (TT) 1645:9-1663:6; 1887:1-1889:9); see also
Post- Conviction Evidentiary Hearing (PCH) Exhibit 12).
3.

Early on the morning of September 2, a neighbor of the Johnsons, Kim

Richards, was awakened by her daughter Rachel, indicating that she heard screaming.
Mrs. Richards" got out of bed and ran to the front door" and "turned on the front porch
light and unlocked and opened the front door," when she saw Johnson running down
their driveway toward their house. (TT 1518:2-11).

I The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are all matters solely within the province of this court. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 4483675, 2 (Idaho
App. 2010) (citing Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988)); see also l.R.C.P 52(a).
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4.

Mrs. Richards and Rachel attempted to find out what was happening.

Johnson was screaming and breathing heavily, stating that someone had shot both of
her parents. (TT 1518:18-1519:23).
5.

Immediately before coming to the Richards' home Johnson had been to

the homes of two neighbors who did not answer the door when Johnson knocked. (IT
1537:11-15; 1518:8-11).
6.

Although Johnson denied any involvement in the shooting, she gave

several different accounts of what she allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what she
heard just prior to and after the murders.
7.

Johnson initially claimed she heard a gunshot while she was in her room

asleep, that she sat up in bed, then heard a second shot, went to her parents' bedroom
door, called for her mother, then fled the house. (TT 1519:6-1521:7; 1558:3-19). Johnson
initially stated she had not seen anything before leaving the home. (Id., 1521:3-7).
8.

The second time Johnson told the story, a short time later, her report

differed: she stated she was awakened by the sound of her father in the shower before
she heard any shots. (TT 1528:3-18).
9.

Johnson told yet another version of events a short time later. (TT 3696:6-

3701:15; 3739:24-3742:22).
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10.

Upon being asked the first time by the police what had happened, just a

few minutes later, Johnson attempted to reconcile her statements, stating that her
father's starting the shower initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was
re-awakened again by the first shot. (TT 1811:21 -1813:6; 2099:17 - 2103:21).
11.

In this statement, Johnson also claimed for the first time she had opened

the door of the master bedroom before fleeing the house. (TT 1850:1-23).
12.

Johnson later told a friend that she had immediately fled the house upon

hearing the shots. (TT 3297:22 - 3298:22). She told this friend's mother that, after
hearing a shot and going to her parent's closed bedroom door, she heard arguing, called
out to her mother, and then fled the house. (Id., 3529:10 - 3530:15).
13.

Johnson was interviewed approximately three hours later by Detective

Steve Harkins of the Blaine County Sheriff's Office. Detective Harkins gave Johnson her
Miranda warnings. (TT 2107:15-23). Johnson then gave additional details during this

interview. (See generally id., 2106-2111).
14.

Later that day, Johnson told her brother Matt that she was awakened

upon hearing the first shot, went to her parents' closed door and called out for them,
then heard the second shot and fled the house. (TT 4545:16 - 4548:12).
15.

Johnson was interviewed again the day after the murders. (TT 2424:16-

2426:7). Johnson stated she was awakened when she heard the shower come on, and

then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Id.,2426:8-2428:4). She got out of bed, went
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through her bathroom into the guest bedroom, out into the hall, and to the door of the
master bedroom. (Id., 2428:5-2429:9). Johnson stated her bedroom door was either
closed or open only a crack. (Id., 2429:10-13).
16.

In this interview Johnson claimed she heard the second shot while

standing outside the maste.r bedroom door, but that the doors were open because her
parents propped their door open with a pillow. Johnson stated she did not see or hear
anything indicating a struggle. (TT 2429:14 - 2432:1).
17.

Law enforcement arrived at the Johnson home shortly after Johnson

arrived at the Richards' residence.
18.

Trooper Ross Kirtley, (Kirtley) an Idaho State Police officer was the first to

arrive on the scene. (TT 1645:24 -1652:11). He was followed shortly thereafter by
Bellevue Marshall Randy Tremble (Tremble). Officer Raul Ornelas (Ornelas) and
Deputy Jamie Shaw (Shaw) arrived soon thereafter. (Id.,1686:21-24).
19.

Kirtley and Tremble did a security search of the north-half of the house.

(TT 1787:4-13).
20.

Diane Johnson's body was located in a bed in the master bedroom. A

cream colored comforter covered her body. (TT 1792:16 -1793:3). Kirtley pulled the
comforter back with his asp, revealing Diane's body with most of the head missing.
(Id., 1793:19-21).
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21.

The comforter was not collected as evidence, (TT 1986:23 -1987:6), which

was, in retrospect, a mistake. (Id., 2016:21 - 24).
22.

About twenty-five days after the murders Johnson told yet another

version of events. She told a relative that the first shot woke her up; she heard a second
shot, ran to her parents' bedroom, and saw blood on the walls and floor. (TT 3684:223690:12).
23.

Johnson's inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did and heard

around the time of the murders are significant in relation to other evidence. Several of
the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted her hair and
appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep in bed when the
murders occurred. (TT 1545:20-1547:18; 1559:14-1560:11; 1818:19-1819:19; 2520:152521:23).
24.

Johnson's claim that her parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door

had been dosed was also inconsistent with the presence of Diane's blood and brain
matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the hallway from her parents' room. Part of
Diane's skull was also found in the hallway outside the master bedroom. (TT 1619:201620:10; 1637:5-15; 1655:2-1657:9; 1868:2-18; 2019:24-2020:18; 2020:24-2022:3; 2121:72124:4; 3122:11-3123:20).
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25.

Additionally, Diane's blood was found on the socks Johnson was wearing

the morning of the murders. (1755:8 -1759:8; 3120:21- 3122: 13; 3423:8-14; 3475:193476:3).
26.

Johnson had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent with a recent

impact, such as a rifle recoil. (TT 2248:3 - 2250:9; 2317:6 - 2318:18).
27.

Johnson admitted owning a pink bathrobe (TT 2436:7-18). She admitted

that a right-handed leather glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother
and was usually in the car (Id., 2036:1-2037:6; 2436:19-2437:1; 3596:20-3598:1), and
Johnson claimed there should not have been any bullets in her room (2437:2-17).
28.

It is notable, however, that two unspent .264 caliber cartridges of the type

used in the murders were found in Johnson's bedroom. (IT 2033:11-2034:18). Diane's
blood was found on the cartridges. (Id. / 3122:11-3123:24). In addition, the police found
the spent casings from the rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and in the
master bedroom (still in the rifle). (Id., 1840:15-1842:12; 1843:24-1844:15; 1954:111956:21; 2051:3-2053:8; 2912:6-2954:16).
29.

Also significant was evidence law enforcement found in a trash can set

out on the street for collection the morning of the murders. The trash can was pulled
back from the curb by law enforcement shortly before it would have been collected. (TT
1672:19-1673:11). Found in the trash can were: one latex glove and one left-hand

leather glove, (which matched the right-hand glove found in Johnson's bedroom),
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wrapped in a pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Id., 1672:16-1673:17; 1826:161832:14; 1893:19-1902:17; 4566:16-4568:17). Five .25-caliber shells were also found in the
pocket of the robe. (Id.,1900:19-1901:13). Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present
inside the latex glove. (Id., 3106:5 -3110:3).
30.

Inside the robe were paint chips that matched paint on the shirt Johnson

was wearing the morning of the murders. (TT 1755:8-1758:13; 3574:1-3587:21).
31.

The pink robe itself tested positive for blood and DNA from Diane (TT

3114:2-3117:11; 3434:11-3459:3; 3473:13-3475:2), DNA possibly from Alan (id., 3434:113459:3), gunshot residue (id., 3229:15-3238:20), and tissue from Diane. (Id., 3446:193448:18; 3454:16-3455:23). The blood on the robe was consistent with the shooter
having worn it backwards during the shooting. (Id., 4194:5-4211:21).
32.

With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had

been stored in a closet in a guesthouse located near the Johnson residence. (TT 2418:82419:22; 2702:3-2706:1).
33.

The guesthouse was an apartment above the detached garage on the

Johnson property. Johnson had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there several
times, including the days immediately preceding the murders. (Id., 2037:7-2038:6;
2257:7- 2258:10; 2437:18-2439:23; 2688:25-2690:6; 2715:12-2716:6; 3274:11-25; 3285:63293:7; 3335:14-3336:22).
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34.

Officers obtained a search warrant on the day of the murders and served it

a short time later. While searching the officers located the scope from the murder
weapon in the guesthouse on the bed, and Officer Cornelas observed human footprints
in the dew on the lawn going to and from the Johnson home and the guesthouse. (Id.,
1733:20-1738:25; 1842:8-1843:3; 2056:2-2057:22; 2685:12-2686:25; 2706:2-16; PostConviction Hearing Transcript (PCHT) 206:6-208:25).
35.

A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from the guesthouse was also found

in Johnson's bedroom, wrapped in a red bandana on the shelf below where the two
.264-caliber shells were found. (IT 2038:7-2040:10). A nine-millimeter handgun
matching the magazine was in a gun safe in the guesthouse (Id., 2061:11-2062:12).
Johnson had asked her parents for a key to the family's gun safe two days before the
murders. (Id.,3336:10-22). A key to the guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room
(Petitioner's Ex. 4).
36.

The search also produced a box of.25 ammunition in the garage, with five

shells missing. The.22 rifle normally kept in the guest house was in the garage on top
of the freezer, and a spent .264 casing was located in the garage as well. (Id.).
37.

Based upon the evidence obtained by the Blaine County prosecutor, a

grand jury convened and ultimately indicted Johnson for two counts of First Degree
Murder. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, page 511:3 - 512::16; TT 1458:18-1460:7).
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38.

Johnson's trial was conducted between February 7 and March 16, 2005.

(TT 1454:16-20, 6173:18-6175:22).
39.

The Honorable R. Barry Wood, District Judge, presided at the trial.

40.

Johnson was represented by two attorneys at trial: Bob Pangburn

(Pangburn) and Mark Stephen Rader (Rader).
41.

At the conclusion of the trial Johnson was convicted of both counts of first

degree murder, as well as an enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of the
crime. (TT 6174-6175).
42.

The defense "team" 2 included Mr. Patrick Dunn (Dunn), a private

investigator who assisted Pangburn and Rader prior to and during the trial. Dunn's
wife was also a member of the team, along with various experts who would be available
from time-to-time to consult with counsel, some of whom testified at the trial. See infra,
Finding of Fact ~ 88.
43.

Pangburn practiced law for about twenty years before he surrendered his

license to the Oregon State Bar on or about September 8,2004. The state of Idaho
suspended Pangburn's license on January 17,2008 by Order of the Supreme Court. The
Idaho suspension was a result of multiple violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct (see Petitioner's Exhibit 15), including violation of Rule 8.4( c) for conduct
/I

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id.

2

Pangburn also felt that Rader's associate attorney, Anita Moore, was a member of the "team."
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44.

While the court gives the suspension weight in evaluating Pangburn's

credibility, the fact that Pangburn is now suspended does not make his testimony
entirely unworthy of belief. The findings of fact set forth by the court herein regarding
Pangburn's testimony and his conduct are based on the entirety of the record, which
includes his individual testimony. Where the court's findings are based upon
Pangburn's testimony, the court has engaged in the appropriate weighing process and
accepts his testimony as true, notwithstanding his ethical misconduct.
45.

During his lawyering career, Pangburn practiced primarily criminal

defense, including representing hundreds of prisoners in the state of Oregon.
46.

Pangburn tried over 100 cases to jury in Idaho and Oregon.

47.

Pangburn devoted a large amount of time to Johnson's defense, spending

"hundreds and hundreds" of hours on the case between 2003 and 2005. (PCHT 279:25280:20).
48.

Before assuming responsibility for the Johnson case, Pangburn

represented a number of people with homicide-related charges. Pangburn also handled
a number of post-conviction and habeas cases involving murder and aggravated
murder in Oregon.
49.

Rader has been licensed to practice law in Oregon since 1973 and in Idaho

since approximately 1990. Rader's practice is focused on aggravated murder and
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capital murder cases in Oregon. He also does some post-conviction work in those kinds
of cases.
50.

The court gives limited weight to Rader's testimony in this case because

he was admittedly confused about several areas of his testimony and he had poor
recollection of the details regarding his beliefs and opinions. (See, e.g., PCHT 188:5189:2). Rader further admitted his bias in that he would like to see Johnson have
another trial. (Id.,195:9-12). This admission causes this court to give even less weight to
Rader's testimony in this proceeding.
51.

Pangburn, on the other hand, testified that the defense team did a "real

good job" of defending Johnson, "given what [they] had to work with." (PCHT 268:911). While the court discounts this self-serving statement to some degree, the record
ultimately sustains Pangburn's conclusion that both attorneys representing Johnson
were qualified; both worked diligently on the case and both put forth significant effort
in Johnson's behalf.
52.

Rader has experience with ballistics experts and multiple contacts with

forensic experts due to the focus of his legal practice. Rader was thus familiar, based on
his significant experience, with the evidentiary standards necessary to challenge or
admit expert or forensic testimony in court.
53.

Rader was asked by Pangburn to assist with the Johnson defense

primarily to handle the forensic/scientific evidence. Rader also had prior involvement
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with Dunn, and suggested that the team hire Dunn when there was a falling-out
between Pangburn and a prior investigator.
54.

Dunn has significant experience as an investigator and he is now working

primarily as an investigator on post-conviction criminal cases.
55.

Dunn was hired generally to review and evaluate the police investigation,

review the evidence and witness interviews and assist with trial preparation.
56.

In a general sense, when Dunn is hired as an investigator he initially

receives and reviews material from the defense attorneys, which the attorneys receive
via discovery from the prosecution. This pattern was followed by Dunn, Pangburn and
Rader in this case.
57.

Once Dunn has a grasp of the evidence in the case, he then organizes the

material for trial counseL Dunn organizes the material chronologically and he also
creates an alphabetical witness listing. Dunn does not generally create written reports
because such reports may have to be provided to the state, thus giving away defense
strategy. Again, Dunn followed this pattern as a member of the Johnson defense team.
58.

Like Rader, Dunn expressed a bias favoring the success of Johnson's post-

conviction petition. (See Rader's Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief). This again causes the court to question Dunn's testimony at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing; however, the court accepts some of Dunn's testimony as accurate
regarding selected details of the case, as is set forth below.
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59.

Dunn had done criminal investigation work for Rader prior to the Johnson

case. Dunn understood that Rader and Pangburn decided to change investigators on
the Johnson case in March 2004 and he was hired thereafter.
60.

Dunn met weekly with Rader, but not as often with Pangburn. Prior to

trial the defense team met less than once per month with both lawyers and Dunn
present.
61.

Pangburn felt that the meetings between the lawyers and Dunn were held

often enough for case preparation. Dunn disagreed,3 but this court concludes that both
counsel prepared adequately for the Johnson trial.
62.

The first thing Dunn received was the Grand Jury transcript. He then

received police reports and witness statements from the police; later in the process he
and Rader received and reviewed the forensic evidence.
63.

One of Dunn's stated concerns regarding Pangburn's preparation

involved Pangburn'S obtaining discovery and carrying it around in his trunk,
sometimes for weeks. (PCHT 42:17-19). Nevertheless, Dunn ultimately received all
discovery in the case, albeit later than he might have liked.
64.

Dunn had access to all the discovery necessary to prepare the case and to

prepare witness books for every witness in the case in advance of trial.

Dunn swore-out an affidavit in support of lohnson's petition in which he testified that Pangburn was unprepared in
the case. Dunn testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that he had never made such an allegation against
an attorney before.

3
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65.

Pangburn indicated that associate attorney Moore organized the discovery

and copied it for Rader and Dunn. Ultimately the parties received the discovery,
although Pangburn did argue several motions to compel during his representation of
Johnson, (TT 787; 837-39; 863-866), and some information was received late in the
process.
66.

The witness books Dunn compiled consisted of an index in the front and a

copy of every statement that related to an individual. The team had such books for all
witnesses, and for most subject matters. There were three copies of each book: one for
each attorney and a working set which was kept in a room right off the courtroom for
use during the trial. When the team knew which witnesses were coming up, the books
were available for counsel's review.
67.

The plan for trial was that Rader would handle the forensic experts and

Pangburn would handle all the other witnesses. No exceptions had been discussed to
this plan in advance of the trial.
68.

During trial the attorneys and Dunn would meet every day after trial, and

in the morning, prior to trial, to go over the witness list to make sure everyone was
prepared.
69.

Dunn testified that in the morning meetings, he and Rader would be the

first ones at the courthouse, and they would bring out the books, go through the books
and make any adjustments necessary. Pangburn was not always present for the pretrial
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meetings each day, although Dunn cannot say what Pangburn was doing during these
times.
70.

Pangburn admitted that he made several appearances on the Nancy Grace

television show, (PCHT 273:12-14) and that he attempted to arrange an interview of
Johnson on Nightline. (Id., lines 15-18). While this court has reservations about such
conduct, there has been no showing that Pangburn's media contacts or appearances
undermined trial strategy, affected the jury pool, or otherwise had any casual nexus
with Pangburn's performance or the jury's verdict.
71.

During the early pre-trial phase, there really wasn't a working strategy for

the defense team; the best Dunn could glean is that they wanted to go after Bruno
Santos (Santos).
72.

Dunn did a "fairly in-depth" investigation of Santos, spanning from Utah

to Hailey, Idaho to Montana. Dunn obtained police statements regarding Santos'
alleged gang affiliations and Santos' known associates. Santos had a gang tattoo and
the school was aware of his gang status.
73.

Dunn couldn't interview Santos extensively because Santos "lawyered-

up"; however, Dunn was able to interview Santos one time during the Johnson trial.
74.

Santos was Johnson's boyfriend at the time of the murders, and he was an

initial suspect of both the police and the defense team.
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75.

The record thus establishes that the police did not focus on Johnson to the

exclusion of all other suspects. (PCHT 405:12-13). To the extent that Johnson suggests
that Santos was ruled out as a suspect on the day of the murders, any such claim is not
supported by the evidence.
76.

Despite Dunn's in-depth investigation, he was not able to discover that

Santos was convicted of any felony crimes. (See TT: 860:2-5). Dunn uncovered
information that Santos had been involved in a possible rape of a girl out of Sun Valley,
and he identified the girl and made contact with her father. While the father confirmed
the information Dunn had discovered, the father did not want his daughter subpoenaed
and he moved the daughter out of Idaho.
77.

Through the school, Dunn obtained a record of a number of fights when

Santos was a juvenile.
78.

Through the course of Dunn's investigation, Santos denied any sexual

contact with Johnson; however, the defense team had sheets from Johnson's bed tested,
which showed DNA from Santos, which confirmed in Dunn's mind that Santos had
sexual contact with Johnson.
79.

The court finds that Johnson and Santos were having a sexual relationship

while Johnson was a minor.
80.

Dunn was unable to locate any evidence linking Santos to the commission

of the Johnson murders. The police also had no evidence establishing such a link.
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81.

Pangburn testified that the information the defense team had on Santos

was "not necessarily what they were looking for," which this court concludes means
that there was no evidence indicating that Santos was personally culpable for the
Johnson murders. (PCHT 259:16-17; 284:23-285:3). The court agrees with this
conclusion.
82.

Moreover, the court further concludes that the evidence which the defense

team did have on Santos was largely inadmissible, either due to Santos' assertion of his
5th Amendment rights, or based on the nature of the evidence and evidentiary rulings
made by Judge Wood during trial.
83.

Johnson references alleged statements by Santos about his car possibly

having been in the area of the murders on the morning of September 3; however, there
is no evidence that such statements were made as cited by Johnson. When interviewed
by Detective Harkins, Harkins asked Santos: "What if I told you that someone said that
they seen [sic] your vehicle in the area that morning?" (Petitioner's Exhibit 34, p. 13).
Santos response to this question was: "I don't know, maybe someone, some guy get my
car I don't know, I don't think so. I was asleep .. ..

If

(Id.) Thus, Santos' statement was

clearly not an admission that his car was in the area of the murders on September 3.
84.

Harkins explained to this court that his question was not based on

evidence the police had, but on an interview technique. (PCHT 409:15-22).
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85.

Thus, as a matter of trial strategy, the defense focus moved from Santos to

a "no blood, no guilt" theme. (IT 4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; PCHT 264:8-13).
86.

Rader testified that their goal at trial was to show that if Johnson had

pulled the trigger, she would have been covered with blood and other matter, and she
couldn't have gotten out of the room without significant blood on her person. (PCHT
157:2-14).
87.

The court concludes that the defense, both Pangburn and Rader pursued

this "no blood, no guilt" strategy with witnesses and argued the same to the jury. (TT
4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; PCHT 264:8-13; Supplemental Appeal Transcript 270:8-272:25).
88.

The defense also focused their efforts in trying to undermine the state's

case with science, (TT 4604:25-4605:1) and the defense called several scientists to
support their arguments. E.g., Dr. Craig Beaver, id., 6367-6407; Dr. Todd Grey, id.,
5350-5379; Michael Howard, id., 4685-4941; Keith Inman, id., 5240 - 5348; Robert
Kerchusky, id., 5045-5130; Dr. Leslie Lundt, id., 5480-5522; Ron Martinez, id., 5179-5191;
and Rocky Mink, id., 5618-5734).
89.

The defense also brought-out the deficiencies in the state's evidence

collection practices, as noted during their opening statement. (TT 4603-4610). These
deficiencies focused on the comforter covering Diane and other items that were not
collected as evidence.
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90.

Dunn testified that he brought shortcomings of the police investigation to

the attention of Rader and Pangburn, i.e., Exhibit 5, which showed a green carpet,
covered with blood, and a towel bar, which items were not taken into evidence. Dunn
also told the attorneys that fingerprints were not taken from the top of the garbage can,
which would have, in his opinion, been a critical identifier as to who opened the can.

See PCH Exhibit 6.
91.

The court finds that the lack of fingerprinting the garbage can was

inconsequentiat given the myriad of individuals who had potential contact with the
can.
92.

Finally, the defense relied upon unidentified, but matching fingerprints

found on the scope, the rifle and a box of ammunition to point the finger of blame away
from Johnson.

a. The Comforter.
93.

The allegation regarding the error in failing to request a continuance is

based on late-disclosed discovery regarding the comforter which had covered Diane's
body. The state failed to collect the comforter as evidence during their search, causing a
perceived need for the defense to have additional time to consider issues surrounding
the missing comforter and "what happens to a head when it's shot at close range, those
kinds of things." (PCHT 162:1-7).
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94.

There was little testimony before this court regarding the comforter which

covered Diane Johnson's body when she was found. The court is without the benefit of
any evidence which indicates what value the comforter might have had, in retrospect,
from a forensic point of view.
95.

Rader testified that the defense was informed of the comforter not being

collected as evidence at a time "close" to trial, but he could not recall how close. (TT
158:24-159:10; 162:3-12).
96.

Rader testified that the defense should have asked for a continuance: "

we should have backed up a little bit at that point, ... and asked for a continuance orr]
whatever, however much time the court would do it, give us, to back up and reexamine some of this material and try and find a better way of presenting it at trial. ... "
(PCHT 121:20-25).
97.

Rader swore-out an affidavit in support of Johnson's case wherein he

concluded that his conduct was ineffective in failing to move for a continuance of the
trial. The court does not accept Rader's conclusions in this regard.
98.

The record shows that Rader was prepared; that both he and Pangburn

conducted examinations and/or made strategic decisions based upon the nature of the
case at the time. While, given the outcome, the court understands how Rader can
second guess his own performance, and that of Pangburn, Rader's conclusions are not
borne-out by the entire record before this court.
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99.

No other witness referenced the need for a continuance or what it would

have done to benefit the defense team.
b. I.S.P. Video/Audio.

100.

Dunn also reviewed a copy of an ISP video/audio which this court

listened to during the evidentiary hearing. (PCH Exhibit 12). Dunn had the audio
enhanced, but the enhanced version was not available for this court.
101.

The audio portion of the recording reveals a number of conversations,

some of which are inaudible, among members of law enforcement.
102.

Johnson played the entirety of the recording at the evidentiary hearing

and asked Sheriff Jerry (Walt) Femling about some of the voices he could identify on the
recording (PCHT 335:17-336:12).
103.

The video starts with Trooper Kirtley's stop at roughly 6:10 a.m. on

September 2, 2003, after which Kirtley proceeded to the crime scene. Kirtley was the
first officer at the crime scene and he recorded 4 conversations for about 2.5 hours.
104.

The enhanced audio includes the voice of Sheriff Femling, Trooper Kirtley

and Bellevue Marshall Trumble.
105.

Dunn concluded that the recording held good information for the defense

because it contained the initial impressions of law enforcement regarding the crime
scene and the officers' initial suppositions about the case.
The dashboard camera simply video-recorded a house across the street from the lohnsons' home while the officers
were conducting their business inside the Johnson home. The audio recorded Kirtley and others' statements during
the approximately 2.5 hour-period.

4
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106.

Dunn's synopsis was that the officers did not think it was possible for

Johnson to have committed the crime because the blood spatter was everywhere and
Johnson didn't have any blood on her. Dunn felt the defense should play the enhanced
version of the whole tape; however, counsel disagreed and the recording was not
introduced.
107.

Rader was generally aware of the law enforcement recording which was

played during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Rader's knowledge came from
Dunn; Rader never reviewed the recording himself. (PCHT 185:2-3). Rader further
believed that Pangburn was aware of the recording and that he would seek to admit it
during the cross-examination of Kirtley. (Id., lines 12-16).
108.

Pangburn testified that the recording would not have added much to the

case, but that that tape may have helped and it was probably a mistake not to seek to
admit it. (PCHT 269:5-12). However, Pangburn wouldn't go so far as to say he should
have sought to admit the recording, but that, in hindsight, he "would think more about
putting it in." (Id' lines 13-16).
l

109.

Sheriff Femling (Femling) could be heard on the recording making a

statement that he was concerned about the community or the valley being worried with
a murderer running around and that Femling thought they should concentrate on the
girl. The officers also discussed that Johnson was an unlikely suspect, due to her not
being covered with blood.
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110.

Dunn acknowledged that strategic decisions during trial are within

counsel's discretion and that the same would hold true as to what evidence was
admitted and what cross-examination would be conducted of a particular witness.

c. Division of Labor/Defense Team Interaction.
111.

Rader noted that he was primarily engaged to handle the scientific

experts; however, he testified that he learned a few days before their fingerprint expert,
Robert Kerchusky (Kerchusky) was called, that Pangburn would be handling
Kerchusky's direct examination.
112.

Pangburn indicated that the decision for him to handle the fingerprint

experts was to allow him to be more involved in that part of the case, and to take some
of the load off Rader.
113.

Rader had concerns regarding how the defense team was interacting

throughout their preparation and handling of the trial. He expected the case to be
defended as a team, and to be able to share their opinions; however, Rader felt that
Pangburn did not seem interested in doing that at all. Their conversations were so
limited that they were not engaging as a team.
114.

Pangburn disagreed with this testimony and indicated that he and Rader

worked "together" from the beginning of their association. Pangburn recognized that
he was "lead" counsel; however, he and Rader worked well together throughout the
case. Pangburn does not recall handing Rader a witness notebook at the last minute
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 28

and asking Rader to handle the witness' cross-examination. The court accepts
Pangburn's memory and testimony in this regard, given Rader's credibility and
memory issues previously noted herein. (See supra, ~ 50).
115.

Rader's examination of several lay witnesses was very limited, in that he

asked no questions, or very few questions. However, very little in the record from the
post-conviction evidentiary hearing establishes what information would have been
elicited from those witnesses had they been asked further questions during the murder
trial.
116.

Moreover, this court concludes, based on the weekly and ultimately daily

meetings, at least between Rader and Dunn, that Rader had an adequate grasp of the
facts regarding such witnesses when he asked them limited or no questions.

d. Rader's Knowledge of the Law and Scientific Principles.
117.

The trial record also establishes that Rader fought for the admission of the

defense scientific tests and experiments which had been done seeking to replicate the
blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane Johnson was shot in the head. The
experiments used multiple media, i.e., coconuts, melons, pig's heads, Styrofoam heads,
(TT 4506:17-19), containing multiple substances, i.e., plastic bags with sponges,
pudding, half and half colored blue and red. (Id., lines 19-23).
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118.

Rader's efforts were made during an extensive hearing on the state's

motion to exclude these experiments, primarily the experiment conducted using a
coconut. (TT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503).
119.

Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic

pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between
the coconut used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508).
120.

Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-

replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment," he would "take another look at it."
(TT 4509:17-22).
121.

At the hearing before this court, Rader testified that, in response to the

court's ruling, he asked his experts "to go back and find, see if there's something else
[they] could do," whether there was "some other object that [they] could shoot," but his
experts "didn't come up with anything." (PCHT 166:13-167:2).
122.

In hindsight, Rader testified he could have gone out to ... various
II

defender agencies in various places around the country" to "see if [he] could find
different experts or different information somehow." (Id., 169:9-24).
123.

Johnson presented no evidence at the hearing regarding what experts

Rader would have located had he "reached out," nor did Johnson present any evidence
regarding what other experiments or reconstruction options could have been presented
to the trial court.
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124.

Thus, there is no evidence before this court which shows what any

additional testing could have provided by way of a test which would have been
admissible. Six years have now passed, and nothing has been presented to this court to
show that any such evidence exists.
125.

While Rader felt that he should have reached out further, to other defense

groups, in seeking to find different experts or different information regarding the blood
spatter testimony, nothing has been provided to establish that such reaching-out would
have accomplished anything more than the defense tried to accomplish at the time of
trial.

e. Facts Regarding Cross-examination.
126.

The defense also raised issues regarding cross-examination of several

witnesses. Those matters are detailed individually as to those witnesses, below.

A.
127.

Sheriff Walt Femling.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked Sheriff

Femling (Femling) whether he recalled "making statements to the press very shortly
after [the murderst assuring the public that there was no concern for their public
safety." (Tr., p.328, Ls.4-7). Femling answered:
Yes. I thought that was very important to let my community
know that I did not believe that this was a random act of
violence or we had some killers out there running, that were
just randomly picking homes and, you know, shooting
people.
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So the crime scene definitely told me that probably was not
the case.
(PCHT 328:8-15).
Femling further explained his initial impressions based upon the crime scene:
I think what the crime scene was telling me pretty quick was
that it was not committed from, by somebody from the
outside as a random killer or killers that carne into the scene.
It was somebody that was familiar with the house and the
contents of the house and that the information that I was
getting from investigators who had talked to Uohnson] was
not adding up to what the crime scene was telling me. So at
that time, it was, you know, something's not right here from
potentially my only witness to these two homicides.
(PCHT 326:12-23).
128.

Femling also testified before this court that he did not, at least initially,

"form[] the theory" that Johnson murdered her parents "out of revenge." (PCHT

338:11-25).
129.

Notably, it took weeks before Femling and his department ruled out

Johnson's boyfriend, Bruno Santos, as a suspect. Femling did not want to believe
Johnson committed the murders because Johnson went to school with Femling's son
and it was hard to believe that she could have killed her parents. However, a crucial
piece of evidence leading Femling to believe Johnson was involved "carne in six weeks
after th[e] case started." (Id., 340:17-342:4; 350:20-351:25).
130.

That crucial piece of evidence was Johnson's DNA on "the gloves that

were wrapped in the bathrobe found in the garbage can." (PCHT 341:10-14).
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131.

Femling further testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing about

the scope of the investigation surrounding the murders:
You know, I can't give you a time when I, you know,
absolutely felt confident that it was - [Johnson] acted alone.
I can tell you, once again, is that we worked really hard to
make sure that we covered every basis that we could, and
Bruno Santos was not involved. We believe very strongly
that he was not involved. There is no evidence at all to put
him at that scene of that crime ....
(PCHT 349:5-13).
132.

In addition to investigating Santos, law enforcement also investigated: (1)

Janet Sylten, the cleaning lady Johnson claimed to have heard at 2:00 in the morning
outside her house the morning of the murders (PCHT 354:23-356:1, 358:20-22); (2) Mel
Speegle, the owner of the murder weapon (id., 356:2-7, 361:3-362:1); (3) the possibility of
a robbery, which there were no signs of at the residence (id., 356:8-24); and (4) whether
someone escaped up the embankment behind the house based on Johnson's claim that
the killer went out the back door (id., 356:25-357:19).
133.

Consistent with his testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,

Femling testified at trial that, on the day of the murders, he identified four persons of
interest - Speegle, Santos, Johnson, and the cleaning lady. (TT 2417:10-2418:2). Also
consistent with his post-conviction testimony, Femling testified at trial that he did not
want to believe Johnson committed the murders and he continued to investigate other
possibilities. (Id., 2424:1-7).
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134.

Femling also testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law enforcement

interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports, spent $517,000
investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5 people to the
case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative leads. (TT
2458:4-2461:16).
135.

Rader cross-examined Femling at trial. (TT 2461-2496; 4057-4059).

136.

Johnson did not ask Rader any questions at the post-conviction

evidentiary about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Femling. (See

generally PCHT 138-195).
B. Steve Harkins.
137.

At the Johnson trial, in response to a question on direct about how many

"calls or interviews" were conducted with Santos, Detective Harkins (Harkins) testified:
"I don't know if I can give you an exact number. I talked to him a number of times.
Numerous interviews. Weekly contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We
made contact over the phone, met in person. I didn't document every contact I had
with him." (TT 2191:1-6).
138.

Harkins further testified he had spoken to Santos "over a hundred" times

"[o]ver the last year and a half," "maybe a lot more." (Id. / 2114:20-23).
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139.

Johnson alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to "adequately cross-

examine" Harkins about this statement, claiming "police reports and supplements do
not support this bald assertion." (Petition, p.l0, ~ 16.a.i.).
140.

Johnson further alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to adequately

cross-examine Harkins "regarding the lack of depth to the search of Santos [sic]
residence [or] outside dumpster," his "failure to acquire fingerprints from [Santos']
known associates," "the inconsistencies in statements made by Santos [sic] family
members, including his mother and cousin," or about "the fact that .25 caliber
ammunition was found in Bruno Santos [sic] residence and in the pink robe found in
the trash can at the crime scene." (Petition, p.l0, ~ 16.a.i, p.12,

~

16.a.vi.).

141.

Pangburn cross-examined Harkins at trial. (TT 2169-2222,2235-2244).

142.

Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about the number of times he

indicated he had spoken with Santos, nor did Pangburn ask Harkins about any alleged
inconsistencies in statements made by Santos or his family members or the ammunition
found in Santos' residence or the Johnson's garbage can. (See generally id.). Although
Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about his failure to "fingerprint[ ]" Santos'
"known associates," Pangburn did ask Harkins about his investigation of Santos'
/I

associates."s

5

Marshal Tremble was also asked about his investigation of Santos' "associates." (IT 1861 :16- J 863:24).
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143.

Pangburn's cross-examination did cover several areas, (See generally TT,

pp. 2197-2202), including Santos' associates who were "law breakers," (TT 2199:1-9) and
Santos' "drug dealer connection." (Id., 2197:2-12, 2200:16-22). Harkins was even asked:
"did you look for someone who may, at the request of Bruno Santos, kill these people 7"
(Id., 2200:5-7).
144.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn

any questions about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Harkins. (See

generally PCHT 237-279). Johnson did call Harkins as a witness at the evidentiary
hearing, but Johnson also failed to ask him any questions about his testimony regarding
the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See generally id., 378-441).
145. Johnson also did not introduce any "police reports" or "supplements" at

the post-conviction evidentiary hearing to rebut Harkins' trial testimony about the
number of times he had contact with Santos.
146. Johnson did ask Harkins about the extent of his search of Santos'

residence. Harkins testified in that regard that he did not recall what his role in the
search was, i.e., whether he "actually did the searching or instructed other officers to, to
search the residence." (PCHT 406:20-24). Harkins acknowledged the "trash
receptacles" at the apartment complex where Santos lived were not searched. (Id.,
407:17-22). Harkins explained the "trash receptacles" were not searched "because [he]

and ten other detectives probably didn't think it was necessary." (Id., 410:1-3).
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147.

Johnson did not introduce any evidence regarding what a more extensive

search of Santos' residence or a search of the "trash receptacles" would have uncovered.
148.

Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing

whether any .25 automatic shells were found at Santos' residence and Harkins agreed
that those were found. (PCHT 410:11-25). Harkins further testified that he was aware
that .25 shells were found in the pocket of the robe discovered in the garbage can at the
Johnson's house. 6 (Id., 411:1-6).
149.

With respect to his involvement in the investigation of Consuelo Cedeno

and Jane Lopez, Harkins testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not recall
interviewing them, but he was sure he talked to them "at one point." (PCHT 411:10-14).
150.

Johnson did not ask Harkins about any inconsistencies in Cedeno's

testimony but she did ask Harkins questions about Lopez's testimony. Specifically,
Johnson asked: "[1]f I told you that those phone numbers [that were subpoenaed]
verified that Jane Lopez did not in fact call Bruno nor the horne phone number when
she originally told you and when she testified before the court, do you think I'd be
mistaken about that?" (PCHT 413:7-12).
151.

Harkins responded that he had "an explanation of why they weren't

recovered." (Id' lines 13-14). That explanation was that if a call was made from "Qwest
l

to Qwest numbers, local carriers, [they] would not be recorded," and that "in 2003 the
Exhibit 20, admitted at trial, was a photograph of five rounds of .25 ammunition found in the pocket of Johnson's
robe. (TT 1900: 19-1901: 13). Exhibit 103, also admitted attrial, was a photograph of a box of Remington .25
automatic shells with five missing rounds. (Jd., 2048:1-16).

6
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whole valley's local phone carrier was Qwest." (ld., 414:3-5, 15-17). So, if Jane Lopez
had "called from the school to a horne number, it wouldn't be recorded." (Id., 416:3-4).
152.

Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing

whether he "learned quickly" who Santos' "close associates were." (PCHT 422:16-18).
Harkins answered: "I don't know which ones you're referring to. There was several
interviewed that were friends of his." (Id., 422:19-21). Johnson specifically asked about
If

Ayala," and Harkins agreed he was interviewed. (Id., lines 22-24). Johnson then asked

whether Harkins ever "took any DNA swab from Ayala." (Id.,422:25-423:1). Harkins
testified that he could not recall. (Id., 423:3).
153.

Johnson did not ask Harkins about fingerprinting Ayala, nor did she ask

him about any other of Santos' "associates."
C. Bruno Santos.

154.

Johnson's Petition alleges counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-

examine Bruno Santos about the "abundant information" that Santos "was dealing
drugs/' "had gang connections," and had "committed the crime of statutory rape."
(Petition, p.13,
155.

~

16.d).

While both attorneys handled both lay and expert witnesses during the

trial, Pangburn generally handled the lay witnesses. Nevertheless, Rader did conduct
the cross-examination of several lay witnesses, including Santos. (PCHT: 172:19-173:2).
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156.

The court concludes that the claim regarding a last-minute hand-off of

Santos' cross-examination to Rader is disproved by the record.
157.

The state brought a motion in limine under I.R.E. 609 and 404(b) regarding

Santos' prior history. (See IT 2739:8-24). The state sought to preclude the defense from
asking Santos about his arrest on October 30,2004, or about "statutory rape" or "having
sexual relations with Sarah Johnson." (Id., 2739:8-2740:3).
158.

The prosecutor objected to any inquiry on the arrest as irrelevant and on

the grounds that Santos would "be claiming the Fifth" on any "pending case" and
would also "invoke his privilege not to incriminate himself" on his sexual relationship
with Johnson. (TT 2739). The state also objected to any questions on a previous battery
charge when Santos was a juvenile. (Id., 2740:24-2741:7).
159.

Counsel for Santos confirmed that he advised Santos to "invoke his

privilege against self-incrimination with respect to any questions relating to drug
activity" and any questioning regarding his sexual relationship with Johnson. (TT
2743:12-15,2751:24-2752:18).
160.

Rader responded to the state's motion and ultimately agreed not to

inquire of Santos regarding his October 30 arrest or the "juvenile information." (TT
2745:4-17; see also p. 2748:1-2749:6 (Rader explaining in detail why Santos' gang

involvement and "other bad acts" should be admitted); p.2750:4-2751:1 (Rader offering
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further argument regarding why he believed certain evidence relating to Santos should
be admitted).
161.

Rader thus argued in specific detail referencing Santos' history and prior

acts, indicating the scope of the cross-examination that he wished to conduct.
162.

For example, Rader argued that he intended "to ask questions about

[Santos'] gang involvement ... and the fact that [Santos] admitted having sexual
relations with Sarah Johnson seven times, and she was a minor at the time and he was
an adult. ... Then [he intended] to ask him about his gang connections and the story
he told the police about his gang involvement." (IT 2747:2-11).
163.

Rader showed additional direct and significant knowledge of Santos' past

as well as the defense purpose for their intended cross-examination. (IT 2748:1-2749:6).
164.

Judge Wood essentially granted the state's motion in limine; however, he

offered the option of a stipulation regarding some of Santos' history. (IT 2754:162755:19).
165.

Although the trial court limited the scope of Santos' cross-examination,

much of the information that was subject to the state's motion in limine had already
been elicited through cross-examination of other witnesses. For example, during crossexamination of Femling, Rader elicited that Santos was a "look-out" for a fight, which
resulted in a suspension. (TT 2474:8-2475:3). Rader also asked Femling about Santos'
reported drug use, to which Femling responded: "I think we did show that he does
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have involvement in drugs" and that he had "used illegal drugs," (id., 2475:21-2476:7),
and examination of Detective Harkins revealed that Santos had a IIdrug dealer
connection." (Id., 2197:2-12, 2200:16-22).
166.

On direct examination at trial, Santos testified: (1) he was dating Johnson

when the murders occurred (TT 2761:15-19); (2) Alan Johnson came to his apartment the
weekend before the murders and threatened that if he did not "leave his daughter
alone, ... he was going to hit [him] and ... put [him] in jail" (id., 2762:5-18); (3) he saw
Johnson the Monday before the murders and she was acting "weird" (id., 2763:9-2764:7);
(4) he spent the night at home the night before the murders (id., 2764:16-20); (5) his
cousin, Jane Lopez, called him about the murders the morning they occurred (id.,
2764:24-2765:5); (6) he was surprised about the murders and went to the Johnson's
home to see what happened (id., 2765:6-2766:9); (7) he allowed law enforcement to
search his car and apartment, he submitted to fingerprint and blood testing, and gave
them his clothes (id., 2766:16-2767:3); (8) he saw Johnson at the hospital the day of the
murders at which time she hugged him and told him she loved him and said she was
sorry and "not to worry" (id., 2768:7-2768:5); (9) he was deported in September 2003
and returned to the United States to testify (id., 2768:17-2769:4); (10) he was not at the
Johnson's house the night before the murders and did not remember Johnson telling
him there were guns in the guest house (id., 2769:5-10); and (11) there was a wedding at
the Johnson's house the weekend before the murders that Johnson wanted him to
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attend, but Alan would not let him, which upset Johnson (id., 2770:21-2770:6). Santos
denied having anything to do with murdering Alan and Diane. (Id., 2769:11-13).
167.

After Santos testified to these facts, and based on Judge Wood's ruling,

Rader indicated that the defense "decided not to enter into a stipulation and ... decided
not to cross examine Mr. Santos ... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15).
168.

Thus, this court concludes that Rader was well-versed and well prepared

to cross-examine Santos, but that given Judge Wood's ruling and Santos' intention to
assert his 5th Amendment privilege, the defense, as a matter of strategy, chose not to ask
any questions at all.
169.

This court recognizes that Johnson asked both Rader and Pangburn at the

post-conviction evidentiary hearing about the decision not to cross-examine Santos.
170.

Despite Rader's vigorous response to the state's motion in limine

regarding the scope of Santos' cross-examination, Rader claimed at the evidentiary
hearing that Pangburn would, without any "warning," have Mr. Rader cross-examine
witnesses he had not planned on cross-examining, including Santos. (PCHT 172:19-24).
171.

Rader could not recall how many witnesses he cross-examined, or even

recall the witnesses he was responsible for, yet he claimed Pangburn gave him the
responsibility of cross-examining Santos without any prior notice. (PCHT 172:13-173:2;
188:5-189:2).
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172.

Pangburn denied Rader's assertions, testifying that the decision to have

Rader cross-examine Santos and other witnesses was not made at the last minute, and
that Rader did not object to cross-examining any particular witness. (PCHT 282:19283:19).
173.

The court again accepts Pangburn's testimony in this regard because it is

more credible than Rader's, given Mr. Rader's involvement in arguing the motion in
limine, during which he demonstrated extensive knowledge of the information
available on which Santos could be cross-examined and the reasons why he believed
such cross-examination should have been permitted. Pangburn's testimony is also
more believable considering Rader's general inability to remember even who he crossexamined.
174.

Most significantly, Rader still believed at the time of the post-conviction

hearing that he handled the fingerprint evidence, even though the record clearly
indicates Pangburn handled that evidence.
175.

Johnson also called Santos as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing. This court concluded, as had Judge Wood, that Santos could invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during the evidentiary hearing. When
asked about his "gang connections," Santos did just that, declining to answer any
questions on that subject. (PCHT 482:10-14).
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176.

Given this court's ruling, and Santos' counsel's indication that he would

continue to assert his privilege, Johnson did not ask Santos about the other topics she
claimed in her Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into, i.e.,
"dealing drugs" and whether he had committed the crime of statutory rape."7
/I

(Petition, p.13, , 16.d; PCHT 472-490).

D. Consuela Cedeno.
177.

With respect to Ms. Cedeno, Johnson alleges in her Petition:
Mr. Pangburn had been provided information based on
prior statements of Consuelo Cedeno wherein she insisted
her son Bruno Santos had not driven the car the morning of
the murders because there was dew on the windshield.
Further, Ms. Cedeno asserted in pre-trial statements that she
checked the mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno was lying
about where he had been.... Ms. Cedeno testified at trial
that she didn't pay attention to such things. Yet, Trial
Counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno.

(Petition, p.12, , 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted»).
178.

At trial, Ms. Cedeno testified (through an interpreter), in relevant part, as

follows:
Q:
Okay, the morning Alan and Diane Johnson were killed,
Tuesday morning, did you go to work that morning?
A:

Yes.

Nor did Johnson ask either Mr. Rader or Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to enter into a stipulation regarding
the sexual nature of lohnson's relationship with Santos. (See generally PCHT pp. 138-187, 196-198,237-279).

7
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Q:
Do you recall seeing Bruno in the house that morning when
you went to work?
A:

Yes.

Q:

What was he doing?

A:

He was sleeping.

Q:

All right, and about what time do you go to work?

A:
Well, exactly, I couldn't really tell you. I don't remember,
but I think around 7:30, 8:00. I always leave around 7:30 or 8:00.
Q:

Okay, where was Bruno sleeping at that time?

A:
In a mattress in the living room. And then my bedroom is
right next to it.
And when you left to work that morning, the morning Alan
Q:
and Diane were killed, did you see Bruno's car in the parking lot?
A:
It's actually my car, and I always take it; and sometimes he
does take it, too. But it's usually just me, because I am the one that
has the key, so it was parked.
Q:
And could you tell whether or not it looked like the car had
been driven that morning before you got into it?
A:

No.

Q:

And how could she tell?

A:

Because I have the key. I have the key.

Q:
Miss Cedeno, was there anything on the window, was there
dew on the window?
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A:
Well, no, no. I don't pay attention to things like that. But
no, I didn't look.
But it's her car and she had the keys to it? It's your car, and
Q:
you had the keys to it, is that correct?
A:

Always.

(TT 2774:19-2776:9).
179.

In response to this testimony, Rader indicated that the defense would not

be cross-examining Ms. Cedeno. (TT 2776:12-13).
180.

Prior to this decision being made, the defense investigator Dunn had

reviewed the statements of Cedeno and Jane Lopez (Lopez). (See PCH Exhibit 13, a
transcript of the interview of Cedeno and Lopez, conducted by two law enforcement
officers, with Lopez translating for Cedeno).

Cedeno is Santos' mother; Lopez is

Santos' cousin.
181.

Dunn found some things problematic with Lopez and Cedeno's

statements. Cedeno gave statements to the police concerning the condition of Santos'
(her) vehicle, i.e., that it had dew on the windshield and that she had checked the
odometer to see whether Santos had been driving the night of the murders.
182.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dunn testified that he made

counsel aware of information that Ms. Cedeno" gave statements to the police
concerning ... the condition of Bruno's vehicle, which was actually her vehicle," that
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there was dew on the window, that she checked the odometer and various things like
LI

that./I (PCHT 62:18-23).
183.

Dunn checked with the weather service and found that there was no dew8

that day, which made it a contradictory statement to him. Dunn made Pangburn aware
of that information. (PCHT 63:3-7).
184.

While examining Rader at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,

Johnson asked Rader about his decision not to cross-examine Cedeno. (PCHT 178:1521). Rader testified that he did not "remember doing that, but [he] wouldn't be
surprised if [he] did./I (Id., 178:22-23).
185.

Rader further testified that, although he did not remember that Cedeno

made certain statements to police about keeping track of the mileage on the car or that
Santos "was always lying to her," he was not prepared to cross-examine her because
Mr. P.angburn "handed off that witness." (Id., 179:13-180:5).
186.

Johnson called Ms. Cedeno as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing. (PCHT pp. 457-468). Cedeno largely denied any recollection of the events
surrounding the murders of Alan and Diane. (PCHT pp.460-468).
187.

With respect to the only claim in Johnson's Petition regarding the cross-

examination of Cedeno - that counsel failed to cross-examine her regarding her
statements to law enforcement that she checked the mileage on the car and saw dew on
The court notes that Officer Cornelas testified about footprints in the grass at the Johnson residence and the heavy
dew that morning, which directly contradicts Dunn's testimony on this point. The court find's Officer Cornelas'
testimony more credible on this point than that of Dunn.
8
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the windshield the morning of the murders - Cedeno testified she did not remember
making either statement to law enforcement. (PCHT 464:7-468:7).
188.

This court did not find any value from Cedeno's testimony at the post-

conviction evidentiary hearing.

She certainly appeared to be a hostile witness to all

concerned, and the breadth of her loss of or lack of memory is astounding.
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this record to conclude what Cedeno knows now, or
what she knew in 2005 at the time of trial, to support any factual conclusion in that
regard.
189.

This court cannot conclude, as a matter of fact that Pangburn just "passed

off" the cross-examination to Rader, given the overall distrust this court has for Rader's
testimony and his lack of memory regarding the facts.

E. lane Lopez.
190.

As to Jane Lopez, Johnson's Petition alleges:

[A] discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial
testimony and proof to the contrary found in phone records,
indicating Bruno Santos was not at his mother's house. Trial
Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy, yet, Trial
Counsel failed to utilize the records on cross-examination.
(Petition, p.12, ~ 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted».
191.

At trial, Ms. Lopez, who worked at the Blaine County High School at the

time of the murders, testified that after she heard about the murders, she called Santos
around 8:30 a.m. (TT 2789:14-2791:20).
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192.

Lopez testified that first she called Santos' house, "and he didn't answer,"

so she "called his cell phone, and he answered." (IT 2791:22-24). She asked Santos
"where he was, and he said, 'at home.'" (Id., 2791:24-25). When Lopez asked why he
did not answer the home phone, Santos stated he was sleeping and told Lopez that if
she did not believe him, she should call him again at the home number. (Id., 2791:252792:3). Lopez testified that she then did call Santos at home, "he answered the

phone," and she told him about the murders. (Id., 2792:3-8). According to Lopez,
Santos "seemed really surprised and really shocked." (Id., 2792:22-25).
193.

Dunn obtained information about these phone calls to the Cedeno

residence which he felt directly conflicted with statements made by Lopez regarding
her telephone calls with Santos the morning of the murders.
194.

Dunn contends that Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, when taken together, set

forth that Lopez's statements were incorrect and the phone calls were not made as
Lopez said. Dunn therefore concluded that Santos was not at home when Lopez said he
was. Dunn made that information known to Pangburn because he thought it was
critical.
195.

Dunn prepared a witness book for Lopez and one for Cedeno. Dunn

included Exhibit 13 in the books he provided Pangburn.
196.

Rader cross-examined Lopez at trial, asking whether those were the "only

phone calls" she made to Santos. (IT 2794:6-7). Lopez answered, "yeah." (TT 2794:15).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 49

197.

Ms. Lopez reiterated this version of events at the post-conviction

evidentiary hearing. (PCHT 370:22-372:10,374:19-375:1). Lopez did not, however,
remember the actual phone numbers she called. (Id., 375:1-25).
198.

Johnson did not attempt to impeach Ms. Lopez with any phone records

during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (PCHT 368-376).
199.

Rader testified that he was simply handed the witness book for Cedeno,

and that he was not prepared to conduct her cross-examination. In retrospect Rader
indicated that the defense team was "incompetent" by his not requesting a brief recess
or continuance to allow him to familiarize himself with the matters contained in Lopez's
witness book. (PCHT 181:2-182:8).
200.

This court has reviewed Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, along with the testimony

from the post-conviction evidentiary hearing in this regard. The court concludes that
these exhibits do not establish the facts which Dunn asserts they do. Rather, the court
concludes that the testimony given by Lopez was more probable, that she attempted to
call Santos' cell phone, and thereafter that she called Santos at home on a land line from
the school. This call was made via a Quest land line-to-land line call, which would not
be traceable through any type of documentation. (PCHT 414:3-17).
F. Raul Ornelas.
201.

Johnson's Petition alleges trial counsel" fail[ ed] to adequately cross-

examine Officer Raul Ornelas who testified regarding footprints allegedly observed in
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wet grass in the back yard/' and I/[s]pecifically, ... failed to point out the [sic] Tim
Richards, the neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked the very area of the
back yard later observed by Ornelas," and counsel "further failed to highlight the fact
that Ornelas concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person, thereby
pointing blame from [Johnson] alone and onto unidentified murders." (Petition, p.lO, ,
16.a.ii.).
202.

At trial, Tim Richards, (Richards) who was not called as a witness at the

post-conviction evidentiary hearing, testified that after Johnson came to his home
reporting that her parents had been shot, he walked down the "gravel road" by the
Johnson residence and "peered into the backyard," then "went around the back side of
the guest house" where "there's a little bit more gravel." (TT 1586:7-10, 1607:15-25).
Richards further testified that there is a dirt hill behind the guest house and that he did
not see any footprints going up the hill. (TT 1608:4-18).
203.

Thus, contrary to the assertions in Johnson's Petition, there is no evidence

that Mr. Richards "walked the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas."
Rather, Mr. Richards only testified that he walked down the gravel road, not that he
walked in the grass, which is where Officer Ornelas observed the footprints.
204.

With respect to footprints, Officer Ornelas (Ornelas) testified on direct

examination at trial that, after responding to the Johnson residence, he was "looking
around" and "noticed that there were tracks in the lawn." (TT 1735:17-18). The prints
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were "due north to the back of th[e] guesthouse" and "disappeared there by the stairs."
(Id., 1736:10-12).
205.

In all, Ornelas saw "two or three sets of footprints" because the grass was

dewy, including "footprints that led back to the garage." (IT 1736:20-1737:15). Ornelas
could not, however, tell whether the prints belonged to more than one person. (Id.,
1737:20-22). Ornelas did not observe any footprints going up the embankment behind
the house or from the "patio that leads off of the bedroom ... on the northeast side."
(Id., 1738:14-25, 1739:11-19).
206.

Pangburn cross-examined Ornelas at trial. (TT 1759-1772). On cross-

examination, Pangburn specifically asked Ornelas about the footprints he observed in
the yard and his failure to conduct an "extensive search" of the hillside for footprints.
(Id., pp.1765-1771).
207.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn

about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas. (See generally PCHT
pp.239-279).
208.

Johnson did, however, inquire of Ornelas regarding his recollection of the

footprints he observed on the morning of the murder. (PCHT 205:15-18). Ornelas
reiterated that he observed footprints in the backyard and again described those prints.
(Id., pp.205-209). Ornelas further testified that he was not aware of "anybody else" who
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had "been in the backyard looking for a possible perpetrator prior to [his] arrival." (Id.,
209:8-15).
209.

Also contrary to Johnson's assertion, Officer Ornelas did not "conclude[]

the footprints were made by more than one person;" in fact, he specifically testified that
he could not tell. The testimony that "there were two or three sets of footprints" is not
equivalent to the footprints having been made by more than one person.
G. Stuart Robinson.
210.

In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "should have been aware"

that "Officer Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted that no latent prints were
found at the crime scene" but "[ d]iscoverable documents[ ] made absolutely clear that
this testimony was inaccurate and false testimony, in that the record reveals that thirty
nine (39) latent prints were found at the scene .... " (Petition, p.13, ~ 16.b.).
211.

Stuart Robinson testified to this court about his collection of evidence at

the crime scene, and particularly about the testimony he gave before the grand jury,
wherein he testified that the Idaho State Forensics lab "could not locate any prints that
could be identified." (PCHT 231:11-17). Robinson's answer was in response to a
question from the prosecutor, Mr. Thomas, asking "as part of your case review, as far as
you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the scope, or the casings?"
(Id., lines 11-15).
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212.

The court finds that Robinson's answer was correct to the question asked

by the prosecutor. The fingerprints were not identified at that point in time.
213.

Rader cross-examined Robinson at trial and did not attempt to impeach

him with his grand jury testimony. (TT pp. 2069-2082.).
214.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson read the following

excerpt from Robinson's grand jury testimony to him:
Mr. Robinson, that [grand] juror asked: You say you found a .264
casing in the garage and one in the chamber. I'm wondering if any
prints were taken and found on those casings.
[The prosecutor] interjected, as it's his right to do, and said: Good
point. Let me ask you this, Detective Robinson. Did you collect the
gun, the scope, the casings, and probably a whole host of other
things to send for fingerprint analysis?
And you said at that time -- this is back in October of 2003 -- yes,
we did.
Question [by the prosecutor]: Now, on the gun and the scope and
the casing, did your Idaho State Police lab do that analysis or
attempt to do that analysis?
Mr. Robinson: Yes, that's correct.
[The prosecutor J asked you the question: Now, based on your -- on
your, I guess, investigation and as part of your case review, as far
as you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the
scope, or the casings?
And you answered: They could not locate any prints that could be
identified.
(peHT 230:19-231:17).
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215.

Johnson then asked Robinson to agree that the testimony was inaccurate.

(PCHT 232:15-17). Robinson did not agree and explained that contrary to Johnson's
interpretation of the testimony, his testimony accurately stated that the prints could not,
at that time, be identified. (Id., 232:18-234:2; see also id., 236:21-237:3).
216.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Rader

about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Robinson. (See generally PCHT,
pp. 138-187, 196-199).

f
217.

Facts Regarding Fingerprint Issues.

Rader was also involved with pre-trial interviews with fingerprint expert

Robert Kerchusky, (Kerchusky), but Rader testified that he became aware some time
before trial that Pangburn was going to present Kerchusky as a witness. (PCHT 186:618).
218.

Rader met with Kerchusky and Kerchusky had some concerns about the

information given him by the state; however, Rader did not remember any discussion
with Kerchusky before the trial about Kerchusky's opinion regarding the freshness of
the fingerprints. (Id., 187:3-10}.
219.

At trial, Tina Walthall, (Walthall) a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho

State Police, testified that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos,
Alan Johnson, Diane Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (the cleaning lady), Russell
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Nuxoll (the cleaning lady's boyfriend), Matthew Johnson (Johnson's brother) and Robin
LeHat (the cleaning lady's employer). (TT 3009:16-20).
220.

Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints lifted from the

crime scene. (TT 3018:2-5). After those comparisons, certain fingerprints taken from
the crime scene remained unidentified, including fingerprints found on the stock of the
rifle (Id., 3027:20-3028:22), the scope from the rifle (Id., 3042:22-3044:2), and two boxes of
.264 shells (Id., 3049:-3052:3).
221.

A search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) prior

to trial using three of the unidentified prints also revealed no matches to any of the
unidentified fingerprints. (TT 3045:1-3046:10,3053:5-11,3066:1-13).
222.

Walthall repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to

determine when it was left (TT 3028:13-17,3044:22-25,3052:22-25; 3058:19-3062:11,
3073:5-15). Walthall specifically stated: (1) "many, many years can pass and you might
still find usable fingerprints on" paper or cardboard (TT 3060:10-11); (2) she has
discovered prints off of nonporous surfaces more than a year later (id., 3061:4-5); (3) one
would expect to find fingerprints more than a year old if nothing happened between
"when they were deposited and when [they were] processed" (id., 3061:20-25); and (4)
"it is probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a year, providing there
has been nothing to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which is true even on a
nonporous surface (id., 3062:3-6).
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223.

The defense called Kerchusky to testify at Johnson's trial, and again before

this court.
224.

During the trial, Kerchusky was asked by Pangburn how long fingerprints

can last. He replied that "we can't be sure how long they're going to last," but that
"pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm
concerned." (TT 5070:6-12; see also 5128:18-5129:16 (latent prints on a non-porous
surface will not last more than one year)).
225.

Kerchusky further testified that fingerprints will dry up and evaporate

over the course of one year. (TT 5074:7-9). Kerchusky also agreed, however, that it is
fair to say that a fingerprint on a box could last for years and years and years. (Id.,
5075:9-14).
226.

Mr. Kerchusky, however, acknowledged that aging of fingerprints on

nonporous surfaces is a controversial subject because "there's so many variables as far
as weather, where it's located. I mean there's so many things that come into it, there's
no way in the world anybody could write any article on it." (TT 5107:3-6).
227.

Kerchusky also acknowledged that fingerprints on porous surfaces can

last for years and that there are some "rare" instances where a latent print that was over
a year old could be found on a nonporous surface. (TT 5130:8-16). Kerchusky further
testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, he still would
1/

have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not." (IT 5108:1-6).
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228.

In 2009, approximately four years after Johnson's criminal trial, Walthall

compared the unidentified prints from the murder scene to prints belonging to Mr.
Christopher Kevin Hill (Hill). (PCHT 652:2-21). Walthall testified at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing that, of the previously unidentified fingerprints, Hill's matched
those that were found on the scope, the boxes of ammunition, and the rifle. (Id.,654:2-

22; see also p. 659:11-14).
229.

Walthall also testified, as she did at trial, about "aging" fingerprints and

how long fingerprints can last. (See generally PCHT, pp.661-670). Walthall reiterated the
opinion previously expressed at trial that fingerprints can last longer than a year. (Id.,
670:4-11).
230.

Mr. Kerchusky also testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.

(See generally PCHT pp. 538-638). Kerchusky's post-conviction testimony was
substantially similar to his trial testimony in that he testified that fingerprints left on
nonporous surfaces "will be gone within a year." (Id., 553:15-554:10).
231.

Kerchusky also referred to the prints on the rifle, scope, and ammunition

(Christopher Kevin Hill's prints) as "fresh" because, according to him, any prints left on
the gun before Mr. Speegle put it in his closet would have been wiped off by the clothes
hanging in his closet and because the prints were not "etched." (PCm 589:2-15; see also
id., 609:22-610:17, 612:21-613:21).
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232.

With respect to the new information that some of the previously

unidentified fingerprints had been matched to Mr. Hill, Kerchusky testified that, in his
opinion, Hill was the last person to touch the .264 rifle and scope and that it was Hill
who removed the scope. (PCHT 615:23-616:19). However, Kerchusky admitted on
cross-examination (as he did at trial) that he has no way of knowing when fingerprints
are placed on any given item. (Id.,627:15-17).
233.

At the evidentiary hearing before this court, Kerchusky found fault with

Pangburn because Pangburn did not ask him specifically whether the unknown
fingerprints were "fresh./I Kerchusky testified that several of the prints were fresh, and
that he had spoken to Pangburn during the trial, requesting that Pangburn put him
back on the stand to discuss the freshness of the prints, but that Pangburn declined to
do so.
234.

It was implied, if not expressed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,

that Pangburn's examination and presentation of Kerchusky's testimony was
insufficient because Pangburn was inadequately prepared to present the expert, based
upon the original plan for Pangburn to handle just the lay witnesses.
235.

The court does not accept this proposition for two reasons: first, the

record of Pangburn's examination sets forth that he was prepared for the examination,
and that he discussed various hypotheticals that brought the pertinent issue (aging of
fingerprints) before the jury for Kerchusky to comment on. (E.g. TT:5071-5072); second,
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the record also establishes that Pangburn conducted the cross-examination of the state's
fingerprint expert, Ms. Walthall, on February 16, 2005, more than two weeks before
Kerchusky's examination on March 3,2005. (Id., 5044:15). Clearly the decision for
Pangburn to handle the fingerprint evidence was decided long before Kerchusky took
the stand in March.
236.

At trial Pangburn began his cross-examination of Ms. Walthall with

questions regarding "this idea about aging fingerprints," (IT 3058:11-12), and he
inquired further regarding the defense theory that fingerprints would dissipate after
approximately one year. (Id., 3060:7-3062:11).
237.

The court concludes from the nature and extent of Pangburn's cross-

examination that he was well-aware of the defense theory regarding aging/freshness of
fingerprints by February 2005. Thus, Pangburn's examination of Kerchusky was not a
last-minute, shoot-from-the-hip situation, but it was, in accord with Pangburn's
testimony, to get him involved some in the scientific aspect of the case and to take some
of the load off Rader.
238.

The court therefore concludes that the defense, through Pangburn, had a

definite strategy regarding the fingerprints; that Pangburn was aware of this strategy
well-ahead of his examination of Kerchusky and that he, as a matter of strategy, asked
the questions he chose to ask of Kerchusky without asking about "freshness" per se.
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239.

Pangburn was prepared regarding the defense fingerprint theory, and he

exercised his judgment and skill in presenting those issues to the jury. He also argued
the freshness of the fingerprints to the jury in his closing. (See Supplemental Appeal
Transcript, 270:11-272:25) ("You know, these things start getting a year old, and you're
just not going to see it. ... Those fingerprints had not been there for very long.").
240.

Mel Speegle, (Speegle) was the tenant in the guesthouse at the time of the

murders. He is also the owner of the .264 rifle used to murder the Johnsons.
241.

Speegle testified at trial that: (1) he kept the rifle in his closet along with

three other guns (TT 2702:8-2703:2); (2) the guns were not locked (id" 2703:3-8); (3) he
saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the scope was still on the
.264 rifle (id., p.2704:6-2706:8); (4) he had only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior
(id., 2706:17-21); (5) he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (id., 2708:2-9); and (6) he has no idea how

many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a friend helped him move into the
guesthouse (id., 2707:11-22).
242.

Speegle also testified that Johnson had access to his apartment, that

Johnson knew he would be gone the weekend before the murders, and that the .264
rifle, as well as his other guns and ammunition, were in the closet when Johnson
cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. (TT 2693:17-20,2694:25-2696:6,
2715:12-25).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 61

243.

Speegle and Hill also both testified at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing before this court. Speegle testified that he moved into the guest house on the
Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (PCHT 699:10-15).
244.

Hill helped Speegle move from his "ranch house" into the Johnson guest

house. (Id., 700:18-20, 703:20-23). Hill was a "good friend" of Speegle's and had been a
caretaker at Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Speelge's .264 rifle. (Id.,
p.704:1-4, 11-13, 724:10-20). To Speegle's knowledge, Hill did not have access to the
Johnson guest house. (Id., 704:8-10).
245.

Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Speegle's ranch and that he

helped Speegle move "a few things" into the Johnson guest house. (PCHT 726:14-17,
727:5-12). Hill also confirmed that he did not have access to the guest house. (Id.,
727:13-16).
246.

Hill specifically, and credibly, denied any involvement in the murders of

Alan and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the murders until about one week
after they occurred because he had been camping. (Id., 728:5-20).
247.

In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other than having

possibly left them when he helped Speegle move, Hill testified that, during the
springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Speegle's ranch, he "took [the rifle] out,
tried to sight it," and shot it six or seven times" using Speegle's ammunition. (PCHT
1/

728:21-729:7; see also 729:24-731:21).
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To the extent that any Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of

Law, they are incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.
2.

An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-

Conviction Procedure Act initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. Kelly v. State,
__ Idaho

---.-J

236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). Like the plaintiff in any other civil

proceeding, Johnson must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon
which her request for post-conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; see also id.
3.

A preponderance of the evidence requires evidence establishing a fact as

more probable than not. Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 622, 809 P.2d 472,
483 (1991); Ebert v. Newton, 97 Idaho 418,546 P.2d 64 (1976); see also Big Butte Ranch Inc.
v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6,9,415 P.2d 48,51 (1966) (,"Preponderance of evidence' means

such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and
from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein.").
4.

As the Court in Big Butte Ranch noted further:
In the event that the evidence is evenly balanced so that the
court is unable to say that the evidence on either side of an
issue ... has the greater convincing force, then the court's
finding upon that issue must be against the party who had
the burden of proving it.

Id.
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5.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought

under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,924-25,828 P.2d
1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992).
6.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Johnson must

show that her attorney's performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2064-65 (1984);

Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App.1995).
7.

To establish a deficiency, Johnson has the burden of showing that her

attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v.

State, 114 Idaho 758,760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).
8.

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance falls within

the wide range of professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 687II

88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176
(1988).
9.

"In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance," the Idaho

Supreme Court has cautioned, "judicial scrutiny must be highly deferential and every
effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time.'

fI

State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 127 P.3d 954,
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961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999) and

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668,689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984»).
10.

Moreover, Idaho's appellate courts have long adhered to the proposition

that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL
4483675, 7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,
263 (Ct.App.1994)).
11.

In addition, Johnson must not only show incompetence, but must also

show that the deficient conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the proceeding cannot be relied upon as having produced a just
result. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
12.

Thus, Johnson's burden here is a "heavy" one. See Davis v. State, 116

Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). As was noted recently by the
United States Supreme Court:
Surmounting Strickland s high bar is never an easy task. ...
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to
escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not
presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be
applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial
inquiry" threaten the integrity of the very adversary process
the right to counsel is meant to serve ....
f
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Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. ----' ----' 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quoting Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.s. ----' ----' 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)) (citations omitted).
13.

In the end, the "question is whether an attorney's representation

amounted to incompetence under 'prevailing professional norms,'" not whether it
deviated from best practices or most common custom. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
14.

Johnson maintains seven claims for relief. Each will be discussed in turn.

I.

Johnson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden To Establish Ineffective

Assistance Of Counsel.

A.

Johnson was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel for her attorneys'

failing to request a continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine the state's expert, after
learning the comforter had not been collected as evidence.
15.

Johnson has presented limited post-hearing argument regarding this

claim; however, there was some testimony during the evidentiary hearing regarding
this issue, which therefore merits consideration by the court.
16.

The court concludes that there is very little evidence establishing: 1) the

claim that a continuance should have been requested; 2) Judge Wood would have
granted the request; 3) what should have been done with the extra time if the
continuance would have been granted; and 4) what, if any, legal arguments or expert
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testimony could have been elicited to establish a defense or create a better presentation
by the defense attorneys during the trial.
17.

In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of

counsel, Johnson is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
counsels' performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U .s. 668, 687-88 (1984). "Because of the distorting effects of
hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a
strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.s. at 689-

90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).
18.

It was Johnson's burden to present evidence to this court sufficient to

overcome the strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" in
order to establish that counsels' performance was "outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th
Cir.1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.s. at 690).
19.

Because "[s]trategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or

serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel," it was also Johnson's burden to prove that counsels' decisions were the result
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of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings
capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373. 941 P.2d 337, 344345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Gabourie v. State,
125 Idaho 254,258,869 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1994)).
20.

In order to prove prejudice, Johnson is required to show that counsels'

deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on her defense; i.e., but for
counsels' deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the
trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.s. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho
681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
21.

Regarding the second element, Johnson had the burden of showing that

her trial counsels' deficient conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
1/

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."

Strickland, 466 U.s. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
22.

When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's
inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713,
905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995).
23.

As with other decisions made by counsel, Johnson must overcome the

presumption that the decision not to file a particular motion was strategic or tactical.
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See State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) (trial counsel's choice
of witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his lack of objection to
testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions).
24.

In the underlying trial, one of the defense strategies was to attack the

state's improper handling of evidence and sloppy investigation. (See TT:4605:5-8
("[We're] going to show you where the state, first of all, ... police agencies in this case
did a very poor job of hanging onto the evidence; of even acquiring it, to begin with."».
25.

Thus, this court will not now second-guess that strategy and find that the

defense should have had another strategy.
26.

Moreover, this court cannot conclude that a request for continuance on

such vague grounds would have been granted by Judge Wood, much less that the
continuance would have made a difference in the evidence presented or the approach
taken at triaL
27.

It was objectively reasonable for counsel to do precisely what they did in

this case - attack the state's failure to collect the comforter, along with other items of
evidence the state failed to collect from the crime scene, rather than request a
continuance on some vague, unsubstantiated basis.
28.

Therefore, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that

her counsel were deficient in failing to request a continuance, and moreover, that she
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suffered any prejudice as a result of the failure to request such a continuance.
Accordingly, Johnson is not entitled to relief on this claim and it is DENIED.
B.

Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the scientific

basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on blood splatter opinion evidence.
29.

This allegation is factually disproved by the record in this case. As this

court has found based on the facts presented, the defense attempted, although
unsuccessfully, to create an experiment sufficiently similar to the explosion of a human
head to be admissible at trial. No facts support the claim that counsel was unprepared
or unschooled as to the legal standards applicable for the admission of this evidence.
There was no proof at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, through expert
testimony or otherwise, that there is some standard of law that Rader failed to recognize
which otherwise would help to get an inadequate re-creation/experiment admitted.
30.

Moreover, nothing has been shown which establishes that an experiment

better than the myriad of experiments tried by the defense even exists. In particular,
this court has not been shown that an experiment has been conducted that: 1) would be
admissible; and 2) Rader had access to, or should have known about during his
preparation for and conduct of the forensic issues in the trial in 2004 and 2005.
31.

During the trial, before the defense case-in-chief, Judge Wood conducted

an extensive hearing on the state's motion to exclude the experiment conducted by the
defense seeking to replicate the blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane
Johnson was shot in the head. (TT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503).
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32.

Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic

pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between
the media used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508).
33.

Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-

replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment/' he would "take another look at it."
(IT 4509:17-22).
34.

Thus, the trial record belies Johnson's claims that her attorneys were

"unable to consult with any experts." (Petition, p. 8, ~15.c.). Counsel had adequate time
to consult with experts, and in fact did so, conducting a myriad of experiments with an
array of media from Styrofoam filled with pudding to the coconut that was argued
extensively before Judge Wood.
35.

Tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed

unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL
4483675, 7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,
263 (Ct.App.1994)).
36.

There has been no showing here that defense counsel's efforts regarding

the experiments were anything but strategic, or that they were based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or any other shortcoming that can be
objectively evaluated.
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37.

Rader's belief that he could have and should have reached out to other

professional groups or attorneys for assistance is simply second guessing and is
precisely the sort of hindsight that is insufficient for establishing a claim of deficient
performance.
38.

Johnson also fails to establish any prejudice regarding this claim, in that

the defense attorneys' theme throughout the case centered on the "no blood, no guilt"
theory and counsel presented forensic evidence for the jury's consideration, albeit short
of the coconut experiment, to establish their theory.
39.

Simply because the jury failed to accept the defense "no blood, no guilt"

premise is insufficient to establish that the attorneys were at fault in any way regarding
their efforts as to the science surrounding the blood spatter and their theory of the case.
40.

Therefore Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing defective

performance or prejudice regarding this claim and it is DENIED.
C.

41.

Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses.
In claim 4(e), Johnson alleges that counsel were ineffective with respect to

the cross-examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, KjeU Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve
Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez,
Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13,
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~

16.)

42.

Of these fourteen witnesses, only seven were called as witnesses at the

evidentiary hearing before this court: Walt Femling, Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos,
Consuelo Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (PCHT 2-3.)
43.

Johnson failed to call Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Glenda

Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala and failed to present any evidence
as to counsels' decisions regarding their examination of these witnesses, or any
substantive evidence of how their testimony would have been different. Johnson,
therefore, failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was ineffective in crossexamining these witnesses. The court will discuss the remaining witnesses in turn.
44.

At the outset it is axiomatic that cross-examination of witnesses is

generally a tactical decision. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,563, n.2, 199 P.3d 123, 138 n.2
(2008). Judicial scrutiny of these issues "must be highly deferential and every effort
must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time.' " State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338,345-46, 127 P.3d 954,
961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 F.2d 323, 329 (1999) and

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984».
a. Sheriff Walt Femling.
45.

In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "failed to adequately cross-

examine the Blaine County Sheriff," Walt Femling who allegedly "made a statement
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during the early stages of the investigation to the effect that it was vital that police find
a suspect in order to prevent a negative perception of the Sun Valley area from
outsiders who may have decided not to visit if the crime went unsolved." (Petition,
pp.l0-11,
46.

~

16.a.iii.).
The legal standard applicable to cross-examination provides that the

scope of Rader's cross-examination is entitled to the presumption that it was sound trial
strategy.
47.

Johnson has failed to rebut that presumption. Indeed, Johnson failed to

even inquire of Rader regarding his strategic decisions regarding Femling's testimony,
much less prove that the strategy was objectively unreasonable.
48.

The facts simply do not support Johnson's claim that law enforcement

were so dead-set on convicting Johnson that they went after her to the exclusion of all
others.
49.

As noted above, Femling testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law

enforcement interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports,
spent $517,000 investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5
people to the case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative
leads. (TT 2458:4-2461:16). It also took an extended period of time, and the receipt of
DNA evidence before the focus of the state's investigation narrowed to Sarah Johnson.
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50.

Given the similarities between Femling's trial testimony regarding the

scope of the investigation into the Johnson murders and his testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, this court finds that such testimony is credible.
51.

Thus, Johnson has failed to prove that counsel was deficient in cross-

examining Femling regarding a theory that the facts simply do not support. Moreover,
there is no showing that Johnson was prejudiced as a result of the allegedly inadequate
cross-examination.
52.

Accordingly, Johnson's claim as to the cross-examination of Femling is

DENIED.

b. Steve Harkins.
53.

The court concludes that Pangburn's cross-examination was, again, based

upon tactical decision-making and is not subject to second-guessing by this court.
54.

Pangburn did cross-examine Harkins' extensively regarding his

interviews in the case with Santos' known associates, and Pangburn succeeded in
asking about unsavory characters and Santos' drug-dealing mindset--even going so far
as to ask whether Santos' associates would kill for him.
55.

While not every question was asked of Harkins that Johnson would now,

in hindsight, think should have been asked, Johnson has failed to overcome the heavy
burden that such questions and the scope of such examination are matters of trial tactics
which are presumed to be sound trial strategy.
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56.

Johnson has also, given the scope and extent of the questions that were

asked, failed to establish the requisite prejudice here, that but for any errors by
Pangburn in his cross-examination of Harkins, the result would have been different.
57.

As such, Johnson has failed to overcome this presumption as to the cross-

examination of Detective Harkins. This claim is DENIED.
c.
58.

Bruno Santos.

This court has reviewed the record of the underlying trial and made

factual findings regarding the cross-examination of Santos by Rader.
59.

Those findings set forth that Rader was very knowledgeable of Santos'

shortcomings, and had a plan regarding the scope of his inquiry.
60.

His inquiry was largely cut short based on Judge Wood's evidentiary

ruling regarding the propriety of the defense's intended questions. Based thereon,
Rader indicated at the conclusion of the state's direct examination that the defense
"decided not to enter into a stipulation and ... decided not to cross examine Mr. Santos
... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15).
61.

This was a penultimate strategic decision made with knowledge of Santos'

past, with full knowledge of the lack of facts tying Santos to the Johnson murders, and
with an understanding of the legal ruling made by Judge Wood.
62.

Thus, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of proving that Rader's

decision not to cross-examine Santos was anything but strategic or that the decision was
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objectively unreasonable in light of the testimony Santos offered on direct and the
limitations Judge Wood placed on cross-examination.
63.

Johnson likewise has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the

failure to cross-examine Santos. Santos provided no additional testimony at the
evidentiary hearing that would have aided in Johnson's defense and there is no reason
to conclude that cross-examination of Santos at trial would have resulted in a different
outcome in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Johnson and the
complete absence of any evidence implicating Santos in the murders.
64.

Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief

on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Santos and this
claim is DENIED.

d. Consuela Cedeno.
65.

This court has indicated that Ms. Cedeno's testimony at the post-

conviction evidentiary hearing was essentially valueless.
66.

The court has concluded as a finding of fact that it cannot conclude that

Pangburn simply passed off the cross-examination of this witness to Rader at the last
minute.
67.

The presumption therefore remains that the failure to cross-examine

Cedeno was a strategic decision and Johnson has not overcome the presumption in that
regard.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 77

68.

Moreover, even if the decision was inept and fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, this court cannot find prejudice regarding the issues which
Johnson now contends should have been asked on cross-examination.
69.

The court has concluded that Dunn's information regarding their being no

dew on the morning of September 3 is an unsupported fact, based upon the testimony
of Officer Cornelas. See supra, fn. 8. Moreover, the fact that Santos may have "run
around," or that Cedeno may have told differing stories regarding the odometer on the
family car is, in light of the entire record and the overwhelming evidence against
Johnson, inconsequential. These facts simply would not have made a difference in this
case, and there is no prejudice to Johnson based on counsel's failure to inquire about
them.
70.

Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief

on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Cedeno and this
claim is DENIED.

e. Jane Lopez.
71.

This court has reviewed the entirety of the record as it pertains to the

issues raised as to the cross-examination of Jane Lopez. The court has further
concluded that the phone records which purportedly create a discrepancy actually do
not.
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72.

Therefore, the presumption that Rader's questioning, limited though it

was, was simply strategic has not been overcome in this case.
73.

Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's decision

regarding the cross-examination of Ms. Lopez was anything but strategic, much less
that it was deficient, and she has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Rader's
failure to try and impeach Ms. Lopez with the phone records. Indeed, Johnson did not
even attempt to do so at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
74.

Consequently, Johnson cannot demonstrate how any such impeachment

would have made a difference in the outcome of this case, particularly where the court
has made a factual determination that the records do not impeach Lopez.
75.

Because Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was

ineffective in his cross-examination of Ms. Lopez, this claim is hereby DENIED.
f. Raul Ornelas.

76.

The court has made factual findings that establish: 1) that Tim Richards

never testified to having walked in the back yard at the Johnson home before officers
arrived at the scene; and 2) Officer Raul Ornelas did not testify that the footprints were
made by more than one person; rather, he specifically testified that he could not tell.
77.

Pangburn's cross-examination of Ornelas was thus based upon the record

and the scope of Ornelas' direct testimony. Johnson has failed to prove Pangburn'S
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efforts were either deficient or prejudicial for his failure to "point out" or "highlight"
information that was not actually in evidence.
78.

Moreover, Johnson failed to offer any evidence, let alone prove that

Pangburn's cross-examination of Officer Ornelas was anything but tactical. Johnson's
claim regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas is therefore DENIED.
G. Stuart Robinson.
79.

The court has made factual findings establishing that Stuart Robinson's

testimony before the grand jury was not inaccurate at the time it was made; the
fingerprints, though recovered at that time, were not identified.
80.

Thus, Rader's failure to impeach Robinson with that information is a non-

issue. There was no impeachment to be had regarding that statement.
81.

Even if there is some limited value from information Johnson elicited from

Robinson at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, that value comes nowhere close to
establishing Johnson's burden to show that "but for counsels' deficient performance,
there [is] a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.s. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App.
1999).
82.

Thus, this court concludes that Johnson has established neither deficient

performance nor prejudice regarding the cross-examination of Stuart Robinson. This
portion of Johnson's claim is therefore DENIED.
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D. Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to present evidence of an audio recording,
recorded inadvertently by Trooper Ross Kirtley.

83.

In this claim Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present

evidence of an audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on
Johnson "to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson]
was the easiest target." (Petition, p.13, ~ 16.c.).
84.

The recording to which Johnson refers was a recording from Trooper

Kirtley's microphone and dashboard camera, which recorded from before he was
dispatched to the crime scene to approximately two and one-half hours later, when he
was still at the scene. (Exhibit 12).
85.

Given the entirety of the record herein, and the court's factual findings

regarding the lack of a "focus" on Johnson to the exclusion of others, see Findings of
Fact, ~~ 126-134, this court concludes that counsel were not ineffective for failing to
admit the recording.
86.

The officers' initial thoughts, while of some interest9, do nothing to

undermine the record of the police investigation, which shows that there were initially
multiple suspects, and that, in the eyes of Sheriff Femling, Johnson's status as "prime
suspect" did not materialize until the DNA results were returned showing Johnson's
DNA in the glove hidden in her pink robe in the garbage can.
One of the initial thoughts of the officers on the recording was that a murder-suicide had occurred, a theory which
is unsupported by the evidence and which the defense did not pursue at trial.

9
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87.

Johnson failed to establish that the decision not to introduce such

evidence was objectively unreasonable or that introduction of such evidence, assuming
it could even be correctly characterized as Johnson has characterized it, would remotely
undermine confidence in the outcome of her case.
88.

Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel was

ineffective for failing to introduce the entirety of Trooper Kirtley's audio, the court
DENIES Johnson relief on this claim.

E.

Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to inquire whether certain

previously unidentified fingerprints were 'fresh.
89.

/I

As the court has concluded based on the record in this case, Pangburn was

adequately prepared regarding the forensic/fingerprint testimony in the Johnson trial.
He inquired of the state's expert regarding aging of fingerprints, and he inquired
similarly of Mr. Kerchusky regarding the same issues.
90.

The information regarding the freshness of the prints was before the jury

from both Pangburn's direct examination of Kerchusky, and from his cross-examination
of Ms. Walthall. Moreover, Pangburn in fact argued that when the fingerprints start
/I

getting a year old ... you're just not going to see [them]." He also argued that the
unknown fingerprints, which have now been identified as those of Christopher Hill
"had not been there for very long./I (Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25).
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91.

Thus, Pangburn did not err in failing to specifically ask whether the prints

were" fresh" or in failing to ask Kerchusky those questions which Kerchusky answered
at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing regarding who, in his opinion, touched the
scope last.
92.

The court therefore concludes that Pangburn's questions of Kerchusky at

trial do not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court further
concludes that Johnson has not overcome the "strong presumption that trial counsel's
performance falls within the wide range of 'professional assistance.'" Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).
93.

This court further recognizes that its scrutiny must be "highly deferential

and every effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.'" State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46,
127 P.3d 954, 961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,
329 (1999) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668,689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984».
94.

Viewing this issue from this deferential perspective, the court concludes

that Johnson has failed to establish that Pangburn was ineffective or that she has
suffered any prejudice from the claimed deficiency. This claim is accordingly DENIED.
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F.

Johnson did not receive a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict due to the

cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of
the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings.
95.

Johnson maintains that she is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon

the cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the
facts and law of the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings.
96.

As is set forth above, this court has concluded that none of these

assertions, either individually or collectively, has been proven in this case. Nothing in
the record establishes that the defense team, or any of them, was chronically late,
unprepared or indolent.
97.

The facts have been established that Pangburn and Rader's conduct did

not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as to any of Johnson's claims.
Consequently, she has failed to establish the cumulative error she alleges occurred in
this case.
98.

Johnson has not cited any support in the record that the defense team was

unaware of legal precedent or the law of the case. In fact, this court has found just the
opposite is true, particularly as it pertains to the defense attempts to: 1) admit their
blood spatter experiment; and 2) cross-examine Bruno Santos extensively regarding his
history.
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99.

Therefore, the court DENIES Johnson any relief based upon the

accumulation of alleged wrongful conduct by her attorneys.
II.

Johnson Is Not Entitled To A New Trial On The Basis Of Newly Discovered

Evidence.
100.

Johnson seeks a new trial in this matter on the basis of newly discovered

evidence relating to the recent identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of
the previously unidentified latent prints.
101.

Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if Johnson

demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to her at the time
of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191
P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976».
102.

In announcing this four-part test in Drapeau, the Court cited Professor

Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment,
1/

after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper

reluctance to give him a second trial." 97 Idaho at 691,551 P.2d at 978 (citation
omitted).
103.

A long line of Idaho cases have held, consistently with the Court's

pronouncement in Drapeau, that evidence known to the defendant at the time of trial
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cannot be considered newly discovered. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191
P.3d at 224 (in order to be newly discovered evidence, the evidence itself, not just
importance or materiality of that evidence, must be unknown and unavailable prior to
trial); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404,410,273 P.2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which
defendant was aware of prior to trial but chose not to present is not newly discovered);

State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99,11 P.2d 619, 622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial
is not newly discovered); State v. Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts
unknown at time of trial could be considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho
45,88 P. 240,242 (1907) (concluding evidence that colts were not stolen but actually
belonged to the rancher for which defendants worked was not newly discovered).
104.

In this case the only thing about the "newly discovered evidence" which is

new is the identification to whom the fingerprints belong. Nevertheless, the court
concludes that this identification meets the first prong of Drapeau because the evidence
is newly discovered and was unknown to Johnson at the time of trial.
105.

The court also finds that the fourth Drapeau prong is met; the discovery of

the identity of the unknown fingerprints had nothing to do with the defendant's
conduct.
106.

However, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the

discovery that Mr. Hill's fingerprints on the .264 rifle, scope, and ammunition boxes is
material or would likely produce an acquittal on a retrial.
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107.

At triat the evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the scope, the

box and elsewhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (TT 2994:10-3077:25;
5045:15-5132:15; 5808:1-5843:4; 5846:16-5858:17).
108.

The jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were on the scope, gun,

some of the shells, and the box containing the shells. (TT 3077:1-17). Thus, it was
established at trial that Johnson had left no fingerprints on those items; if any of the
prints on those items belonged to the "real killer," then the killer was not Johnson and
was some unidentified person.
109.

Pangburn utilized this fingerprint information and argued it to the jury, to

no avail. (See, e.g., Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25) (Pangburn'S closing
argument that the fingerprints on the rifle and scope had not been there very long implying that the "real killer" was unidentified).
110.

The jury was aware of the phantom prints, and they still convicted

Johnson of both counts of first degree murder; thus, telling a new jury the name of the
owner of those phantom prints will not likely produce an acquittal.
111.

Speegle and Hill both testified as to how, when and where Hill had

touched the rifle. The fact that this information is now known makes the fingerprint
testimony even less valuable than it was at the time of the trial, when the defense could
argue that a nameless third party handled the gun, the shells and removed the scope.
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112.

The court recognizes that Mr. Kerchusky testified in a contradictory

manner to this conclusion; he is convinced of his theory of the case, as much as the
state's expert, Ms. Walthall is convinced that you cannot age fingerprints.
113.

This court's task is to evaluate both witnesses' testimony in light of the

entire record before the court. In doing so, the court chooses not to accept Kerchusky's
hypothesis.
114.

This court, as fact-finder, is not bound to accept the testimony of any

expert witness. See Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 566, 130 P.3d 1097,
1104 (2006) (the factfinder is free to determine the weight to be given to the testimony of
an expert); In re Baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 460,902 P.2d 477, 485 (1995) (the weight to
be given to expert testimony is for the trier of fact).
115.

The court simply cannot accept the theory that Hill was the unknown

killer in this case. Hill testified credibly that he was camping on East Magic Road at the
time of the murders. He had no access to the guest house or to the Johnson home; he
has no knowledge of the inner workings of the Johnson home, i.e., where knives were
hidden, where Sarah's robe was kept, or where the key to the gun safe was located (to
retrieve the 9mm magazine). The totality of the circumstances simply does not support
Kerchusky's theory that Hill was the last person to touch the scope, the gun, or the
ammunition and this court does not accept that theory.
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116.

The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson's fingerprints were

not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the ammunition or packaging, given that a
leather glove was found in her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was
wrapped in Johnson's robe ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove containing
Johnson's DNA.
117.

Moreover, the trial jury was also instructed on the theory of aiding and

abetting murder. Use of such instruction was affirmed on appeal. See State v. Johnson,
145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008).
118.

While the state did not rely upon that "theory of liability" in proving its

case, see 145 Idaho at 975, 188 P.3d at 917, the jury was free to consider that theory
because "it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been the actual shooter."
ld. at 977, 188 P.3d at 919.

119.

Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not the actual shooter, was not
complicit as an aider and abettor.
120.

It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the murders. There

was no forced entry in this case, either to the Johnson home or the guesthouse;
Johnson's bedroom contained .264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a righthanded leather glove matching the left one wrapped in Johnson's robe in the garbage;
both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the family vehicle; the knives found in
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the guest bedroom and at the foot of the Johnsons' bed were located where an intruder
or stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to the guesthouse;
Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her relationship with
Santos; and Johnson gave numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was
doing when her parents were shot. As Judge Barry Wood viewed this evidence:
I think it's really interesting that the brother-in-law, the
man who had gotten married there the week before, two
weeks before, whatever it was, that spent he testified, four
or five days in that very upstairs apartment in the guest
house, and never knew the gun was there, never saw it.
Used the closet and didn't even know the gun was there.
Didn't know the bullets were there.
[T]o suggest to a reasonable jury such things that
somebody off of the street could corne and find that gun in
the guest house, find those bullets in the guest house, know
when the parents were going to be there; find the knives in
the kitchen that are hidden, the one knife that's hidden
behind the microwave or bread box, whatever it was, in the
dark, no less; go out past the family dog that the evidence
was would bark, and the dog didn't bark. Take the same
route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took out of the
house, past the trash can where the robe is found. Get her
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not
awaken her or bother her.
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the
parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do all of this
in the dark and not disturb the parents just defies common
sense.
I think a reasonable jury could clearly find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here.
(Supp. Appeal Transcript, 449:1-450:4).
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121.

This court agrees with this sentiment, to the extent that Johnson must

show that the alleged "newly discovered evidence" would produce an acquittal in
another trial, and this court simply cannot make that leap given the above-noted facts.
122.

This court's reference to the aiding and abetting theory is not to say that

this court is unconvinced of Johnson's direct culpability for the murder of her parents,
as argued by the state at trial. Add to the above-noted circumstances the DNA
evidence, Johnson's motive for the crimes, her access and her opportunity, and this
court concludes that telling a new jury that the fingerprint owner is now identified will
do nothing to ameliorate the mountain of evidence which the jury saw and heard in this
case against Ms. Johnson.
123.

To quote Judge Wood again:
The jury heard all of the evidence about the robe. The
jury doesn't have to believe that the crime occurred exactly
the way the defense theory is that it occurred. The argument
of no blood, no guilt; well, the converse of that is if there's
blood, there is guilt. And there's blood. There's blood all
over the robe, blood on the socks.
Your whole theory, it seems to me, the whole defense
theory is an aiding and abetting theory, because the
defendant's there and there's no evidence that excludes the
defendant. There's not one piece of evidence that excludes
the defendant from the commission of this crime that I
heard. She's right there. And her defense -- I mean her
defense people, Howard and Mink, testify -- and Inman, I
believe, all three - at least two of them testified that the
doors were open. The door to the parents' bedroom, which
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is propped open by the pillows, and the door to Sarah
Johnson's room is open.
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was
taken out of the Suburban, that's something else that this
unnamed killer would have had to have known, is where the
gloves were located, the mother's gloves in the Suburban.
Located those in the dark, as well, and brought them into the
house to help commit this crime. And leave one in Sarah
Johnson's room with two cartridges for the .264; unspent,
unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson's room that part of her
mother's body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah
Johnson's room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it
just doesn't make sense to me.
And I don't think it would make sense to the jury. One of
the leather gloves found in her room, the other one found
out -- wrapped up in the trash can inside the pink robe.
That's what I mean by the circumstantial evidence here, and
she admits being there.
The evidence here is overwhelming.
(Id., 450:4-451:19).

124.

This court adopts Judge Wood's reasoning as its own. The court has spent

significant hours reviewing the 1000's of pages of transcripts from trial; the court has
listened to testimony during the post-conviction hearing; the court has reviewed the
parties' post-hearing briefing; and the court has reviewed all of this evidence against
the legal standards set forth herein. The evidence against Ms. Johnson which exists in
this record is, indeed, "overwhelming."
125.

Thus, the court concludes that the evidence identifying Mr. Hill's

fingerprints is insufficient to make such evidence material, or likely to produce an
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acquittal. As such, Johnson's claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
is DENIED.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court
hereby concludes that Johnson's Petition for Post-Conviction relief is, in all respects,
DENIED. Counsel for the state is to prepare a judgment in conformity with this opinion
within seven days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

District Judge
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Based upon the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding
Claims Taken Under Advisement filed May 21,2010, the Order on Cross Motions
for Summary Disposition filed July 22, 2010, and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law filed April 5, 2011, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that Johnson's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief is hereby DENIED in all respects and this cause of action shall be
DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this B1y of April, 2011

District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
________~R=e=sp=o=nd=e=n=t,___________)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV-06-324

NOTICE OF APPEAL

LA.R. ll(a)
LR.C.P.54

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL &
SPECIAL PROSECTUING ATTORNEYS, PO BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 837200010, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Petitioner-Appellant appeals

against the above-named

Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in the above-entitled
action on the
2.

i

h

day of April, 2011, the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, presiding.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment

or order described in paragraph one (l) above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule (LA.R.) 11 (a).

NOTICE OF APPEAL

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant intends to

assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the
appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, is/are:
(a)

Whether the district court erred in dismissing the appellant's Second

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and all claims raised there under.
4.

There is a portion of the record that is sealed. The portion of the record that is

sealed is the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report. (PSI)
5.

Reporter's Transcript.

The appellant requests preparation of the entire

reporter's transcript as defined in LA.R. 25( c), without exclusions or omissions, and

including all argument at motion hearings, all pre-trial proceedings, and all trial
proceedings.
6.

Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to

LA.R. 28(b)(2)., without exclusion or omission, to include all pleadings papers and
evidence filed and submitted in the District Court. The appellant requests the following
documents to be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically
included:
(a)

Any and all exhibits, including all attachments or copies of transcripts,

filed or lodged, by the state, the appellate, or the court in support of, or in
opposition to, the dismissal of the Post-Conviction Petition;
7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court
Reporter, Virginia Bailey, P.O. Box 126, Twin Falls, ID 83303;

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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(b)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho Code §§
31-3220, 31-3220A, LA.R. 24(e);

(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee because this is an appeal in a criminal
case (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 23(a)(8);

(d)

That arrangements have been made with Blaine County who will be
responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is indigent,
Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, LA.R. 24(e);

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to I.A.R 20.

DATED this

21

day of

J/fR.1 t-

,2011.

istopher P. Simms
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
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Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2 nd Avenue South, Ste. 100
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State Appellate Public Defender
3647 N. Lake Harbor Lane
Boise,ID 83703-69103
The Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Virginia Bailey
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P.O. 126
Twin Falls, ID 83303
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STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
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STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
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SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -06-324

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

COMES NOW, Sarah M. Johnson, by and through her attorney of record, Christopher P.
Simms, and hereby moves this Court for its order pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-867, for its order
appointing the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to represent the appellant in all further
appellate proceedings and allowing current counsel for the defendant to withdraw as counsel of
record. This motion is brought on the grounds and for the reasons that the appellant is currently
represented by Christopher P. Simms pursuant to the Blaine County Public Defender's Contract;
the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by Idaho Code § 19-870 to represent the
defendant in all felony appellate proceedings; the defendant has been found indigent; and it is in
the interest of justice for them to do so in this case.
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for the purposes of the appeal
only.
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istopher P. Simms
Attorney for Defendant
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Sarah Johnson
c/o Pocatello Womens Correctional Center
1451 Fore Road
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue South, Ste. 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 N. Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703-69103
The Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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THIS MATIER M:ving come before the Court pursuant to Petition~-AppeUanfs Motion
for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender the Court having reviewed the pleadings on
J

:file and the motion; the Court being fully apprised in the matter and good cause appearing;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Christopher P. Simins, is withdrawn as counsel of
reoord £Or the Defendant and. the State Appellate Public Defender is hereby appointt;d to
represent the Appellant, SARAH M. JOHNSON in the above em.titled 'matters for appellate

purposes.
The appointment of the State Appellate Public D~fender
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MAY 0 4 2011
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
)
vs.
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
__________=R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t~.____________ )

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -06-324

MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY
FOR CLERK'S RECORD
AND TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
AT COUNTY COST
I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e)

COMES NOW, the Petitioner-Appellant, SARAH M. JOHNSON, by and through her
Attorney of Record, Christopher P. Simms, in the above-entitled matter and files this, her Motion
for Blaine County to Pay for Clerk's Record and Transcript on Appeal and in support thereof
states the following:
1.

The above-named Petitioner-Appellant filed her NOTICE OF APPEAL on April 29,

2011, against the above-named Respondent from the Judgment entered in the above-entitled
cause on the i
2.

h

day of April, 2011, the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, presiding.

A Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Supporting Affidavit, has been prepared and

submitted to appellant for verification, and will be filed with this Court in due course.
3.

The Petitioner Petitioner-Appellant has requested, in her Notice of Appeal, the

preparation of the entire reporter's transcript as defined in LA.R. 2S(c), without exclusions or
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omissions, and including all argument at motion hearings, all pre-trial proceedings, and all trial
proceedings.
4.

The Petitioner-Appellant has requested in her Notice of Appeal the preparation of the

standard clerk's record pursuant to LA.R. 28(b)(2), without exclusion or omission, to include all
pleadings papers and evidence filed and submitted in the District Court.
5.

The Petitioner-Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of

the record because the appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of
Corrections and is therefore indigent. (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, LA.R. 24(e).
WHEREFORE appellant prays this Honorable Court enter an Order directing Blaine
County, Idaho pay for all fees associated with producing the Clerk's Record and Transcript on
Appeal in the above styled matter.

istopher P. Simms
Attorney for Petitioner - Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT
ON APPEAL AT COUNTY COSTS was served upon the parties below as follows:

Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue South, Ste. 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Fax: 208.788.5554
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 N. Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703-69103
Fax: 208.334.2985
The Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Fax: 208. 854.8074

MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL AT COUNTY
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FAX NO, 20A 736 4155

Services

FILED~:
[ MAY n5 2011

~~

I~

:>v{

Jolynn Df8ge, Clerk District
Court Blains Counly, Idaho

IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
STATE OF IDAHO

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
.)

SARAH M. JOHNSON~

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Res:Qondent

CV~06-324

)

ORDER FOR BLAINE
COUNTY TO PAY FOR
CLERK'S RECORD AND
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

)
)
)

I.C. 19 ~ 4904

)
)

vs.

Case No:

The Court) having considered PETITlONERlS MOnON FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR

CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCIPT ON APPEAL AT COUNTY COSTS filed herein by

the Petitioner-Appellant, Sarah M Johnson, by and through her Attorney) Christopher P. Simms.
and good cause appearing therefore, HEREBY ORDERS the clerks record be prepared aud the
transcript of all hearings on the Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief in the above styled matter
~ct:ibed

at the cost of Blaine County, Idaho .

.

C~·

DATED this ()

day of May, 2011.

ORDER. FOR BLAlNE COUNIYTO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
SOOO/sooo lei

IVd

~9:Cl

TIO~/~O/gO

FILE D ~. ~. ~'f"'H
Sarah Johnson
clo Pocatello Womens Correctional Center
1451 Fore Road
Pocatello, Idaho 83205

MAY 2 6 2011
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Count , Idaho

Petitioner-Appellant
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -06-324

)

)
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
________~R=e=sp=o=nd=e=n=t,___________)
Petitioner-Appellant,

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING
AFFIDAVIT

COMES NOW, the petitioner, SARAH M. JOHNSON, in the above-entitled matter and
moves this Honorable Court for an order of the Court to proceed in forma pauperis on the
grounds she is a prisoner and indigent pursuant to Idaho Code §31-3220A.

Said Motion is

supported by the following Affidavit of Inability to Pay Court Fees.
DATED this

-.:L day of Uo L\

\

, 2011.

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page 1 ['1l.{ ~

AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY
STATE OF IDAHO
County 0[1)\ ai ne..

)
) ss
)

SARAH M. JOHNSON, declares under penalty of perjury, that I am the PetitionerAppellant in the above entitled proceeding; that, in support of my request to proceed without
being required to prepay fees, cost or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty, I

am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or give security therefor; that I believe I am
entitled to relief.
The nature of my action is I have been incarcerated for many years, am indigent and
unable to earn funds adequate to pay for these proceedings.
In further support of this application, I answer the following questions:
1.

I am presently employed.

)(Yes

o

No

houb"

$ • 'bD

a.

If the answer is "Yes" my wages per moRY are:

b.

If the answer is "No" list last date of employment and salary:

$_-2.

I have received money from the following sources within the last 12 months:

0

business, profession or other self employment

$

0

rent payments, interest or dividends

$

0

pensions, annuities or life insurance payments

$

0

gifts or inheritances

$

0

other sources

$

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page 2 tql1~

3.

The real and personal property I own is: None.

4.

I have a savings account:

DYes

~o

$

5.

1 have a checking account:

DYes

~No

$

6.

Balance in inmate trust account

$5~.12

7.

Spouse's income

$

8.

Affiant's dependents :

9.

Affiant's debts:

10.

Affiant's monthly expenses: __________________________________

11.

Attached is a copy of my inmate account reflecting the activity of my account

---------------------------------------------

over the period of my incarceration or for the past twelve (12) months, whichever is less. Said
copy has been celiified by the custodian of said account.
Further, your Affiant states that I am unable to pay the costs of pursuing this action. I
verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct.

DATED this~ day of

\\A 0

U

,

,20_

&wilim.&~
ffiant

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page

3[q45

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

q~day of--..l-H4-hJ..-..q_ _ _' 20~.
\

111 ~~OA)~LbKJ
Notiry Public for IdaJ1(;'"
Commission Expires:

Nru . It 1 2D\~

~ERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/(p

OF MAILING
day of

mlft

, 2011, I served a true and

correct copy of the MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING
AFFIDAVIT upon the parties below as follows:
Sarah Johnson
c/o Pocatello Womens Correctional Center
1451 Fore Road
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2 nd Avenue South, Ste. 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 N. Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703-69103
The Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page 4
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IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 77613
Name: JOHNSON, SARAH MARIE
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/09/2011

=

PWCC/UNIT5 PRES FACIL
TIER-A CELL-4

Transaction Dates: 05/01/2010-05/09/2011
Beginning
Balance
0.69

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1195.65
1250.71
55.75
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
-

----------

----------

-------------

-------------

05/04/2010
05/07/2010
05/11/2010
05/11/2010
05/18/2010
05/18/2010
06/01/2010
06/07/2010
06/07/2010
06/08/2010
06/08/2010
06/14/2010
06/29/2010
07/06/2010
07/06/2010
07/13/2010
07/13/2010
07/20/2010
08/06/2010
08/10/2010
08/13/2010
08/16/2010
08/17/2010
08/31/2010
09/07/2010
09/08/2010
09/08/2010
09/14/2010
09/21/2010
09/21/2010
09/22/2010
09/28/2010
10/06/2010
10/07/2010
10/12/2010
10/12/2010
1 0'/ 19 / 2 0 1 0
10/19/2010
11/01/2010

HQ0498033-014
PW0498944-017
PW0499409-139
PW0499409-140
PW0500195-130
PW0500195-131
PW0501526-113
PW0502412-004
HQ0502431-011
PW0502501-123
PW0502501-124
PW0503375-025
PW0504940-105
HQ0505608-003
PW0505745-007
PW0506629-140
PW0506629-141
PW0507697 128
PW0510077-014
PW0510299-138
HQ0510747-016
PW0510960-124
PW0511143-006
PW0512737-100
PW0513802-016
PW0513917-118
PW0513917-119
PW0514614-133
HQ0515343-013
PW0515397-103
PW0515660-004
PW0516157-109
PW0517372-014
PW0517574-009
PW0518049-121
PW0518049-122
PW0518899-117
HQ0519006-023
PW0520157-019

011-RCPT MO/CC
175.00
175.69
072-METER MAIL
65279
0.88DB
174.81
099-COMM SPL
158.40DB
16.41
099-COMM SPL
3.95DB
12.46
099-COMM SPL
5.83DB
6.63
099-COMM SPL
2.48DB
4.15
3.71DB
099-COMM SPL
0.44
223-IMF PAYROL
MAY PAY
2.20
2.64
50.00
011-RCPT MO/CC
52.64
099-COMM SPL
42.51DB
10.13
5.00DB
099-COMM SPL
5.13
2.00DB
071-MED CO-PAY
349717
3.13
2.49DB
099-COMM SPL
0.64
60.00
60.64
RTCP MO
011-RCPT MO/CC
3.00
63.64
223-IMF PAYROL
JUN U3JNTR
39.78DB
23.86
099-COMM SPL
13.71DB
10.15
099-COMM SPL
7.83DB
2.32
099-COMM SPL
2.60
4.92
223-IMF PAYROL
JUL JANTR
4.61DB
0.31
099-COMM SPL
60.00
60.31
011-RCPT MO/CC
MAIL
35.94DB
24.37
099-COMM SPL
13.00DB
11.37
071-MED CO-PAY
394601
8.66DB
2.71
099-COMM SPL
60.31
AUG PAY
57.60
223-IMF PAYROL
41.23DB
19.08
099-COMM SPL
10.00DB
9.08
099-COMM SPL
8.49DB
0.59
099 COMM SPL
60.59
MAIL
60.00
011 RCPT MO/CC
38.74DB
21.85
099-COMM SPL
8.00DB
13.85
071-MED CO-PAY
393775
13.36DB
0.49
099-COMM SPL
7.51DB
071-MED CO-PAY
394853
8.00DB
72.00
64.49
223-IMF PAY~.fPA:rE OF ~DOGTR
21.
55
099- COMM S PIMaho Department of Correction
42 . 94 DB
6.78
099 - COMM SPIy hereby certify that the foregoing is a fit'fl; t17e?~d
0.06
099 _ COMM S P T t'Cl copy of an instrument as the same tfuw7r6RJfns
60.06
011 RCPT MO o<;;Yi Ie and of).tc~;a il!1@y office.
60 . 00
072 - METER ~HfNESS m? fi~3 ~ereto affixed this O. 9 5DB ~ 59.11

----------

-----------

10I

day of

Bv

\o4t~

A..D.,2oJ.i

Jtl.lS

tqlt

=

IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 77613
Name: JOHNSON, SARAH MARIE
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/09/2011

=

PWCC/UNIT5 PRES FACIL
TIER-A CELL-4

Transaction Dates: 05/01/2010-05/09/2011
Beginning
Balance
0.69

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1195.65
1250.71
55.75
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
11/02/2010
11/03/2010
11/08/2010
11/09/2010
11/09/2010
11/16/2010
11/19/2010
11/29/2010
11/30/2010
12/03/2010
12/08/2010
12/29/2010
12/29/2010
12/30/2010
01/05/2011
01/06/2011
01/06/2011
01/10/2011
01/11/2011
01/11/2011
01/11/2011
01/21/2011
01/25/2011
01/27/2011
02/07/2011
02/08/2011
02/15/2011
02/16/2011
02/23/2011
02/23/2011
03/04/2011
03/04/2011
03/08/2011
03/09/2011
03/09/2011
03/10/2011
03/16/2011
03/16/2011
03/29/2011

PW0520383-102
PW0520641-007
PW0521189-006
PW0521506-137
PW0521506-138
PW0522164-104
HQ0522754-009
PW0523405-006
PW0523675-004
PW0524193-010
HQ0525277-001
PW0527785-114
PW0527785-115
PW0527938-011
PW0528702-006
PW0528859-113
PW0528859-114
PW0529267-006
HQ0529382-002
PW0529432-019
PW0529443-006
HQ0530528-014
PW0530964-012
PW0531167-118
PW0532588-002
PW0532732-132
HQ0533369-020
PW0533597-117
PW0534319-110
PW0534319-111
PW0535468-003
PW0535483-042
PW0535903-004
PW0536063-121
PW0536063-122
HQ0536202-012
PW0536841-114
PW0536841-115
PW0538057-102

099-COMM SPL
46.19DB
223-IMF PAYROL
OCT PAY
74.40
071-MED CO-PAY
405549
8.00DB
099-COMM SPL
41.97DB
099-COMM SPL
10.00DB
099-COMM SPL
27.24DB
MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
60.00
072-METER MAIL
71781
10.35DB
404511
8.00DB
071-MED CO-PAY
NOV PAY
223-IMF PAYROL
72.00
061-CK INMATE
71787
30.00DB
099-COMM SPL
29.80DB
099-COMM SPL
33.82DB
072-METER MAIL
71439
0.44DB
212-LAUNDRY
DEC PAY
1. 20
099-COMM SPL
17.33DB
099-COMM SPL
3.40DB
223-IMF PAYROL
DEC PAY
1. 20
013-RCPT RDU
0.88
RDU
11.00DB
071-MED CO-PAY
430359
1.20DB
323-FIX529267
FIX529267
100.00
011-RCPT MO/CC
MAIL
071-MED CO-PAY
428034
8.00DB
099-COMM SPL
22.59DB
223-IMF PAYROL
JAN PAY
17.60
099-COMM SPL
10.11DB
011-RCPT MO/CC
RTCP MO
60.00
099-COMM SPL
6.80DB
099-COMM SPL
68.90DB
099-COMM SPL
32.29DB
223-IMF PAYROL
FEB PAY
17.60
223-IMF PAYROL
FEB PAY
10.30
071-MED CO-PAY
439714
8.00DB
099 - COMM SPIsTATE OF IDAHO
16.4 9DB
099-COMM SP~
,10.00DB
011-RCPT MO;;~o DepaT1iJil~t1fffCorrectlOn
60.00
099 - COMM S PI! reby cert'tyffi,at the foregoing is a ~" ~!9ld
099 - COMM S p~orrect .:opy of an ms~rument as the sam~l!9~9..~s
099 - COMM S PT(:~ file and of record In my office,
15 . 78 DB
,\VffNESS my hand hereto affixed this

day

Qt-b

Of_",,!C7--:::O-'V\.II.-l..I.o!U4~q...1- -_ _A.D., 20Ji

Bv _ _--LI

.-=1A~

12.92
87.32
79.32
37.35
27.35
0.11
60.11
49.76
41. 76
113.76
83.76
53.96
20.14
19.70
20.90
3.57
0.17
1. 37
2.25
8.75DB
9.95DB
90.05
82.05
59.46
77.06
66.95
126.95
120.15
51. 25
18.96
36.56
46.86
38.86
22.37
12.37
72.37
43.25
17.74
1. 96

=

IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 77613
Name: JOHNSON, SARAH MARIE
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/09/2011

=

PWCC/UNIT5 PRES FACIL
TIER-A CELL-4

Transaction Dates: 05/01/2010-05/09/2011
Beginning
Balance
0.69

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1195.65
1250.71
55.75
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
----------

------------- ------------------

04/06/2011
04/07/2011
04/07/2011
04/08/2011
04/12/2011
04/12/2011
04/20/2011
04/21/2011
04/27/2011
04/27/2011
05/04/2011
05/05/2011
05/05/2011

PW0539351-114
PW0539603-016
PW0539617-006
PW0539796-015
PW0540171-132
PW0540171-133
PW0541101-123
HQ0541185-016
PW0541673-115
PW0541741-002
PW0542588-100
PW0542842-013
PW0542858-005

099-COMM SPL
223-IMF PAYROL
212-LAUNDRY
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
223-IMF PAYROL
223-IMF PAYROL

MARCH PAY
MARCH PAY
436127

MAIL
436190
APRIL PAY
APRIL PAY

1.64DB
13.18
51.60
3.00DB
15.00DB
31.59DB
11.39DB
60.00
39.50DB
3.00DB
14.22DB
11. 60
36.75

STATE OF JDAHO
Idaho Department of Correction
I hereby certify th.at the foregoing is a full, true, and
correct copy of an Instrument as the same now remains
on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand hereto affixed this

a=t:>.

,\',lOM

day of~~~~.I.4.Jif-1<5
By

!c; ./v1)!
J";;;'

__A.D.. 20-4-

0.32
13.50
65.10
62.10
47.10
15.51
4.12
64.12
24.62
21.62
7.40
19.00
55.75

TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
P. O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0101

JUN 0 6 2011
SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Jo!ynn DfBg6, Cieri, District
Court Bj8int~ County; Id.e!'!~

Appellant,
DOCKET NO. 38769-2011

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

NOTICE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT LODGED

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on this date I lodged a
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL of 1109 pages in the
above-entitled appeal, with the Clerk of the District Court,
County of BLAINE, in the Fifth Judicial District.
E-Mail Deliveryto:sctfilings@idcourts.net.
DATED this 6th day of June, 2011.
.

..

_I

VI rg I n la Bal ey
__________

Digitally signed by Virginia Bailey
ON:cn:::::VirginiaBalley,Q,ou,

email..lJinnybailey@hotmail.com. c=us
0".:2011.06.0216:27:46-06'00'

Virginia M. Bailey, RPR, CSR No. 262
Official Court Reporter
Fifth Judicial District
State of Idaho

NOTICE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT LODGED

I N D E X

DATE OF HEARING

PAGE

October 1, 2009 - Status Conference
April 30, 2010 - Motion for Summary Dismissal
July 19, 2010

-

Status Conference

-

November 8 ,

2010

December 7 ,

2010 - Court Trial,

December 8,

2010

-

December 9,

2010

-

December 10, 2010

.

Pretrial Conference

-

7

17
96
112

Day 1

142

Court Trial,

Day 2

427

Court Trial,

Day 3

663

Court Trial,

2

Day 4

934

EXHIBIT LIST
Petitioner's Exhibits:
1. Reporter's Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings lodged December 4,
2003

2. Transcript of Trial Proceedings on CD
3. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn in Support of Post-Conviction Relief-NOT
ADMITTED
4. Photograph of Glen Aspen Drive diagram
5. Photograph of murder weapon at scene
6. Photograph of trash can at Johnson residence
7. Photograph of removed rifle scope on guest bed at Johnson residence
8. Photograph of cartridges from Winchester Super X Rifle
9. Consuela Cedeno's phone records
10. Jane Lopez's phone records
11. Bruno Santos' application for travel document
13. Transcript of police interview of Consuela Cedeno and Jane Lopez
14. Affidavit of Mark Rader, Co-Counsel for Bob Pangburn-NOT
ADMITTED
15. Bobby E. Pangburn's Disciplinary Order from Idaho Supreme Court
] 6. Attorney Roster Search, Bobby Eugene Pangburn-NOT ADMITTETJ
EXHIBIT LIST,

17. June 5,2009 Deposition of Bob Pangburn-NOT ADMITTED
18. Orchid Cellmark Laboratory Report, Bates Nos. 10017-10021
19. Blaine County Sheriff s Report 2/272009 identification of
fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill, Bates Nos. 003PC thru
0020PC
20. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 0021-PC thru 0028-PC
21. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 0029-PC thru 0092-PC
22. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of
Fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill with lab report, Bates Nos.
00094PC thru 00106PC
23. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 00108-PC thru 00123-PC
24. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of
Fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill, Bates Nos. 000124PC thru
00125PC
25. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 00126-PC thru 00132-PC
26. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 00133-PC thru 00139-PC
27. Blaine County Sheriffs Office Case Supplemental Report 11/022009
identification of fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill, with suspect
written alibi statement, Bates Nos. 000 140PC thru 00141 C- NOT
ADMITTED
28. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. unknown dates 1.27.092.11.09-NOT ADMITTED
31. Written statement of Julia Dupuis, Bates Nos. 000201-NOT
ADMITTED

EXHIBIT LIST 'a

32. ISP Chain of Custody for last date 11125/03, Bates Nos. 005988
33. ISP Forensic Services Latent Section case notes 11/25/03, Bates No.
004550-NOT ADMITTED
34. Transcript of interview with Bruno Santos held on September 3,
2003, Bates Nos. 002861-002922
35. Blaine County Sheriffs Department Report of Interview with Bruno
Santos on September 2,2003.
36. Transcript of taped telephone call Nikki Settle & Bruno Santos
37. Police report of Carlos Ayala interview Bates Nos. 003087
38. Resume of Robery J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert
39. Latent Fingerprint Cards (without Bates stamps)
40. Qwest telephone records

Respondent's (State's) Exhibits:
1002. AFIS printout dated 11129/2010

EXHIBIT LIST :3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Supreme Court No. 38769-2011
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

Respondent.

)

-------------------------)
STATE OF IDAHO)
) ss.
County of Blaine
)
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or
admitted in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record as required by Rule
31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereun 0 set my hand and affixed the seal of
day of
~
, 2011.
said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this

l

JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court

By

~

Andrea Logan, De uty Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1

{

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38769-2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-------------------------)
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any
Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:
State Appellate Public Defender's Office
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703

Attorney General's Office
Criminal Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

IN WITNE%S WHEREOF, I h j t hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
~
, 2011.
said Court this
day of

JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the District Court

~

By
Andrea Logan,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-1

eputy Clerk

